| Message ID | 20220823152108.v2.3.Ieb1215f598bc9df56b0e29e5977eae4fcca25e15@changeid |
|---|---|
| State | Superseded |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Encrypted Hibernation | expand |
On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 03:25:19PM -0700, Evan Green wrote: > In addition to the private key and public key, the TPM2_Create > command may also return creation data, a creation hash, and a creation > ticket. These fields allow the TPM to attest to the contents of a > specified set of PCRs at the time the trusted key was created. Encrypted > hibernation will use this to ensure that PCRs settable only by the > kernel were set properly at the time of creation, indicating this is an > authentic hibernate key. > > Encode these additional parameters into the ASN.1 created to represent > the key blob. The new fields are made optional so that they don't bloat > key blobs which don't need them, and to ensure interoperability with > old blobs. > > --- > > (no changes since v1) > > This is a replacement for Matthew's original patch here: > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/12096489/ > > That patch was written before the exported key format was switched to > ASN.1. This patch accomplishes the same thing (saving, loading, and > getting pointers to the creation data) while utilizing the new ASN.1 > format. This part (between your S-o-b and the "---") should got below the "---" after your S-o-b, otherwise tooling will include it in the commit log (or lose your S-o-b). > > Signed-off-by: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org> > --- > include/keys/trusted-type.h | 8 + > security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 | 5 +- > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 202 +++++++++++++++++++--- > 3 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h > index 4eb64548a74f1a..209086fed240a5 100644 > --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h > +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h > @@ -22,15 +22,23 @@ > #define MAX_BLOB_SIZE 512 > #define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 64 > #define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64 > +#define MAX_CREATION_DATA 412 > +#define MAX_TK 76 > > struct trusted_key_payload { > struct rcu_head rcu; > unsigned int key_len; > unsigned int blob_len; > + unsigned int creation_len; > + unsigned int creation_hash_len; > + unsigned int tk_len; > unsigned char migratable; > unsigned char old_format; > unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1]; > unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE]; > + unsigned char *creation; > + unsigned char *creation_hash; > + unsigned char *tk; > }; > > struct trusted_key_options { > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 > index f57f869ad60068..1bfbf290e523a3 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 > @@ -7,5 +7,8 @@ TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE { > emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, > parent INTEGER ({tpm2_key_parent}), > pubkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_pub}), > - privkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_priv}) > + privkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_priv}), > + creationData [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL ({tpm2_key_creation_data}), > + creationHash [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL ({tpm2_key_creation_hash}), > + creationTk [3] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL ({tpm2_key_creation_tk}) > } Maybe include a link (or named reference) to these fields from the TPM spec? > [...] > @@ -46,6 +49,26 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > > pub_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2; > pub = src; > + src += pub_len; > + > + creation_data_len = get_unaligned_be16(src); > + if (creation_data_len) { > + creation_data_len += 2; > + creation_data = src; > + src += creation_data_len; > + > + creation_hash_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2; > + creation_hash = src; > + src += creation_hash_len; > + > + /* > + * The creation ticket (TPMT_TK_CREATION) consists of a 2 byte > + * tag, 4 byte handle, and then a TPM2B_DIGEST, which is a 2 > + * byte length followed by data. > + */ > + creation_tk_len = get_unaligned_be16(src + 6) + 8; > + creation_tk = src; > + } > > if (!scratch) > return -ENOMEM; I don't see anything in this code (even before your patch) actually checking length against the "len" argument to tpm2_key_encode(). I think that needs to be fixed so proper bounds checking can be done here. Otherwise how do we know if we're running off the end of "src"? Yes, I realize if we have a malicious TPM everything goes out the window, but TPMs don't always behave -- this code should likely be more defensive. Or, I've misunderstood where "src" is coming from. Regardless, my question stands: what is checking "len"? > @@ -63,26 +86,81 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > } > > /* > - * Assume both octet strings will encode to a 2 byte definite length > + * Assume each octet string will encode to a 2 byte definite length. > + * Each optional octet string consumes one extra byte. > * > - * Note: For a well behaved TPM, this warning should never > - * trigger, so if it does there's something nefarious going on > + * Note: For a well behaved