Message ID | 20220419160407.1740458-1-Jason@zx2c4.com |
---|---|
State | New |
Headers | show |
Series | random: add fork_event sysctl for polling VM forks | expand |
Hey again, On Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 02:15:45AM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > Hi Jann, > > On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 9:45 PM Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> wrote: > > AFAIK this also means that if you make an epoll watch for > > /proc/sys/kernel/random/fork_event, and then call poll() *on the epoll > > fd* for some reason, that will probably already consume the event; and > > if you then try to actually receive the epoll event via epoll_wait(), > > it'll already be gone (because epoll tries to re-poll the "ready" > > files to figure out what state those files are at now). Similarly if > > you try to create an epoll watch for an FD that already has an event > > pending: Installing the watch will call the ->poll handler once, > > resetting the file's state, and the following epoll_wait() will call > > ->poll again and think the event is already gone. See the call paths > > to vfs_poll() in fs/eventpoll.c. > > > > Maybe we don't care about such exotic usage, and are willing to accept > > the UAPI inconsistency and slight epoll breakage of plumbing > > edge-triggered polling through APIs designed for level-triggered > > polling. IDK. > > Hmm, I see. The thing is, this is _already_ what's done for > domainname/hostname. It's how the sysctl poll handler was "designed". > So our options here are: > > a) Remove this quirky behavior from domainname/hostname and start > over. This would potentially break userspace, but maybe nobody uses > this? No idea, but sounds risky. > > b) Apply this commit as-is, because it's using the API as the API was > designed, and call it a day. > > c) Apply this commit as-is, because it's using the API as the API was > designed, and then later try to fix up the epoll behavior on this. > > Of these, (a) seems like a non-starter. (c) is most appealing, but it > sounds like it might not actually be possible? > > Jason I actually tried to verify your concern but didn't have success doing so. Both of these worked: int efd = epoll_create1(0); assert(efd >= 0); struct epoll_event event = { .data.fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/random/fork_event", O_RDONLY) }; assert(event.data.fd >= 0); assert(epoll_ctl(efd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, event.data.fd, &event) == 0); for (;;) { assert(epoll_wait(efd, &event, 1, -1) == 1); puts("vm fork detected"); } And: int efd = epoll_create1(0); assert(efd >= 0); struct epoll_event event = { .data.fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/random/fork_event", O_RDONLY) }; assert(event.data.fd >= 0); assert(epoll_ctl(efd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, event.data.fd, &event) == 0); for (;;) { assert(poll(&(struct pollfd){ .fd = efd, .events = POLLIN }, 1, -1) == 1); puts("vm fork detected"); } It also worked if I added EPOLLET to the epoll_event. It did not work if I removed POLLIN from the pollfd event. Maybe I'm missing some subtlety. But what exactly is broken? (Either way, it doesn't change the (a) vs (c) calculus in my previous email.) Jason
Hey Jann, Ahh, gotcha, that makes sense. Either way, sounds like something to fix in the sysctl proc API (option c) if possible... Jason
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst index 1144ea3229a3..ddbd603f0be7 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst @@ -1001,7 +1001,7 @@ This is a directory, with the following entries: * ``urandom_min_reseed_secs``: obsolete (used to determine the minimum number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect - on any RNG behavior. + on any RNG behavior; * ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can thus be used to generate UUIDs at will); @@ -1009,8 +1009,10 @@ This is a directory, with the following entries: * ``write_wakeup_threshold``: when the entropy count drops below this (as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to ``/dev/random`` are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but - writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior. + writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior; +* ``fork_event``: unreadable, but can be poll()'d on for notifications + delivered after the RNG reseeds following a virtual machine fork. randomize_va_space ================== diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index bf89c6f27a19..63fba6f042f7 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1187,6 +1187,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMGENID) static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(vmfork_chain); +static DEFINE_CTL_TABLE_POLL(sysctl_fork_event_poll); /* * Handle a new unique VM ID, which is unique, not secret, so we @@ -1201,6 +1202,8 @@ void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t size) pr_notice("crng reseeded due to virtual machine fork\n"); } blocking_notifier_call_chain(&vmfork_chain, 0, NULL); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SYSCTL)) + proc_sys_poll_notify(&sysctl_fork_event_poll); } #if IS_MODULE(CONFIG_VMGENID) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_vmfork_randomness); @@ -1655,6 +1658,8 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { * It is writable to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing * to it does not change any behavior of the RNG. * + * - fork_event - an unreadable file that can be poll()'d on for VM forks. + * ********************************************************************/ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL @@ -1708,6 +1713,14 @@ static int proc_do_rointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer, return write ? 0 : proc_dointvec(table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos); } +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMGENID) +static int proc_do_nodata(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer, + size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +{ + return -ENODATA; +} +#endif + static struct ctl_table random_table[] = { { .procname = "poolsize", @@ -1748,6 +1761,14 @@ static struct ctl_table random_table[] = { .mode = 0444, .proc_handler = proc_do_uuid, }, +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMGENID) + { + .procname = "fork_event", + .mode = 0444, + .poll = &sysctl_fork_event_poll, + .proc_handler = proc_do_nodata, + }, +#endif { } };
In order to inform userspace of virtual machine forks, this commit adds a "fork_event" sysctl, which does not return any data, but allows userspace processes to poll() on it for notification of VM forks. It avoids exposing the actual vmgenid from the hypervisor to userspace, in case there is any randomness value in keeping it secret. Rather, userspace is expected to simply use getrandom() if it wants a fresh value. For example, the following snippet can be used to print a message every time a VM forks, after the RNG has been reseeded: struct pollfd fd = { .fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/random/fork_event", O_RDONLY) }; assert(fd.fd >= 0); for (;;) { assert(poll(&fd, 1, -1) > 0); puts("vm fork detected"); } Various programs and libraries that utilize cryptographic operations depending on fresh randomness can invalidate old keys or take other appropriate actions when receiving that event. While this is racier than allowing userspace to mmap/vDSO the vmgenid itself, it's an incremental step forward that's not as heavyweight. Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Colm MacCarthaigh <colmmacc@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> --- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 6 ++++-- drivers/char/random.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)