| Message ID | 20240609104355.442002-1-jcalmels@3xx0.net |
|---|---|
| Headers | show |
| Series | Introduce user namespace capabilities | expand |
On Sun, Jun 09, 2024 at 03:43:34AM -0700, Jonathan Calmels wrote: (Adding amorgan as he doesn't seem to be on cc list) > Attackers often rely on user namespaces to get elevated (yet confined) > privileges in order to target specific subsystems (e.g. [1]). Distributions I'd modify this to say "in order to target *bugs* in specific subsystems" :) > have been pretty adamant that they need a way to configure these, most of > them carry out-of-tree patches to do so, or plainly refuse to enable them. > As a result, there have been multiple efforts over the years to introduce > various knobs to control and/or disable user namespaces (e.g. [2][3][4]). > > While we acknowledge that there are already ways to control the creation of > such namespaces (the most recent being a LSM hook), there are inherent > issues with these approaches. Preventing the user namespace creation is not > fine-grained enough, and in some cases, incompatible with various userspace > expectations (e.g. container runtimes, browser sandboxing, service > isolation) > > This patch addresses these limitations by introducing an additional > capability set used to restrict the permissions granted when creating user > namespaces. This way, processes can apply the principle of least privilege > by configuring only the capabilities they need for their namespaces. I think this is precisely the right thing to do. In each of these cases, there is a kernel bug in code which is only reachable with some CAP_X, regardless of which user namespace the CAP_X is targeted towards. So there's really no better way to resist this (apart from not having the bugs in the first place) than to allow CAP_X to be denied in unprivileged user namespaces. > For compatibility reasons, processes always start with a full userns > capability set. > > On namespace creation, the userns capability set (pU) is assigned to the > new effective (pE), permitted (pP) and bounding set (X) of the task: > > pU = pE = pP = X > > The userns capability set obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set > if it is not already part of the task’s bounding set. This ensures that > no namespace can ever gain more privileges than its predecessors. > Additionally, if a task is not privileged over CAP_SETPCAP, setting any bit > in the userns set requires its corresponding bit to be set in the permitted > set. This effectively mimics the inheritable set rules and means that, by > default, only root in the user namespace can regain userns capabilities > previously dropped: Something about this last sentence feels wrong, but I'm not sure what the best alternative would be. As is, though, it makes it sound as though root in the userns can always regain previously dropped capabilities, but that's not true if dropped in ancestor ns, or if root also dropped the bits from its bounding set (right?). > p’U = (pE & CAP_SETPCAP) ? X : (X & pP) > > Note that since userns capabilities are strictly hierarchical, policies can > be enforced at various levels (e.g. init, pam_cap) and inherited by every > child namespace. > > Here is a sample program that can be used to verify the functionality: > > /* > * Test program that drops CAP_SYS_RAWIO from subsequent user namespaces. > * > * ./cap_userns_test unshare -r grep Cap /proc/self/status > * CapInh: 0000000000000000 > * CapPrm: 000001fffffdffff > * CapEff: 000001fffffdffff > * CapBnd: 000001fffffdffff > * CapAmb: 0000000000000000 > * CapUNs: 000001fffffdffff > */ > > int main(int argc, char *argv[]) > { > if (prctl(PR_CAP_USERNS, PR_CAP_USERNS_LOWER, CAP_SYS_RAWIO, 0, 0) < 0) > err(1, "cannot drop userns cap"); > > execvp(argv[1], argv + 1); > err(1, "cannot exec"); > } > > [1] https://security.googleblog.com/2023/06/learnings-from-kctf-vrps-42-linux.html > [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1453502345-30416-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org > [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220815162028.926858-1-fred@cloudflare.com > [4] https://lore.kernel.org/containers/168547265011.24337.4306067683997517082-0@git.sr.ht > > Signed-off-by: Jonathan Calmels <jcalmels@3xx0.net> Thanks. Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > --- > Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 1 + > Documentation/security/credentials.rst | 6 +++ > fs/proc/array.c | 9 ++++ > include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++ > include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 7 +++ > kernel/cred.c | 3 ++ > kernel/umh.c | 15 +++++++ > kernel/user_namespace.c | 12 +++-- > security/commoncap.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > security/keys/process_keys.c | 3 ++ > 10 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst > index 7c3a565ffbef..b5de4eaf1b7b 100644 > --- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst > +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst > @@ -294,6 +294,7 @@ It's slow but very precise. > CapEff bitmap of effective capabilities > CapBnd bitmap of capabilities bounding set > CapAmb bitmap of ambient capabilities > + CapUns bitmap of user namespace capabilities > NoNewPrivs no_new_privs, like prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIV, ...) > Seccomp seccomp mode, like prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, ...) > Speculation_Store_Bypass speculative store bypass mitigation status > diff --git a/Documentation/security/credentials.rst b/Documentation/security/credentials.rst > index 357328d566c8..7ee904237023 100644 > --- a/Documentation/security/credentials.rst > +++ b/Documentation/security/credentials.rst > @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ The Linux kernel supports the following types of credentials: > - Set of permitted capabilities > - Set of inheritable capabilities > - Set of effective capabilities > + - Set of user namespace capabilities > - Capability bounding set > > These are only carried by tasks. They indicate superior capabilities > @@ -170,6 +171,11 @@ The Linux kernel supports the following types of credentials: > ``execve()``, especially when a binary is executed that will execute as > UID 0. > > + The user namespace set limits the capabilities granted to user namespaces. > + It defines what capabilities will be available in the other sets after > + creating a new user namespace, such as when calling ``clone()`` or > + ``unshare()`` with ``CLONE_NEWUSER``. > + > 3. Secure management flags (securebits). > > These are only carried by tasks. These govern the way the above > diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c > index 34a47fb0c57f..364e8bb19f9d 100644 > --- a/fs/proc/array.c > +++ b/fs/proc/array.c > @@ -313,6 +313,9 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) > const struct cred *cred; > kernel_cap_t cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_effective, > cap_bset, cap_ambient; > +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS > + kernel_cap_t cap_userns; > +#endif > > rcu_read_lock(); > cred = __task_cred(p); > @@ -321,6 +324,9 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) > cap_effective = cred->cap_effective; > cap_bset = cred->cap_bset; > cap_ambient = cred->cap_ambient; > +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS > + cap_userns = cred->cap_userns; > +#endif > rcu_read_unlock(); > > render_cap_t(m, "CapInh:\t", &cap_inheritable); > @@ -328,6 +334,9 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) > render_cap_t(m, "CapEff:\t", &cap_effective); > render_cap_t(m, "CapBnd:\t", &cap_bset); > render_cap_t(m, "CapAmb:\t", &cap_ambient); > +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS > + render_cap_t(m, "CapUNs:\t", &cap_userns); > +#endif > } > > static inline void task_seccomp(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) > diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h > index 2976f534a7a3..adab0031443e 100644 > --- a/include/linux/cred.h > +++ b/include/linux/cred.h > @@ -124,6 +124,9 @@ struct cred { > kernel_cap_t cap_effective; /* caps we can actually use */ > kernel_cap_t cap_bset; /* capability bounding set */ > kernel_cap_t cap_ambient; /* Ambient capability set */ > +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS > + kernel_cap_t cap_userns; /* User namespace capability set */ > +#endif > #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS > unsigned char jit_keyring; /* default keyring to attach requested > * keys to */ > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h > index 35791791a879..b58325ebdc9e 