| Message ID | 20220408210545.3915712-1-vannapurve@google.com |
|---|---|
| Headers | show |
| Series | selftests: KVM: selftests for fd-based approach of supporting private memory | expand |
On 4/9/2022 2:35 AM, Vishal Annapurve wrote: > This series implements selftests targeting the feature floated by Chao > via: > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20220310140911.50924-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com/ > Thanks for working on this. > Below changes aim to test the fd based approach for guest private memory > in context of normal (non-confidential) VMs executing on non-confidential > platforms. > > Confidential platforms along with the confidentiality aware software > stack support a notion of private/shared accesses from the confidential > VMs. > Generally, a bit in the GPA conveys the shared/private-ness of the > access. Non-confidential platforms don't have a notion of private or > shared accesses from the guest VMs. To support this notion, > KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE > is modified to allow marking an access from a VM within a GPA range as > always shared or private. Any suggestions regarding implementing this ioctl > alternatively/cleanly are appreciated. > > priv_memfd_test.c file adds a suite of two basic selftests to access private > memory from the guest via private/shared access and checking if the contents > can be leaked to/accessed by vmm via shared memory view. > > Test results: > 1) PMPAT - PrivateMemoryPrivateAccess test passes > 2) PMSAT - PrivateMemorySharedAccess test fails currently and needs more > analysis to understand the reason of failure. That could be because of the return code (*r = -1) from the KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_ERROR. This gets interpreted as -EPERM in the VMM when the vcpu_run exits. + vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_ERROR; + vcpu->run->memory.flags = flags; + vcpu->run->memory.padding = 0; + vcpu->run->memory.gpa = fault->gfn << PAGE_SHIFT; + vcpu->run->memory.size = PAGE_SIZE; + fault->pfn = -1; + *r = -1; + return true; Regards Nikunj [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220310140911.50924-10-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com/#t
On Mon, Apr 11, 2022 at 05:31:09PM +0530, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote: > On 4/9/2022 2:35 AM, Vishal Annapurve wrote: > > This series implements selftests targeting the feature floated by Chao > > via: > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20220310140911.50924-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com/ > > > > Thanks for working on this. > > > Below changes aim to test the fd based approach for guest private memory > > in context of normal (non-confidential) VMs executing on non-confidential > > platforms. > > > > Confidential platforms along with the confidentiality aware software > > stack support a notion of private/shared accesses from the confidential > > VMs. > > Generally, a bit in the GPA conveys the shared/private-ness of the > > access. Non-confidential platforms don't have a notion of private or > > shared accesses from the guest VMs. To support this notion, > > KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE > > is modified to allow marking an access from a VM within a GPA range as > > always shared or private. Any suggestions regarding implementing this ioctl > > alternatively/cleanly are appreciated. > > > > priv_memfd_test.c file adds a suite of two basic selftests to access private > > memory from the guest via private/shared access and checking if the contents > > can be leaked to/accessed by vmm via shared memory view. > > > > Test results: > > 1) PMPAT - PrivateMemoryPrivateAccess test passes > > 2) PMSAT - PrivateMemorySharedAccess test fails currently and needs more > > analysis to understand the reason of failure. > > That could be because of the return code (*r = -1) from the KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_ERROR. > This gets interpreted as -EPERM in the VMM when the vcpu_run exits. > > + vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_ERROR; > + vcpu->run->memory.flags = flags; > + vcpu->run->memory.padding = 0; > + vcpu->run->memory.gpa = fault->gfn << PAGE_SHIFT; > + vcpu->run->memory.size = PAGE_SIZE; > + fault->pfn = -1; > + *r = -1; > + return true; That's true. The current private mem patch treats KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_ERROR as error for KVM_RUN. That behavior needs to be discussed, but right now (v5) it hits the ASSERT in tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c before you have chance to handle KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_ERROR in this patch series. void vcpu_run(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpuid) { int ret = _vcpu_run(vm, vcpuid); TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0, "KVM_RUN IOCTL failed, " "rc: %i errno: %i", ret, errno); } Thanks, Chao > > > Regards > Nikunj > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220310140911.50924-10-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com/#t