TPM, this warning should never trigger, so > + * if it does there's something nefarious going on > */ > - if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 14 > SCRATCH_SIZE, > - "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) > - return -EINVAL; > + if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + creation_data_len + > + creation_hash_len + creation_tk_len + (7 * 5) + 3 > > + SCRATCH_SIZE, > + "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) { > + rc = -EINVAL; > + goto err; > + } > > work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle); > work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len); > work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len); > + if (creation_data_len) { > + u8 *scratch2 = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); > + u8 *work2; > + u8 *end_work2 = scratch2 + SCRATCH_SIZE; > + > + if (!scratch2) { > + rc = -ENOMEM; > + goto err; > + } > + > + work2 = asn1_encode_octet_string(scratch2, > + end_work2, > + creation_data, > + creation_data_len); > + > + work = asn1_encode_tag(work, > + end_work, > + 1, > + scratch2, > + work2 - scratch2); > + > + work2 = asn1_encode_octet_string(scratch2, > + end_work2, > + creation_hash, > + creation_hash_len); > + > + work = asn1_encode_tag(work, > + end_work, > + 2, > + scratch2, > + work2 - scratch2); > + > + work2 = asn1_encode_octet_string(scratch2, > + end_work2, > + creation_tk, > + creation_tk_len); > + > + work = asn1_encode_tag(work, > + end_work, > + 3, > + scratch2, > + work2 - scratch2); > + > + kfree(scratch2); > + } > > work1 = payload->blob; > work1 = asn1_encode_sequence(work1, work1 + sizeof(payload->blob), > scratch, work - scratch); > - if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed")) > - return PTR_ERR(work1); > + if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed")) { > + rc = PTR_ERR(work1); > + goto err; I find the addition of the word "BUG" in a WARN() to be confusing. :) I realize this is just copying the existing style, though. > + } > > return work1 - payload->blob; > +err: > + kfree(scratch); > + return rc; > } > > struct tpm2_key_context { > @@ -91,15 +169,21 @@ struct tpm2_key_context { > u32 pub_len; > const u8 *priv; > u32 priv_len; > + const u8 *creation_data; > + u32 creation_data_len; > + const u8 *creation_hash; > + u32 creation_hash_len; > + const u8 *creation_tk; > + u32 creation_tk_len; > }; > > static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > - struct trusted_key_options *options, > - u8 **buf) > + struct trusted_key_options *options) > { > + u64 data_len; > int ret; > struct tpm2_key_context ctx; > - u8 *blob; > + u8 *blob, *buf; > > memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); > > @@ -108,21 +192,57 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > if (ret < 0) > return ret; > > - if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) > + data_len = ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + ctx.creation_data_len + > + ctx.creation_hash_len + ctx.creation_tk_len; > + > + if (data_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) > return -EINVAL; > > - blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL); > - if (!blob) > + buf = kmalloc(data_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!buf) > return -ENOMEM; > > - *buf = blob; > + blob = buf; > options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; > > memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); > blob += ctx.priv_len; > > memcpy(blob, ctx.pub, ctx.pub_len); > + blob += ctx.pub_len; > + if (ctx.creation_data_len) { > + memcpy(blob, ctx.creation_data, ctx.creation_data_len); > + blob += ctx.creation_data_len; > + } > + > + if (ctx.creation_hash_len) { > + memcpy(blob, ctx.creation_hash, ctx.creation_hash_len); > + blob += ctx.creation_hash_len; > + } > > + if (ctx.creation_tk_len) { > + memcpy(blob, ctx.creation_tk, ctx.creation_tk_len); > + blob += ctx.creation_tk_len; > + } > + > + /* > + * Copy the buffer back into the payload blob since the creation > + * info will be used after loading. > + */ > + payload->blob_len = blob - buf; > + memcpy(payload->blob, buf, payload->blob_len); > + if (ctx.creation_data_len) { > + payload->creation = payload->blob + ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len; > + payload->creation_len = ctx.creation_data_len; > + payload->creation_hash = payload->creation + ctx.creation_data_len; > + payload->creation_hash_len = ctx.creation_hash_len; > + payload->tk = payload->creation_hash + > + payload->creation_hash_len; > + > + payload->tk_len = ctx.creation_tk_len; > + } > + > + kfree(buf); > return 0; > } > > @@ -185,6 +305,42 @@ int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen, > return 0; > } > > +int tpm2_key_creation_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen, > + unsigned char tag, > + const void *value, size_t vlen) > +{ > + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; > + > + ctx->creation_data = value; > + ctx->creation_data_len = vlen; > + > + return 0; > +} What is hdrlen here? Or rather, what kinds of bounds checking is needed here? > + > +int tpm2_key_creation_hash(void *context, size_t hdrlen, > + unsigned char tag, > + const void *value, size_t vlen) > +{ > + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; > + > + ctx->creation_hash = value; > + ctx->creation_hash_len = vlen; > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +int tpm2_key_creation_tk(void *context, size_t hdrlen, > + unsigned char tag, > + const void *value, size_t vlen) > +{ > + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; > + > + ctx->creation_tk = value; > + ctx->creation_tk_len = vlen; > + > + return 0; > +} > + > /** > * tpm_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer. > * > @@ -229,6 +385,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > struct trusted_key_options *options) > { > int blob_len = 0; > + unsigned int offset; > struct tpm_buf buf; > u32 hash; > u32 flags; > @@ -317,13 +474,14 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > rc = -E2BIG; > goto out; > } > - if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4 + blob_len) { > + offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4; > + if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < offset + blob_len) { > rc = -EFAULT; > goto out; > } > > blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, > - &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], > + &buf.data[offset], > blob_len); > > out: > @@ -370,13 +528,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > int rc; > u32 attrs; > > - rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob); > - if (rc) { > - /* old form */ > - blob = payload->blob; > + rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options); > + if (rc) > payload->old_format = 1; > - } > > + blob = payload->blob; > /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ > if (!options->keyhandle) > return -EINVAL; > @@ -433,8 +589,6 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); > > out: > - if (blob != payload->blob) > - kfree(blob); > tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); > > if (rc > 0) > -- > 2.31.0 > Otherwise looks good! -Kees
On Tue, Sep 20, 2022 at 4:04 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > > On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 03:25:19PM -0700, Evan Green wrote: > > In addition to the private key and public key, the TPM2_Create > > command may also return creation data, a creation hash, and a creation > > ticket. These fields allow the TPM to attest to the contents of a > > specified set of PCRs at the time the trusted key was created. Encrypted > > hibernation will use this to ensure that PCRs settable only by the > > kernel were set properly at the time of creation, indicating this is an > > authentic hibernate key. > > > > Encode these additional parameters into the ASN.1 created to represent > > the key blob. The new fields are made optional so that they don't bloat > > key blobs which don't need them, and to ensure interoperability with > > old blobs. > > > > --- > > > > (no changes since v1) > > > > This is a replacement for Matthew's original patch here: > > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/12096489/ > > > > That patch was written before the exported key format was switched to > > ASN.1. This patch accomplishes the same thing (saving, loading, and > > getting pointers to the creation data) while utilizing the new ASN.1 > > format. > > This part (between your S-o-b and the "---") should got below the "---" > after your S-o-b, otherwise tooling will include it in the commit log > (or lose your S-o-b). Will fix. > > > > > Signed-off-by: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org> > > --- > > include/keys/trusted-type.h | 8 + > > security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 | 5 +- > > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 202 +++++++++++++++++++--- > > 3 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h > > index 4eb64548a74f1a..209086fed240a5 100644 > > --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h > > +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h > > @@ -22,15 +22,23 @@ > > #define MAX_BLOB_SIZE 512 > > #define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 64 > > #define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64 > > +#define MAX_CREATION_DATA 412 > > +#define MAX_TK 76 > > > > struct trusted_key_payload { > > struct rcu_head rcu; > > unsigned int key_len; > > unsigned int blob_len; > > + unsigned int creation_len; > > + unsigned int creation_hash_len; > > + unsigned int tk_len; > > unsigned char migratable; > > unsigned char old_format; > > unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1]; > > unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE]; > > + unsigned char *creation; > > + unsigned char *creation_hash; > > + unsigned char *tk; > > }; > > > > struct trusted_key_options { > > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 > > index f57f869ad60068..1bfbf290e523a3 100644 > > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 > > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 > > @@ -7,5 +7,8 @@ TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE { > > emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, > > parent INTEGER ({tpm2_key_parent}), > > pubkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_pub}), > > - privkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_priv}) > > + privkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_priv}), > > + creationData [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL ({tpm2_key_creation_data}), > > + creationHash [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL ({tpm2_key_creation_hash}), > > + creationTk [3] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL ({tpm2_key_creation_tk}) > > } > > Maybe include a link (or named reference) to these fields from the TPM > spec? Sure. The TPM spec names their structure types (TPM2B_CREATION_DATA, TPM2B_DIGEST, etc), so I'll add comments with the names of the types as well as the command they came out of. > > > [...] > > @@ -46,6 +49,26 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > > > > pub_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2; > > pub = src; > > + src += pub_len; > > + > > + creation_data_len = get_unaligned_be16(src); > > + if (creation_data_len) { > > + creation_data_len += 2; > > + creation_data = src; > > + src += creation_data_len; > > + > > + creation_hash_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2; > > + creation_hash = src; > > + src += creation_hash_len; > > + > > + /* > > + * The creation ticket (TPMT_TK_CREATION) consists of a 2 byte > > + * tag, 4 byte handle, and then a TPM2B_DIGEST, which is a 2 > > + * byte length followed by data. > > + */ > > + creation_tk_len = get_unaligned_be16(src + 6) + 8; > > + creation_tk = src; > > + } > > > > if (!scratch) > > return -ENOMEM; > > I don't see anything in this code (even before your patch) actually > checking length against the "len" argument to tpm2_key_encode(). I think > that needs to be fixed so proper bounds checking can be done here. > Otherwise how do we know if we're running off the end of "src"? > > Yes, I realize if we have a malicious TPM everything goes out the > window, but TPMs don't always behave -- this code should likely be more > defensive. Or, I've misunderstood where "src" is coming from. > Regardless, my question stands: what is checking "len"? Sure, will add checks of len to my hunk and the bit above. > > > @@ -63,26 +86,81 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > > } > > > > /* > > - * Assume both octet strings will encode to a 2 byte definite length > > + * Assume each octet string will encode to a 2 byte definite length. > > + * Each optional octet string consumes one extra byte. > > * > > - * Note: For a well behaved TPM, this warning should never > > - * trigger, so if it does there's something nefarious going on > > + * Note: For a well behaved TPM, this warning should never trigger, so > > + * if it does there's something nefarious going on > > */ > > - if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 14 > SCRATCH_SIZE, > > - "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) > > - return -EINVAL; > > + if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + creation_data_len + > > + creation_hash_len + creation_tk_len + (7 * 5) + 3 > > > + SCRATCH_SIZE, > > + "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) { > > + rc = -EINVAL; > > + goto err; > > + } > > > > work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle); > > work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len); > > work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len); > > + if (creation_data_len) { > > + u8 *scratch2 = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); > > + u8 *work2; > > + u8 *end_work2 = scratch2 + SCRATCH_SIZE; > > + > > + if (!scratch2) { > > + rc = -ENOMEM; > > + goto err; > > + } > > + > > + work2 = asn1_encode_octet_string(scratch2, > > + end_work2, > > + creation_data, > > + creation_data_len); > > + > > + work = asn1_encode_tag(work, > > + end_work, > > + 1, > > + scratch2, > > + work2 - scratch2); > > + > > + work2 = asn1_encode_octet_string(scratch2, > > + end_work2, > > + creation_hash, > > + creation_hash_len); > > + > > + work = asn1_encode_tag(work, > > + end_work, > > + 2, > > + scratch2, > > + work2 - scratch2); > > + > > + work2 = asn1_encode_octet_string(scratch2, > > + end_work2, > > + creation_tk, > > + creation_tk_len); > > + > > + work = asn1_encode_tag(work, > > + end_work, > > + 3, > > + scratch2, > > + work2 - scratch2); > > + > > + kfree(scratch2); > > + } > > > > work1 = payload->blob; > > work1 = asn1_encode_sequence(work1, work1 + sizeof(payload->blob), > > scratch, work - scratch); > > - if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed")) > > - return PTR_ERR(work1); > > + if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed")) { > > + rc = PTR_ERR(work1); > > + goto err; > > I find the addition of the word "BUG" in a WARN() to be confusing. :) I > realize this is just copying the existing style, though. It wasn't my favorite either, but I felt an urge to be consistent. So far I've lft this as-is, holler if I should change it. > > > + } > > > > return work1 - payload->blob; > > +err: > > + kfree(scratch); > > + return rc; > > } > > > > struct tpm2_key_context { > > @@ -91,15 +169,21 @@ struct tpm2_key_context { > > u32 pub_len; > > const u8 *priv; > > u32 priv_len; > > + const u8 *creation_data; > > + u32 creation_data_len; > > + const u8 *creation_hash; > > + u32 creation_hash_len; > > + const u8 *creation_tk; > > + u32 creation_tk_len; > > }; > > > > static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > > - struct trusted_key_options *options, > > - u8 **buf) > > + struct trusted_key_options *options) > > { > > + u64 data_len; > > int ret; > > struct tpm2_key_context ctx; > > - u8 *blob; > > + u8 *blob, *buf; > > > > memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); > > > > @@ -108,21 +192,57 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > > if (ret < 0) > > return ret; > > > > - if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) > > + data_len = ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + ctx.creation_data_len + > > + ctx.creation_hash_len + ctx.creation_tk_len; > > + > > + if (data_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) > > return -EINVAL; > > > > - blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL); > > - if (!blob) > > + buf = kmalloc(data_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL); > > + if (!buf) > > return -ENOMEM; > > > > - *buf = blob; > > + blob = buf; > > options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; > > > > memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); > > blob += ctx.priv_len; > > > > memcpy(blob, ctx.pub, ctx.pub_len); > > + blob += ctx.pub_len; > > + if (ctx.creation_data_len) { > > + memcpy(blob, ctx.creation_data, ctx.creation_data_len); > > + blob += ctx.creation_data_len; > > + } > > + > > + if (ctx.creation_hash_len) { > > + memcpy(blob, ctx.creation_hash, ctx.creation_hash_len); > > + blob += ctx.creation_hash_len; > > + } > > > > + if (ctx.creation_tk_len) { > > + memcpy(blob, ctx.creation_tk, ctx.creation_tk_len); > > + blob += ctx.creation_tk_len; > > + } > > + > > + /* > > + * Copy the buffer back into the payload blob since the creation > > + * info will be used after loading. > > + */ > > + payload->blob_len = blob - buf; > > + memcpy(payload->blob, buf, payload->blob_len); > > + if (ctx.creation_data_len) { > > + payload->creation = payload->blob + ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len; > > + payload->creation_len = ctx.creation_data_len; > > + payload->creation_hash = payload->creation + ctx.creation_data_len; > > + payload->creation_hash_len = ctx.creation_hash_len; > > + payload->tk = payload->creation_hash + > > + payload->creation_hash_len; > > + > > + payload->tk_len = ctx.creation_tk_len; > > + } > > + > > + kfree(buf); > > return 0; > > } > > > > @@ -185,6 +305,42 @@ int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen, > > return 0; > > } > > > > +int tpm2_key_creation_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen, > > + unsigned char tag, > > + const void *value, size_t vlen) > > +{ > > + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; > > + > > + ctx->creation_data = value; > > + ctx->creation_data_len = vlen; > > + > > + return 0; > > +} > > What is hdrlen here? Or rather, what kinds of bounds checking is needed > here? The prototype of asn1_action_t looks like this: typedef int (*asn1_action_t)(void *context, size_t hdrlen, /* In case of ANY type */ unsigned char tag, /* In case of ANY type */ const void *value, size_t vlen); I'm not an ASN.1 expert, but from studying asn1_ber_decoder(), it looks like the core unit of an ASN.1 thing is a TLV, and hdrlen represents the number of bytes in the datastream that make up the {TL} portion. Based on the ANY comment above this seems to maybe be useful for certain generic/undefined object types, but I think it's not relevant to the types we're using. The vlen arg is the L value of the TLV, which is what we save away in tpm2_key_context. In asn1_ber_decoder(), I do see checks that what they pass for vlen stays within the bounds of the source data buffer (since I knew you'd ask :)). > > > + > > +int tpm2_key_creation_hash(void *context, size_t hdrlen, > > + unsigned char tag, > > + const void *value, size_t vlen) > > +{ > > + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; > > + > > + ctx->creation_hash = value; > > + ctx->creation_hash_len = vlen; > > + > > + return 0; > > +} > > + > > +int tpm2_key_creation_tk(void *context, size_t hdrlen, > > + unsigned char tag, > > + const void *value, size_t vlen) > > +{ > > + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; > > + > > + ctx->creation_tk = value; > > + ctx->creation_tk_len = vlen; > > + > > + return 0; > > +} > > + > > /** > > * tpm_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer. > > * > > @@ -229,6 +385,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > struct trusted_key_options *options) > > { > > int blob_len = 0; > > + unsigned int offset; > > struct tpm_buf buf; > > u32 hash; > > u32 flags; > > @@ -317,13 +474,14 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > rc = -E2BIG; > > goto out; > > } > > - if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4 + blob_len) { > > + offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4; > > + if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < offset + blob_len) { > > rc = -EFAULT; > > goto out; > > } > > > > blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, > > - &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], > > + &buf.data[offset], > > blob_len); > > > > out: > > @@ -370,13 +528,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > int rc; > > u32 attrs; > > > > - rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob); > > - if (rc) { > > - /* old form */ > > - blob = payload->blob; > > + rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options); > > + if (rc) > > payload->old_format = 1; > > - } > > > > + blob = payload->blob; > > /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ > > if (!options->keyhandle) > > return -EINVAL; > > @@ -433,8 +589,6 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); > > > > out: > > - if (blob != payload->blob) > > - kfree(blob); > > tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); > > > > if (rc > 0) > > -- > > 2.31.0 > > > > Otherwise looks good! Thank you for reviewing it! -Evan