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h > @@ -198,6 +198,13 @@ struct prctl_mm_map { > # define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3 > # define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4 > > +/* Control the userns capability set */ > +#define PR_CAP_USERNS 48 > +# define PR_CAP_USERNS_IS_SET 1 > +# define PR_CAP_USERNS_RAISE 2 > +# define PR_CAP_USERNS_LOWER 3 > +# define PR_CAP_USERNS_CLEAR_ALL 4 > + > /* arm64 Scalable Vector Extension controls */ > /* Flag values must be kept in sync with ptrace NT_ARM_SVE interface */ > #define PR_SVE_SET_VL 50 /* set task vector length */ > diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c > index 075cfa7c896f..9912c6f3bc6b 100644 > --- a/kernel/cred.c > +++ b/kernel/cred.c > @@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ struct cred init_cred = { > .cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET, > .cap_effective = CAP_FULL_SET, > .cap_bset = CAP_FULL_SET, > +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS > + .cap_userns = CAP_FULL_SET, > +#endif > .user = INIT_USER, > .user_ns = &init_user_ns, > .group_info = &init_groups, > diff --git a/kernel/umh.c b/kernel/umh.c > index 598b3ffe1522..0a5a9cf10d83 100644 > --- a/kernel/umh.c > +++ b/kernel/umh.c > @@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ > > #include <trace/events/module.h> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS > +static kernel_cap_t usermodehelper_userns = CAP_FULL_SET; > +#endif > static kernel_cap_t usermodehelper_bset = CAP_FULL_SET; > static kernel_cap_t usermodehelper_inheritable = CAP_FULL_SET; > static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(umh_sysctl_lock); > @@ -94,6 +97,9 @@ static int call_usermodehelper_exec_async(void *data) > new->cap_bset = cap_intersect(usermodehelper_bset, new->cap_bset); > new->cap_inheritable = cap_intersect(usermodehelper_inheritable, > new->cap_inheritable); > +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS > + new->cap_userns = cap_intersect(usermodehelper_userns, new->cap_userns); > +#endif > spin_unlock(&umh_sysctl_lock); > > if (sub_info->init) { > @@ -560,6 +566,15 @@ static struct ctl_table usermodehelper_table[] = { > .mode = 0600, > .proc_handler = proc_cap_handler, > }, > +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS > + { > + .procname = "userns", > + .data = &usermodehelper_userns, > + .maxlen = 2 * sizeof(unsigned long), > + .mode = 0600, > + .proc_handler = proc_cap_handler, > + }, > +#endif > }; > > static int __init init_umh_sysctls(void) > diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c > index 0b0b95418b16..7e624607330b 100644 > --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c > +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c > @@ -42,15 +42,13 @@ static void dec_user_namespaces(struct ucounts *ucounts) > > static void set_cred_user_ns(struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *user_ns) > { > - /* Start with the same capabilities as init but useless for doing > - * anything as the capabilities are bound to the new user namespace. > - */ > - cred->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; > + /* Start with the capabilities defined in the userns set. */ > + cred->cap_bset = cred->cap_userns; > + cred->cap_permitted = cred->cap_userns; > + cred->cap_effective = cred->cap_userns; > cred->cap_inheritable = CAP_EMPTY_SET; > - cred->cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET; > - cred->cap_effective = CAP_FULL_SET; > cred->cap_ambient = CAP_EMPTY_SET; > - cred->cap_bset = CAP_FULL_SET; > + cred->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; > #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS > key_put(cred->request_key_auth); > cred->request_key_auth = NULL; > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c > index 162d96b3a676..59fafbfcfc5e 100644 > --- a/security/commoncap.c > +++ b/security/commoncap.c > @@ -214,10 +214,10 @@ int cap_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, > } > > /* > - * Determine whether the inheritable capabilities are limited to the old > + * Determine whether the capabilities are limited to the old > * permitted set. Returns 1 if they are limited, 0 if they are not. > */ > -static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) > +static inline int cap_is_capped(void) > { > /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP > * capability > @@ -228,6 +228,29 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) > return 1; > } > > +/* > + * Determine whether a userns capability can be raised. > + * Returns 1 if it can, 0 otherwise. > + */ > +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS > +static inline int cap_uns_is_raiseable(unsigned long cap) > +{ > + if (!!