[07/12] nvme: Implement In-Band authentication

Message ID	20210910064322.67705-8-hare@suse.de
State	Superseded
Headers	show Return-Path: <linux-crypto-owner@kernel.org> From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>, Keith Busch <keith.busch@wdc.com>, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>, "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>, linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Subject: [PATCH 07/12] nvme: Implement In-Band authentication Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2021 08:43:17 +0200 Message-Id: <20210910064322.67705-8-hare@suse.de> In-Reply-To: <20210910064322.67705-1-hare@suse.de> References: <20210910064322.67705-1-hare@suse.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk
Series	nvme: In-band authentication support \| expand [PATCHv3,00/12] nvme: In-band authentication support [01/12] crypto: add crypto_has_shash() [03/12] crypto/ffdhe: Finite Field DH Ephemeral Parameters [07/12] nvme: Implement In-Band authentication [08/12] nvme-auth: Diffie-Hellman key exchange support [09/12] nvmet: Parse fabrics commands on all queues [11/12] nvmet-auth: Diffie-Hellman key exchange support

On 9/10/21 9:43 AM, Hannes Reinecke wrote: > Implement NVMe-oF In-Band authentication according to NVMe TPAR 8006. > This patch adds two new fabric options 'dhchap_secret' to specify the > pre-shared key (in ASCII respresentation according to NVMe 2.0 section > 8.13.5.8 'Secret representation') and 'dhchap_bidi' to request bi-directional > authentication of both the host and the controller. > Re-authentication can be triggered by writing the PSK into the new > controller sysfs attribute 'dhchap_secret'. > > Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> > --- > drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig | 12 + > drivers/nvme/host/Makefile | 1 + > drivers/nvme/host/auth.c | 1285 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > drivers/nvme/host/auth.h | 25 + > drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 79 ++- > drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c | 73 +- > drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h | 6 + > drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h | 30 + > drivers/nvme/host/trace.c | 32 + > 9 files changed, 1537 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 drivers/nvme/host/auth.c > create mode 100644 drivers/nvme/host/auth.h > > diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig b/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig > index dc0450ca23a3..97e8412dc42d 100644 > --- a/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig > +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig > @@ -83,3 +83,15 @@ config NVME_TCP > from https://github.com/linux-nvme/nvme-cli. > > If unsure, say N. > + > +config NVME_AUTH > + bool "NVM Express over Fabrics In-Band Authentication" > + depends on NVME_CORE > + select CRYPTO_HMAC > + select CRYPTO_SHA256 > + select CRYPTO_SHA512 > + help > + This provides support for NVMe over Fabrics In-Band Authentication > + for the NVMe over TCP transport. Not tcp specific... > diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..5393ac16a002 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c > @@ -0,0 +1,1285 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > +/* > + * Copyright (c) 2020 Hannes Reinecke, SUSE Linux > + */ > + > +#include <linux/crc32.h> > +#include <linux/base64.h> > +#include <asm/unaligned.h> > +#include <crypto/hash.h> > +#include <crypto/dh.h> > +#include <crypto/ffdhe.h> > +#include "nvme.h" > +#include "fabrics.h" > +#include "auth.h" > + > +static u32 nvme_dhchap_seqnum; > + > +struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context { > + struct list_head entry; > + struct work_struct auth_work; > + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl; > + struct crypto_shash *shash_tfm; > + struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm; > + void *buf; > + size_t buf_size; > + int qid; > + int error; > + u32 s1; > + u32 s2; > + u16 transaction; > + u8 status; > + u8 hash_id; > + u8 hash_len; > + u8 dhgroup_id; > + u8 c1[64]; > + u8 c2[64]; > + u8 response[64]; > + u8 *host_response; > +}; > + > +static struct nvme_auth_dhgroup_map { > + int id; > + const char name[16]; > + const char kpp[16]; > + int privkey_size; > + int pubkey_size; > +} dhgroup_map[] = { > + { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_NULL, > + .name = "NULL", .kpp = "NULL", Nit, no need for all-caps, can do "null" > + .privkey_size = 0, .pubkey_size = 0 }, > + { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_2048, > + .name = "ffdhe2048", .kpp = "dh", > + .privkey_size = 256, .pubkey_size = 256 }, > + { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_3072, > + .name = "ffdhe3072", .kpp = "dh", > + .privkey_size = 384, .pubkey_size = 384 }, > + { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_4096, > + .name = "ffdhe4096", .kpp = "dh", > + .privkey_size = 512, .pubkey_size = 512 }, > + { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_6144, > + .name = "ffdhe6144", .kpp = "dh", > + .privkey_size = 768, .pubkey_size = 768 }, > + { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_8192, > + .name = "ffdhe8192", .kpp = "dh", > + .privkey_size = 1024, .pubkey_size = 1024 }, > +}; > + > +const char *nvme_auth_dhgroup_name(int dhgroup_id) > +{ > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) { > + if (dhgroup_map[i].id == dhgroup_id) > + return dhgroup_map[i].name; > + } > + return NULL; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_name); > + > +int nvme_auth_dhgroup_pubkey_size(int dhgroup_id) > +{ > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) { > + if (dhgroup_map[i].id == dhgroup_id) > + return dhgroup_map[i].pubkey_size; > + } > + return -1; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_pubkey_size); > + > +int nvme_auth_dhgroup_privkey_size(int dhgroup_id) > +{ > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) { > + if (dhgroup_map[i].id == dhgroup_id) > + return dhgroup_map[i].privkey_size; > + } > + return -1; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_privkey_size); > + > +const char *nvme_auth_dhgroup_kpp(int dhgroup_id) > +{ > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) { > + if (dhgroup_map[i].id == dhgroup_id) > + return dhgroup_map[i].kpp; > + } > + return NULL; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_kpp); > + > +int nvme_auth_dhgroup_id(const char *dhgroup_name) > +{ > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) { > + if (!strncmp(dhgroup_map[i].name, dhgroup_name, > + strlen(dhgroup_map[i].name))) > + return dhgroup_map[i].id; > + } > + return -1; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_id); > + > +static struct nvme_dhchap_hash_map { > + int id; > + const char hmac[15]; > + const char digest[15]; > +} hash_map[] = { > + {.id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA256, > + .hmac = "hmac(sha256)", .digest = "sha256" }, > + {.id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA384, > + .hmac = "hmac(sha384)", .digest = "sha384" }, > + {.id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA512, > + .hmac = "hmac(sha512)", .digest = "sha512" }, > +}; > + > +const char *nvme_auth_hmac_name(int hmac_id) > +{ > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hash_map); i++) { > + if (hash_map[i].id == hmac_id) > + return hash_map[i].hmac; > + } > + return NULL; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_name); > + > +const char *nvme_auth_digest_name(int hmac_id) > +{ > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hash_map); i++) { > + if (hash_map[i].id == hmac_id) > + return hash_map[i].digest; > + } > + return NULL; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_digest_name); > + > +int nvme_auth_hmac_id(const char *hmac_name) > +{ > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hash_map); i++) { > + if (!strncmp(hash_map[i].hmac, hmac_name, > + strlen(hash_map[i].hmac))) > + return hash_map[i].id; > + } > + return -1; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_id); > + > +unsigned char *nvme_auth_extract_secret(unsigned char *secret, size_t *out_len) > +{ > + unsigned char *key; > + u32 crc; > + int key_len; > + size_t allocated_len; > + > + allocated_len = strlen(secret); Can move to declaration initializer. > + key = kzalloc(allocated_len, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!key) > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > + > + key_len = base64_decode(secret, allocated_len, key); > + if (key_len != 36 && key_len != 52 && > + key_len != 68) { > + pr_debug("Invalid DH-HMAC-CHAP key len %d\n", > + key_len); > + kfree_sensitive(key); > + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); > + } > + > + /* The last four bytes is the CRC in little-endian format */ > + key_len -= 4; > + /* > + * The linux implementation doesn't do pre- and post-increments, > + * so we have to do it manually. > + */ > + crc = ~crc32(~0, key, key_len); > + > + if (get_unaligned_le32(key + key_len) != crc) { > + pr_debug("DH-HMAC-CHAP key crc mismatch (key %08x, crc %08x)\n", > + get_unaligned_le32(key + key_len), crc); > + kfree_sensitive(key); > + return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED); > + } > + *out_len = key_len; > + return key; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_extract_secret); > + > +u8 *nvme_auth_transform_key(u8 *key, size_t key_len, u8 key_hash, char *nqn) > +{ > + const char *hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(key_hash); > + struct crypto_shash *key_tfm; > + struct shash_desc *shash; > + u8 *transformed_key; > + int ret; > + > + /* No key transformation required */ > + if (key_hash == 0) > + return 0; > + > + hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(key_hash); > + if (!hmac_name) { > + pr_warn("Invalid key hash id %d\n", key_hash); > + return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED); > + } newline