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index 4eb64548a74f1a..209086fed240a5 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -22,15 +22,23 @@ #define MAX_BLOB_SIZE 512 #define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 64 #define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64 +#define MAX_CREATION_DATA 412 +#define MAX_TK 76 struct trusted_key_payload { struct rcu_head rcu; unsigned int key_len; unsigned int blob_len; + unsigned int creation_len; + unsigned int creation_hash_len; + unsigned int tk_len; unsigned char migratable; unsigned char old_format; unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1]; unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE]; + unsigned char *creation; + unsigned char *creation_hash; + unsigned char *tk; }; struct trusted_key_options { diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 index f57f869ad60068..1bfbf290e523a3 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 @@ -7,5 +7,8 @@ TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE { emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, parent INTEGER ({tpm2_key_parent}), pubkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_pub}), - privkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_priv}) + privkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_priv}), + creationData [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL ({tpm2_key_creation_data}), + creationHash [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL ({tpm2_key_creation_hash}), + creationTk [3] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL ({tpm2_key_creation_tk}) } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 2b2c8eb258d5bd..1f166d4fa307a9 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -37,7 +37,10 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, u8 *work = scratch, *work1; u8 *end_work = scratch + SCRATCH_SIZE; u8 *priv, *pub; + u8 *creation_data = NULL, *creation_hash = NULL, *creation_tk = NULL; + u16 creation_data_len, creation_hash_len = 0, creation_tk_len = 0; u16 priv_len, pub_len; + int rc; priv_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2; priv = src; @@ -46,6 +49,26 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, pub_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2; pub = src; + src += pub_len; + + creation_data_len = get_unaligned_be16(src); + if (creation_data_len) { + creation_data_len += 2; + creation_data = src; + src += creation_data_len; + + creation_hash_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2; + creation_hash = src; + src += creation_hash_len; + + /* + * The creation ticket (TPMT_TK_CREATION) consists of a 2 byte + * tag, 4 byte handle, and then a TPM2B_DIGEST, which is a 2 + * byte length followed by data. + */ + creation_tk_len = get_unaligned_be16(src + 6) + 8; + creation_tk = src; + } if (!scratch) return -ENOMEM; @@ -63,26 +86,81 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, } /* - * Assume both octet strings will encode to a 2 byte definite length + * Assume each octet string will encode to a 2 byte definite length. + * Each optional octet string consumes one extra byte. * - * Note: For a well behaved TPM, this warning should never - * trigger, so if it does there's something nefarious going on + * Note: For a well behaved TPM, this warning should never trigger, so + * if it does there's something nefarious going on */ - if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 14 > SCRATCH_SIZE, - "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) - return -EINVAL; + if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + creation_data_len + + creation_hash_len + creation_tk_len + (7 * 5) + 3 > + SCRATCH_SIZE, + "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto err; + } work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle); work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len); work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len); + if (creation_data_len) { + u8 *scratch2 = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + u8 *work2; + u8 *end_work2 = scratch2 + SCRATCH_SIZE; + + if (!scratch2) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + + work2 = asn1_encode_octet_string(scratch2, + end_work2, + creation_data, + creation_data_len); + + work = asn1_encode_tag(work, + end_work, + 1, + scratch2, + work2 - scratch2); + + work2 = asn1_encode_octet_string(scratch2, + end_work2, + creation_hash, + creation_hash_len); + + work = asn1_encode_tag(work, + end_work, + 2, + scratch2, + work2 - scratch2); + + work2 = asn1_encode_octet_string(scratch2, + end_work2, + creation_tk, + creation_tk_len); + + work = asn1_encode_tag(work, + end_work, + 3, + scratch2, + work2 - scratch2); + + kfree(scratch2); + } work1 = payload->blob; work1 = asn1_encode_sequence(work1, work1 + sizeof(payload->blob), scratch, work - scratch); - if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed")) - return PTR_ERR(work1); + if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed")) { + rc = PTR_ERR(work1); + goto err; + } return work1 - payload->blob; +err: + kfree(scratch); + return rc; } struct tpm2_key_context { @@ -91,15 +169,21 @@ struct tpm2_key_context { u32 pub_len; const u8 *priv; u32 priv_len; + const u8 *creation_data; + u32 creation_data_len; + const u8 *creation_hash; + u32 creation_hash_len; + const u8 *creation_tk; + u32 creation_tk_len; }; static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options, - u8 **buf) + struct trusted_key_options *options) { + u64 data_len; int ret; struct tpm2_key_context ctx; - u8 *blob; + u8 *blob, *buf; memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); @@ -108,21 +192,57 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, if (ret < 0) return ret; - if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) + data_len = ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + ctx.creation_data_len + + ctx.creation_hash_len + ctx.creation_tk_len; + + if (data_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) return -EINVAL; - blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!blob) + buf = kmalloc(data_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) return -ENOMEM; - *buf = blob; + blob = buf; options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); blob += ctx.priv_len; memcpy(blob, ctx.pub, ctx.pub_len); + blob += ctx.pub_len; + if (ctx.creation_data_len) { + memcpy(blob, ctx.creation_data, ctx.creation_data_len); + blob += ctx.creation_data_len; + } + + if (ctx.creation_hash_len) { + memcpy(blob, ctx.creation_hash, ctx.creation_hash_len); + blob += ctx.creation_hash_len; + } + if (ctx.creation_tk_len) { + memcpy(blob, ctx.creation_tk, ctx.creation_tk_len); + blob += ctx.creation_tk_len; + } + + /* + * Copy the buffer back into the payload blob since the creation + * info will be used after loading. + */ + payload->blob_len = blob - buf; + memcpy(payload->blob, buf, payload->blob_len); + if (ctx.creation_data_len) { + payload->creation = payload->blob + ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len; + payload->creation_len = ctx.creation_data_len; + payload->creation_hash = payload->creation + ctx.creation_data_len; + payload->creation_hash_len = ctx.creation_hash_len; + payload->tk = payload->creation_hash + + payload->creation_hash_len; + + payload->tk_len = ctx.creation_tk_len; + } + + kfree(buf); return 0; } @@ -185,6 +305,42 @@ int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen, return 0; } +int tpm2_key_creation_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->creation_data = value; + ctx->creation_data_len = vlen; + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_creation_hash(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->creation_hash = value; + ctx->creation_hash_len = vlen; + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_creation_tk(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->creation_tk = value; + ctx->creation_tk_len = vlen; + + return 0; +} + /** * tpm_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer. * @@ -229,6 +385,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_options *options) { int blob_len = 0; + unsigned int offset; struct tpm_buf buf; u32 hash; u32 flags; @@ -317,13 +474,14 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, rc = -E2BIG; goto out; } - if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4 + blob_len) { + offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4; + if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < offset + blob_len) { rc = -EFAULT; goto out; } blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, - &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], + &buf.data[offset], blob_len); out: @@ -370,13 +528,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, int rc; u32 attrs; - rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob); - if (rc) { - /* old form */ - blob = payload->blob; + rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options); + if (rc) payload->old_format = 1; - } + blob = payload->blob; /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ if (!options->keyhandle) return -EINVAL; @@ -433,8 +589,6 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); out: - if (blob != payload->blob) - kfree(blob); tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); if (rc > 0)
In addition to the private key and public key, the TPM2_Create command may also return creation data, a creation hash, and a creation ticket. These fields allow the TPM to attest to the contents of a specified set of PCRs at the time the trusted key was created. Encrypted hibernation will use this to ensure that PCRs settable only by the kernel were set properly at the time of creation, indicating this is an authentic hibernate key. Encode these additional parameters into the ASN.1 created to represent the key blob. The new fields are made optional so that they don't bloat key blobs which don't need them, and to ensure interoperability with old blobs. --- (no changes since v1) This is a replacement for Matthew's original patch here: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/12096489/ That patch was written before the exported key format was switched to ASN.1. This patch accomplishes the same thing (saving, loading, and getting pointers to the creation data) while utilizing the new ASN.1 format. Signed-off-by: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org> --- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 8 + security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 | 5 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 202 +++++++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)