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_userns, cap)) > + return 1; > + > + /* > + * A capability cannot be raised unless the current task has it in > + * its bounding set and, without CAP_SETPCAP, its permitted set. > + */ > + if (!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_bset, cap)) > + return 0; > + if (cap_is_capped() && !cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_permitted, cap)) > + return 0; > + > + return 1; > +} > +#endif > + > /** > * cap_capset - Validate and apply proposed changes to current's capabilities > * @new: The proposed new credentials; alterations should be made here > @@ -246,7 +269,7 @@ int cap_capset(struct cred *new, > const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, > const kernel_cap_t *permitted) > { > - if (cap_inh_is_capped() && > + if (cap_is_capped() && > !cap_issubset(*inheritable, > cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable, > old->cap_permitted))) > @@ -1382,6 +1405,39 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, > return commit_creds(new); > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS > + case PR_CAP_USERNS: > + if (arg2 == PR_CAP_USERNS_CLEAR_ALL) { > + if (arg3 | arg4 | arg5) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + new = prepare_creds(); > + if (!new) > + return -ENOMEM; > + cap_clear(new->cap_userns); > + return commit_creds(new); > + } > + > + if (((!cap_valid(arg3)) | arg4 | arg5)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (arg2 == PR_CAP_USERNS_IS_SET) > + return !!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_userns, arg3); > + if (arg2 != PR_CAP_USERNS_RAISE && arg2 != PR_CAP_USERNS_LOWER) > + return -EINVAL; > + if (arg2 == PR_CAP_USERNS_RAISE && !cap_uns_is_raiseable(arg3)) > + return -EPERM; > + > + new = prepare_creds(); > + if (!new) > + return -ENOMEM; > + if (arg2 == PR_CAP_USERNS_RAISE) > + cap_raise(new->cap_userns, arg3); > + else > + cap_lower(new->cap_userns, arg3); > + return commit_creds(new); > +#endif > + > default: > /* No functionality available - continue with default */ > return -ENOSYS; > diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c > index b5d5333ab330..e3670d815435 100644 > --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c > +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c > @@ -944,6 +944,9 @@ void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork) > new->cap_effective = old->cap_effective; > new->cap_ambient = old->cap_ambient; > new->cap_bset = old->cap_bset; > +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS > + new->cap_userns = old->cap_userns; > +#endif > > new->jit_keyring = old->jit_keyring; > new->thread_keyring = key_get(old->thread_keyring); > -- > 2.45.2
On Mon, Jun 10, 2024 at 01:47:13AM -0700, Jonathan Calmels wrote: > On Sun, Jun 09, 2024 at 08:50:24PM GMT, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > On Sun, Jun 09, 2024 at 03:43:34AM -0700, Jonathan Calmels wrote: > > > Attackers often rely on user namespaces to get elevated (yet confined) > > > privileges in order to target specific subsystems (e.g. [1]). Distributions > > > > I'd modify this to say "in order to target *bugs* in specific subsystems" :) > > Ack > > > > This effectively mimics the inheritable set rules and means that, by > > > default, only root in the user namespace can regain userns capabilities > > > previously dropped: > > > > Something about this last sentence feels wrong, but I'm not sure what > > the best alternative would be. As is, though, it makes it sound as though > > root in the userns can always regain previously dropped capabilities, but > > that's not true if dropped in ancestor ns, or if root also dropped the > > bits from its bounding set (right?). > > Right, the wording is a little bit confusing here I admit. > What I meant to say is that if a cap is dropped in a *given* namespace, > then it can only be regained by root there. But yes, caps can never be > regained from ancestors ns. I'll try to rephrase it. > > BTW, this is rather strict, but I think that's what we want right, Yes, > something simple? Alternative would be to have a new cap masked off by > default, but if granted to a userns, allows you to regain ancestors > caps. we absolutely do not want to allow regaining caps dropped in an ancestor namespace. thanks, -serge
