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[RFC,v7,0/8] Add NUMA mempolicy support for KVM guest-memfd

Message ID 20250408112402.181574-1-shivankg@amd.com
Headers show
Series Add NUMA mempolicy support for KVM guest-memfd | expand

Message

Shivank Garg April 8, 2025, 11:23 a.m. UTC
KVM's guest-memfd memory backend currently lacks support for NUMA policy
enforcement, causing guest memory allocations to be distributed arbitrarily
across host NUMA nodes regardless of the policy specified by the VMM. This
occurs because conventional userspace NUMA control mechanisms like mbind()
are ineffective with guest-memfd, as the memory isn't directly mapped to
userspace when allocations occur.

This patch-series adds NUMA-aware memory placement for guest_memfd backed
KVM guests. Based on community feedback, the approach has evolved as
follows:

- v1,v2: Extended the KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD IOCTL to pass mempolicy.
- v3: Introduced fbind() syscall for VMM memory-placement configuration.
- v4-v6: Current approach using shared_policy support and vm_ops (based on
         suggestions from David[1] and guest_memfd biweekly upstream
         calls[2][4]).
- v7: Use inodes to store NUMA policy instead of file[5].

== Implementation ==

This series implements proper NUMA policy support for guest-memfd by:

1. Adding mempolicy-aware allocation APIs to the filemap layer.
2. Add custom inodes (via a dedicated slab-allocated inode cache,
   kvm_gmem_inode_info) to store NUMA policy and metadata for guest memory.
3. Implementing get/set_policy vm_ops in guest_memfd to support shared policy.

With these changes, VMMs can now control guest memory placement by
specifying:
- Policy modes: default, bind, interleave, or preferred
- Host NUMA nodes: List of target nodes for memory allocation

Policies only affect future allocations and do not migrate existing memory.
This matches mbind(2)'s default behavior which affects only new allocations
unless overridden with MPOL_MF_MOVE/MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL flags (Not supported
for guest_memfd as it is unmovable).

This series builds on the existing guest-memfd support in KVM and provides
a clean integration path for NUMA-aware memory management in confidential
computing environments. The work is primarily focused on supporting SEV-SNP
requirements, though the benefits extend to any VMM using the guest-memfd
backend that needs control over guest memory placement.

== Example usage with QEMU (requires patched QEMU from [3]) ==

Snippet of the QEMU changes[3] needed to support this feature:

        /* Create and map guest-memfd region */
        new_block->guest_memfd = kvm_create_guest_memfd(
                                  new_block->max_length, 0, errp);
...
        void *ptr_memfd = mmap(NULL, new_block->max_length,
                               PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED,
                               new_block->guest_memfd, 0);
...
        /* Apply NUMA policy */
        int ret = mbind(ptr_memfd, new_block->max_length,
                        backend->policy, backend->host_nodes,
                        maxnode+1, 0);
...

QEMU Command to run SEV-SNP guest with interleaved memory across
nodes 0 and 1 of the host:

$ qemu-system-x86_64 \
   -enable-kvm \
  ...
   -machine memory-encryption=sev0,vmport=off \
   -object sev-snp-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=51,reduced-phys-bits=1 \
   -numa node,nodeid=0,memdev=ram0,cpus=0-15 \
   -object memory-backend-memfd,id=ram0,host-nodes=0-1,policy=interleave,size=1024M,share=true,prealloc=false

== Experiment and Analysis == 

SEV-SNP enabled host, AMD Zen 3, 2 socket 2 NUMA node system
NUMA for Policy Guest Node 0: policy=interleave, host-node=0-1

Test: Allocate and touch 50GB inside guest on node=0.


* Generic Kernel (without NUMA supported guest-memfd):
                          Node 0          Node 1           Total
Before running Test:
MemUsed                  9981.60         3312.00        13293.60
After running Test:
MemUsed                 61451.72         3201.62        64653.34

Arbitrary allocations: all ~50GB allocated on node 0.


* With NUMA supported guest-memfd:
                          Node 0          Node 1           Total
Before running Test:
MemUsed                  5003.88         3963.07         8966.94
After running Test:
MemUsed                 30607.55        29670.00        60277.55

Balanced memory distribution: Equal increase (~25GB) on both nodes.

== Conclusion ==

Adding the NUMA-aware memory management to guest_memfd will make a lot of
sense. Improving performance of memory-intensive and locality-sensitive
workloads with fine-grained control over guest memory allocations, as
pointed out in the analysis.

Please review and provide feedback!