here. > + key_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0, 0); > + if (IS_ERR(key_tfm)) > + return (u8 *)key_tfm; > + > + shash = kmalloc(sizeof(struct shash_desc) + > + crypto_shash_descsize(key_tfm), > + GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!shash) { > + crypto_free_shash(key_tfm); > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > + } newline here. > + transformed_key = kzalloc(crypto_shash_digestsize(key_tfm), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!transformed_key) { > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + goto out_free_shash; > + } > + > + shash->tfm = key_tfm; > + ret = crypto_shash_setkey(key_tfm, key, key_len); > + if (ret < 0) > + goto out_free_shash; > + ret = crypto_shash_init(shash); > + if (ret < 0) > + goto out_free_shash; > + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, nqn, strlen(nqn)); > + if (ret < 0) > + goto out_free_shash; > + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, "NVMe-over-Fabrics", 17); > + if (ret < 0) > + goto out_free_shash; > + ret = crypto_shash_final(shash, transformed_key); > +out_free_shash: > + kfree(shash); > + crypto_free_shash(key_tfm); > + if (ret < 0) { > + kfree_sensitive(transformed_key); > + return ERR_PTR(ret); > + } Any reason why this is not a reverse cleanup with goto call-sites standard style? > + return transformed_key; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_transform_key); > + > +static int nvme_auth_hash_skey(int hmac_id, u8 *skey, size_t skey_len, u8 *hkey) > +{ > + const char *digest_name; > + struct crypto_shash *tfm; > + int ret; > + > + digest_name = nvme_auth_digest_name(hmac_id); > + if (!digest_name) { > + pr_debug("%s: failed to get digest for %d\n", __func__, > + hmac_id); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(digest_name, 0, 0); > + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + ret = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, skey, skey_len, hkey); > + if (ret < 0) > + pr_debug("%s: Failed to hash digest len %zu\n", __func__, > + skey_len); > + > + crypto_free_shash(tfm); > + return ret; > +} > + > +int nvme_auth_augmented_challenge(u8 hmac_id, u8 *skey, size_t skey_len, > + u8 *challenge, u8 *aug, size_t hlen) > +{ > + struct crypto_shash *tfm; > + struct shash_desc *desc; > + u8 *hashed_key; > + const char *hmac_name; > + int ret; > + > + hashed_key = kmalloc(hlen, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!hashed_key) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + ret = nvme_auth_hash_skey(hmac_id, skey, > + skey_len, hashed_key); > + if (ret < 0) > + goto out_free_key; > + > + hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(hmac_id); > + if (!hmac_name) { > + pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algoritm %d\n", > + __func__, hmac_id); > + ret = -EINVAL; > + goto out_free_key; > + } newline. > + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0, 0); > + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { > + ret = PTR_ERR(tfm); > + goto out_free_key; > + } newline > + desc = kmalloc(sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm), > + GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!desc) { > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + goto out_free_hash; > + } > + desc->tfm = tfm; > + > + ret = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, hashed_key, hlen); > + if (ret) > + goto out_free_desc; > + > + ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); > + if (ret) > + goto out_free_desc; > + > + ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, challenge, hlen); > + if (ret) > + goto out_free_desc; > + > + ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, aug); > +out_free_desc: > + kfree_sensitive(desc); > +out_free_hash: > + crypto_free_shash(tfm); > +out_free_key: > + kfree_sensitive(hashed_key); > + return ret; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_augmented_challenge); > + > +int nvme_auth_gen_privkey(struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm, int dh_gid) > +{ > + char *pkey; > + int ret, pkey_len; > + > + if (dh_gid == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_2048 || > + dh_gid == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_3072 || > + dh_gid == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_4096 || > + dh_gid == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_6144 || > + dh_gid == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_8192) { > + struct dh p = {0}; > + int bits = nvme_auth_dhgroup_pubkey_size(dh_gid) << 3; > + int dh_secret_len = 64; > + u8 *dh_secret = kzalloc(dh_secret_len, GFP_KERNEL); > + > + if (!dh_secret) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + /* > + * NVMe base spec v2.0: The DH value shall be set to the value > + * of g^x mod p, where 'x' is a random number selected by the > + * host that shall be at least 256 bits long. > + * > + * We will be using a 512 bit random number as