On Sun, Jun 09, 2024 at 03:43:33AM -0700, Jonathan Calmels wrote: > This patch series introduces a new user namespace capability set, as > well as some plumbing around it (i.e. sysctl, secbit, lsm support). > > First patch goes over the motivations for this as well as prior art. > > In summary, while user namespaces are a great success today in that they > avoid running a lot of code as root, they also expand the attack surface > of the kernel substantially which is often abused by attackers. > Methods exist to limit the creation of such namespaces [1], however, > application developers often need to assume that user namespaces are > available for various tasks such as sandboxing. Thus, instead of > restricting the creation of user namespaces, we offer ways for userspace > to limit the capabilities granted to them. > > Why a new capability set and not something specific to the userns (e.g. > ioctl_ns)? > > 1. We can't really expect userspace to patch every single callsite > and opt-in this new security mechanism. > > 2. We don't necessarily want policies enforced at said callsites. > For example a service like systemd-machined or a PAM session need to > be able to place restrictions on any namespace spawned under it. > > 3. We would need to come up with inheritance rules, querying > capabilities, etc. At this point we're just reinventing capability > sets. > > 4. We can easily define interactions between capability sets, thus > helping with adoption (patch 2 is an example of this) > > Some examples of how this could be leveraged in userspace: > > - Prevent user from getting CAP_NET_ADMIN in user namespaces under SSH: > echo "auth optional pam_cap.so" >> /etc/pam.d/sshd > echo "!cap_net_admin $USER" >> /etc/security/capability.conf > capsh --secbits=$((1 << 8)) -- -c /usr/sbin/sshd > > - Prevent containers from ever getting CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE: > systemd-run -p CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE \ > -p SecureBits=userns-strict-caps \ > /usr/bin/dockerd > systemd-run -p UserNSCapabilities=~CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE \ > /usr/bin/incusd > > - Kernel could be vulnerable to CAP_SYS_RAWIO exploits, prevent it: > sysctl -w cap_bound_userns_mask=0x1fffffdffff > > - Drop CAP_SYS_ADMIN for this shell and all the user namespaces below it: > bwrap --unshare-user --cap-drop CAP_SYS_ADMIN /bin/sh > Where are the tests for this patchset? I see you updated the bpf tests for the bpf lsm bits, but there's nothing to validate this new behavior or exercise the new ioctl you've added. Thanks, Josef
On Mon, Jun 10, 2024 at 08:00:57AM GMT, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > Now, one thing that does occur to me here is that there is a > very mild form of sendmail-capabilities vulnerability that > could happen here. Unpriv user joe can drop CAP_SYS_ADMIN > from cap_userns, then run a setuid-root program which starts > a container which expects CAP_SYS_ADMIN. This could be a > shared container, and so joe could be breaking expected > behavior there. > > I *think* we want to say we don't care about this case, but > if we did, I suppose we could say that the normal cap raise > rules on setuid should apply to cap_userns? > Right, good catch. If we do want to fix it, we could just check for setuid no? Or do we want to follow the normal root inheritance rules too? Essentially something like this: pU' = is_suid(root) ? X : pU
On Mon, Jun 10, 2024 at 04:12:27PM GMT, Josef Bacik wrote: > Where are the tests for this patchset? I see you updated the bpf tests for the > bpf lsm bits, but there's nothing to validate this new behavior or exercise the > new ioctl you've added. Thanks, Apologies, I haven't had much time to spend on it so I prioritized the rest. But yes, we should certainly update the capabilities selftests once we agreed on the different behaviors.