On Fri, Apr 8, 2022, at 2:05 PM, Vishal Annapurve wrote: > This series implements selftests targeting the feature floated by Chao > via: > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20220310140911.50924-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com/ > > Below changes aim to test the fd based approach for guest private memory > in context of normal (non-confidential) VMs executing on non-confidential > platforms. > > Confidential platforms along with the confidentiality aware software > stack support a notion of private/shared accesses from the confidential > VMs. > Generally, a bit in the GPA conveys the shared/private-ness of the > access. Non-confidential platforms don't have a notion of private or > shared accesses from the guest VMs. To support this notion, > KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE > is modified to allow marking an access from a VM within a GPA range as > always shared or private. Any suggestions regarding implementing this ioctl > alternatively/cleanly are appreciated. This is fantastic. I do think we need to decide how this should work in general. We have a few platforms with somewhat different properties: TDX: The guest decides, per memory access (using a GPA bit), whether an access is private or shared. In principle, the same address could be *both* and be distinguished by only that bit, and the two addresses would refer to different pages. SEV: The guest decides, per memory access (using a GPA bit), whether an access is private or shared. At any given time, a physical address (with that bit masked off) can be private, shared, or invalid, but it can't be valid as private and shared at the same time. pKVM (currently, as I understand it): the guest decides by hypercall, in advance of an access, which addresses are private and which are shared. This series, if I understood it correctly, is like TDX except with no hardware security. Sean or Chao, do you have a clear sense of whether the current fd-based private memory proposal can cleanly support SEV and pKVM? What, if anything, needs to be done on the API side to get that working well? I don't think we need to support SEV or pKVM right away to get this merged, but I do think we should understand how the API can map to them.
On Tue, Apr 12, 2022 at 05:16:22PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Fri, Apr 8, 2022, at 2:05 PM, Vishal Annapurve wrote: > > This series implements selftests targeting the feature floated by Chao > > via: > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20220310140911.50924-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com/ > > > > Below changes aim to test the fd based approach for guest private memory > > in context of normal (non-confidential) VMs executing on non-confidential > > platforms. > > > > Confidential platforms along with the confidentiality aware software > > stack support a notion of private/shared accesses from the confidential > > VMs. > > Generally, a bit in the GPA conveys the shared/private-ness of the > > access. Non-confidential platforms don't have a notion of private or > > shared accesses from the guest VMs. To support this notion, > > KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE > > is modified to allow marking an access from a VM within a GPA range as > > always shared or private. Any suggestions regarding implementing this ioctl > > alternatively/cleanly are appreciated. > > This is fantastic. I do think we need to decide how this should work in general. We have a few platforms with somewhat different properties: > > TDX: The guest decides, per memory access (using a GPA bit), whether an access is private or shared. In principle, the same address could be *both* and be distinguished by only that bit, and the two addresses would refer to different pages. > > SEV: The guest decides, per memory access (using a GPA bit), whether an access is private or shared. At any given time, a physical address (with that bit masked off) can be private, shared, or invalid, but it can't be valid as private and shared at the same time. > > pKVM (currently, as I understand it): the guest decides by hypercall, in advance of an access, which addresses are private and which are shared. > > This series, if I understood it correctly, is like TDX except with no hardware security. > > Sean or Chao, do you have a clear sense of whether the current fd-based private memory proposal can cleanly support SEV and pKVM? What, if anything, needs to be done on the API side to get that working well? I don't think we need to support SEV or pKVM right away to get this merged, but I do think we should understand how the API can map to them. I've been looking at porting the SEV-SNP hypervisor patches over to using memfd, and I hit an issue that I think is generally applicable to SEV/SEV-ES as well. Namely at guest init time we have something like the following flow: VMM: - allocate shared memory to back the guest and map it into guest address space - initialize shared memory with initialize memory contents (namely the BIOS) - ask KVM to encrypt these pages in-place and measure them to generate the initial measured payload for attestation, via KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE with the GPA for each range of memory to encrypt. KVM: - issue SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE firmware command, which takes an HPA as input and does an in-place encryption/measure of the page. With current v5 of the memfd/UPM series, I think the expected flow is that we would fallocate() these ranges from the private fd backend in advance of calling KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE (if VMM does it after we'd destroy the initial guest payload, since they'd be replaced by newly-allocated pages). But if VMM does it before, VMM has no way to initialize the guest memory contents, since mmap()/pwrite() are disallowed due to MFD_INACCESSIBLE. I think something similar to your proposal[1] here of making pread()/pwrite() possible for private-fd-backed memory that's been flagged as "shareable" would work for this case. Although here the "shareable" flag could be removed immediately upon successful completion of the SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE firmware command. I think with TDX this isn't an issue because their analagous TDH.MEM.PAGE.ADD seamcall takes a pair of source/dest HPA as input params, so the VMM wouldn't need write access to dest HPA at any point, just source HPA. [1] https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/eefc3c74-acca-419c-8947-726ce2458446@www.fastmail.com/