Thanks,
Shivank

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/6fbef654-36e2-4be5-906e-2a648a845278@redhat.com
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/6f2bfac2-d9e7-4e4a-9298-7accded16b4f@redhat.com
[3] https://github.com/shivankgarg98/qemu/tree/guest_memfd_mbind_NUMA
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/all/2b77e055-98ac-43a1-a7ad-9f9065d7f38f@amd.com
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/all/diqzbjumm167.fsf@ackerleytng-ctop.c.googlers.com

== Earlier postings and changelogs ==

v7 (current):
- Add fixes suggested by Vlastimil and Ackerley.
- Store NUMA policy in custom inode struct instead of file.

v6:
- https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250226082549.6034-1-shivankg@amd.com
- Rebase to linux mainline
- Drop RFC tag
- Add selftests to ensure NUMA support for guest_memfd works correctly.

v5:
- https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250219101559.414878-1-shivankg@amd.com
- Fix documentation and style issues.
- Use EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL
- Split preparatory change in separate patch

v4:
- https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250210063227.41125-1-shivankg@amd.com
- Dropped fbind() approach in favor of shared policy support.

v3:
- https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241105164549.154700-1-shivankg@amd.com
- Introduce fbind() syscall and drop the IOCTL-based approach.

v2:
- https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240919094438.10987-1-shivankg@amd.com
- Add fixes suggested by Matthew Wilcox.

v1:
- https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240916165743.201087-1-shivankg@amd.com
- Proposed IOCTL based approach to pass NUMA mempolicy.

Ackerley Tng (1):
  KVM: guest_memfd: Make guest mem use guest mem inodes instead of
    anonymous inodes

Shivank Garg (6):
  mm/mempolicy: Export memory policy symbols
  security: Export security_inode_init_security_anon for KVM guest_memfd
  KVM: Add kvm_gmem_exit() cleanup function
  KVM: guest_memfd: Add slab-allocated inode cache
  KVM: guest_memfd: Enforce NUMA mempolicy using shared policy
  KVM: guest_memfd: selftests: Add tests for mmap and NUMA policy
    support

Shivansh Dhiman (1):
  mm/filemap: Add mempolicy support to the filemap layer

 include/linux/pagemap.h                       |  41 +++
 include/uapi/linux/magic.h                    |   1 +
 mm/filemap.c                                  |  27 +-
 mm/mempolicy.c                                |   6 +
 security/security.c                           |   1 +
 .../testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c  |  86 +++++-
 virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c                        | 261 ++++++++++++++++--
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c                           |   2 +
 virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h                             |   6 +
 9 files changed, 402 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

Comments

Paul Moore April 9, 2025, 8:19 p.m. UTC | #1
On Tue, Apr 8, 2025 at 7:25 AM Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com> wrote:
>
> KVM guest_memfd is implementing its own inodes to store metadata for
> backing memory using a custom filesystem. This requires the ability to
> initialize anonymous inode using security_inode_init_security_anon().
>
> As guest_memfd currently resides in the KVM module, we need to export this
> symbol for use outside the core kernel. In the future, guest_memfd might be
> moved to core-mm, at which point the symbols no longer would have to be
> exported. When/if that happens is still unclear.

Can you help me understand the timing just a bit more ... do you
expect the move to the core MM code to happen during the lifetime of
this patchset, or is it just some hand-wavy "future date"?  No worries
either way, just trying to understand things a bit better.

> Signed-off-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
> ---
>  security/security.c | 1 +
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index fb57e8fddd91..097283bb06a5 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1877,6 +1877,7 @@ int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
>         return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, inode, name,
>                              context_inode);
>  }
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security_anon);
>
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
>  /**
> --
> 2.34.1
Shivank Garg April 11, 2025, 6:07 a.m. UTC | #2
Hi Paul,

On 4/10/2025 1:49 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 8, 2025 at 7:25 AM Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com> wrote:
>>
>> KVM guest_memfd is implementing its own inodes to store metadata for
>> backing memory using a custom filesystem. This requires the ability to
>> initialize anonymous inode using security_inode_init_security_anon().
>>
>> As guest_memfd currently resides in the KVM module, we need to export this
>> symbol for use outside the core kernel. In the future, guest_memfd might be
>> moved to core-mm, at which point the symbols no longer would have to be
>> exported. When/if that happens is still unclear.
> 
> Can you help me understand the timing just a bit more ... do you
> expect the move to the core MM code to happen during the lifetime of
> this patchset, or is it just some hand-wavy "future date"?  No worries
> either way, just trying to understand things a bit better.

I am not sure about it, any ideas David?

Thanks,
Shivank

> 
>> Signed-off-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
>> ---
>>  security/security.c | 1 +
>>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>> index fb57e8fddd91..097283bb06a5 100644
>> --- a/security/security.c
>> +++ b/security/security.c
>> @@ -1877,6 +1877,7 @@ int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
>>         return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, inode, name,
>>                              context_inode);
>>  }
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security_anon);
>>
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
>>  /**
>> --
>> 2.34.1
>