On Tue, Jun 11, 2024 at 01:20:40AM -0700, Jonathan Calmels wrote: > On Mon, Jun 10, 2024 at 08:00:57AM GMT, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > > Now, one thing that does occur to me here is that there is a > > very mild form of sendmail-capabilities vulnerability that > > could happen here. Unpriv user joe can drop CAP_SYS_ADMIN > > from cap_userns, then run a setuid-root program which starts > > a container which expects CAP_SYS_ADMIN. This could be a > > shared container, and so joe could be breaking expected > > behavior there. > > > > I *think* we want to say we don't care about this case, but > > if we did, I suppose we could say that the normal cap raise > > rules on setuid should apply to cap_userns? > > > > Right, good catch. If we do want to fix it, we could just check for > setuid no? Or do we want to follow the normal root inheritance rules > too? Essentially something like this: > > pU' = is_suid(root) ? X : pU Yeah, I think that makes sense. Thanks. -serge
This patch series introduces a new user namespace capability set, as well as some plumbing around it (i.e. sysctl, secbit, lsm support). First patch goes over the motivations for this as well as prior art. In summary, while user namespaces are a great success today in that they avoid running a lot of code as root, they also expand the attack surface of the kernel substantially which is often abused by attackers. Methods exist to limit the creation of such namespaces [1], however, application developers often need to assume that user namespaces are available for various tasks such as sandboxing. Thus, instead of restricting the creation of user namespaces, we offer ways for userspace to limit the capabilities granted to them. Why a new capability set and not something specific to the userns (e.g. ioctl_ns)? 1. We can't really expect userspace to patch every single callsite and opt-in this new security mechanism. 2. We don't necessarily want policies enforced at said callsites. For example a service like systemd-machined or a PAM session need to be able to place restrictions on any namespace spawned under it. 3. We would need to come up with inheritance rules, querying capabilities, etc. At this point we're just reinventing capability sets. 4. We can easily define interactions between capability sets, thus helping with adoption (patch 2 is an example of this) Some examples of how this could be leveraged in userspace: - Prevent user from getting CAP_NET_ADMIN in user namespaces under SSH: echo "auth optional pam_cap.so" >> /etc/pam.d/sshd echo "!cap_net_admin $USER" >> /etc/security/capability.conf capsh --secbits=$((1 << 8)) -- -c /usr/sbin/sshd - Prevent containers from ever getting CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE: systemd-run -p CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE \ -p SecureBits=userns-strict-caps \ /usr/bin/dockerd systemd-run -p UserNSCapabilities=~CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE \ /usr/bin/incusd - Kernel could be vulnerable to CAP_SYS_RAWIO exploits, prevent it: sysctl -w cap_bound_userns_mask=0x1fffffdffff - Drop CAP_SYS_ADMIN for this shell and all the user namespaces below it: bwrap --unshare-user --cap-drop CAP_SYS_ADMIN /bin/sh [1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=7cd4c5c2101cb092db00f61f69d24380cf7a0ee8 --- Changes since v1: - Add documentation - Change commit wording - Cleanup various aspects of the code based on feedback - Add new CAP_SYS_CONTROL capability for sysctl check - Add BPF-LSM support for modifying userns capabilities --- Jonathan Calmels (4): capabilities: Add user namespace capabilities capabilities: Add securebit to restrict userns caps capabilities: Add sysctl to mask off userns caps bpf,lsm: Allow editing capabilities in BPF-LSM hooks Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/credentials.rst | 6 ++ fs/proc/array.c | 9 +++ include/linux/cred.h | 3 + include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- include/linux/securebits.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 4 +- include/linux/user_namespace.h | 7 ++ include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 6 +- include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 7 ++ include/uapi/linux/securebits.h | 11 ++- kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 55 +++++++++++++ kernel/cred.c | 3 + kernel/sysctl.c | 10 +++ kernel/umh.c | 15 ++++ kernel/user_namespace.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++-- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +- security/commoncap.c | 62 +++++++++++++- security/keys/process_keys.c | 3 + security/security.c | 6 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 5 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/deny_namespace.c | 12 ++- .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_deny_namespace.c | 7 +- 24 files changed, 291 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)