On Wed, Apr 13, 2022 at 08:42:00AM -0500, Michael Roth wrote: > On Tue, Apr 12, 2022 at 05:16:22PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > On Fri, Apr 8, 2022, at 2:05 PM, Vishal Annapurve wrote: > > > This series implements selftests targeting the feature floated by Chao > > > via: > > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20220310140911.50924-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com/ > > > > > > Below changes aim to test the fd based approach for guest private memory > > > in context of normal (non-confidential) VMs executing on non-confidential > > > platforms. > > > > > > Confidential platforms along with the confidentiality aware software > > > stack support a notion of private/shared accesses from the confidential > > > VMs. > > > Generally, a bit in the GPA conveys the shared/private-ness of the > > > access. Non-confidential platforms don't have a notion of private or > > > shared accesses from the guest VMs. To support this notion, > > > KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE > > > is modified to allow marking an access from a VM within a GPA range as > > > always shared or private. Any suggestions regarding implementing this ioctl > > > alternatively/cleanly are appreciated. > > > > This is fantastic. I do think we need to decide how this should work in general. We have a few platforms with somewhat different properties: > > > > TDX: The guest decides, per memory access (using a GPA bit), whether an access is private or shared. In principle, the same address could be *both* and be distinguished by only that bit, and the two addresses would refer to different pages. > > > > SEV: The guest decides, per memory access (using a GPA bit), whether an access is private or shared. At any given time, a physical address (with that bit masked off) can be private, shared, or invalid, but it can't be valid as private and shared at the same time. > > > > pKVM (currently, as I understand it): the guest decides by hypercall, in advance of an access, which addresses are private and which are shared. > > > > This series, if I understood it correctly, is like TDX except with no hardware security. > > > > Sean or Chao, do you have a clear sense of whether the current fd-based private memory proposal can cleanly support SEV and pKVM? What, if anything, needs to be done on the API side to get that working well? I don't think we need to support SEV or pKVM right away to get this merged, but I do think we should understand how the API can map to them. > > I've been looking at porting the SEV-SNP hypervisor patches over to > using memfd, and I hit an issue that I think is generally applicable > to SEV/SEV-ES as well. Namely at guest init time we have something > like the following flow: > > VMM: > - allocate shared memory to back the guest and map it into guest > address space > - initialize shared memory with initialize memory contents (namely > the BIOS) > - ask KVM to encrypt these pages in-place and measure them to > generate the initial measured payload for attestation, via > KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE with the GPA for each range of memory to > encrypt. > KVM: > - issue SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE firmware command, which takes an HPA as > input and does an in-place encryption/measure of the page. > > With current v5 of the memfd/UPM series, I think the expected flow is that > we would fallocate() these ranges from the private fd backend in advance of > calling KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE (if VMM does it after we'd destroy the initial > guest payload, since they'd be replaced by newly-allocated pages). But if > VMM does it before, VMM has no way to initialize the guest memory contents, > since mmap()/pwrite() are disallowed due to MFD_INACCESSIBLE. OK, so for SEV, basically VMM puts vBIOS directly into guest memory and then do in-place measurement. TDX has no problem because TDX temporarily uses a VMM buffer (vs. guest memory) to hold the vBIOS and then asks SEAM-MODULE to measure and copy that to guest memory. Maybe something like SHM_LOCK should be used instead of the aggressive MFD_INACCESSIBLE. Before VMM calling SHM_LOCK on the memfd, the content can be changed but after that it's not visible to userspace VMM. This gives userspace a chance to modify the data in private page. Chao > > I think something similar to your proposal[1] here of making pread()/pwrite() > possible for private-fd-backed memory that's been flagged as "shareable" > would work for this case. Although here the "shareable" flag could be > removed immediately upon successful completion of the SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE > firmware command. > > I think with TDX this isn't an issue because their analagous TDH.MEM.PAGE.ADD > seamcall takes a pair of source/dest HPA as input params, so the VMM > wouldn't need write access to dest HPA at any point, just source HPA. > > [1] https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/eefc3c74-acca-419c-8947-726ce2458446@www.fastmail.com/