private key. > + * This is large enough to provide adequate security, but > + * small enough such that we can trivially conform to > + * NIST SB800-56A section 5.6.1.1.4 if > + * we guarantee that the random number is not either > + * all 0xff or all 0x00. But that should be guaranteed > + * by the in-kernel RNG anyway. > + */ > + get_random_bytes(dh_secret, dh_secret_len); > + > + ret = crypto_ffdhe_params(&p, bits); > + if (ret) { > + kfree_sensitive(dh_secret); > + return ret; > + } > + > + p.key = dh_secret; > + p.key_size = dh_secret_len; > + > + pkey_len = crypto_dh_key_len(&p); > + pkey = kmalloc(pkey_len, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!pkey) { > + kfree_sensitive(dh_secret); > + return -ENOMEM; > + } > + > + get_random_bytes(pkey, pkey_len); > + ret = crypto_dh_encode_key(pkey, pkey_len, &p); > + if (ret) { > + pr_debug("failed to encode private key, error %d\n", > + ret); > + kfree_sensitive(dh_secret); > + goto out; > + } > + } else { > + pr_warn("invalid dh group %d\n", dh_gid); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + ret = crypto_kpp_set_secret(dh_tfm, pkey, pkey_len); > + if (ret) > + pr_debug("failed to set private key, error %d\n", ret); > +out: > + kfree_sensitive(pkey); pkey can be unset here. > + return ret; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_gen_privkey); > + > +int nvme_auth_gen_pubkey(struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm, > + u8 *host_key, size_t host_key_len) > +{ > + struct kpp_request *req; > + struct crypto_wait wait; > + struct scatterlist dst; > + int ret; > + > + req = kpp_request_alloc(dh_tfm, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!req) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + crypto_init_wait(&wait); > + kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0); > + sg_init_one(&dst, host_key, host_key_len); > + kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, host_key_len); > + kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, > + crypto_req_done, &wait); > + > + ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req), &wait); > + no need for this newline > + kpp_request_free(req); > + return ret; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_gen_pubkey); > + > +int nvme_auth_gen_shared_secret(struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm, > + u8 *ctrl_key, size_t ctrl_key_len, > + u8 *sess_key, size_t sess_key_len) > +{ > + struct kpp_request *req; > + struct crypto_wait wait; > + struct scatterlist src, dst; > + int ret; > + > + req = kpp_request_alloc(dh_tfm, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!req) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + crypto_init_wait(&wait); > + sg_init_one(&src, ctrl_key, ctrl_key_len); > + kpp_request_set_input(req, &src, ctrl_key_len); > + sg_init_one(&dst, sess_key, sess_key_len); > + kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, sess_key_len); > + kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, > + crypto_req_done, &wait); > + > + ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req), &wait); > + > + kpp_request_free(req); > + return ret; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_gen_shared_secret); > + > +static int nvme_auth_send(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid, > + void *data, size_t tl) > +{ > + struct nvme_command cmd = {}; > + blk_mq_req_flags_t flags = qid == NVME_QID_ANY ? > + 0 : BLK_MQ_REQ_NOWAIT | BLK_MQ_REQ_RESERVED; > + struct request_queue *q = qid == NVME_QID_ANY ? > + ctrl->fabrics_q : ctrl->connect_q; > + int ret; > + > + cmd.auth_send.opcode = nvme_fabrics_command; > + cmd.auth_send.fctype = nvme_fabrics_type_auth_send; > + cmd.auth_send.secp = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_PROTOCOL_IDENTIFIER; > + cmd.auth_send.spsp0 = 0x01; > + cmd.auth_send.spsp1 = 0x01; > + cmd.auth_send.tl = tl; > + > + ret = __nvme_submit_sync_cmd(q, &cmd, NULL, data, tl, 0, qid, > + 0, flags); > + if (ret > 0) > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, > + "%s: qid %d nvme status %d\n", __func__, qid, ret); > + else if (ret < 0) > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, > + "%s: qid %d error %d\n", __func__, qid, ret); > + return ret; > +} > + > +static int nvme_auth_receive(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid, > + void *buf, size_t al) > +{ > + struct nvme_command cmd = {}; > + blk_mq_req_flags_t flags = qid == NVME_QID_ANY ? > + 0 : BLK_MQ_REQ_NOWAIT | BLK_MQ_REQ_RESERVED; > + struct request_queue *q = qid == NVME_QID_ANY ? > + ctrl->fabrics_q : ctrl->connect_q; > + int ret; > + > + cmd.auth_receive.opcode = nvme_fabrics_command; > + cmd.auth_receive.fctype = nvme_fabrics_type_auth_receive; > + cmd.auth_receive.secp = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_PROTOCOL_IDENTIFIER; > + cmd.auth_receive.spsp0 = 0x01; > + cmd.auth_receive.spsp1 = 0x01; > + cmd.auth_receive.al = al; > + > + ret = __nvme_submit_sync_cmd(q, &cmd, NULL, buf, al, 0, qid, > + 0, flags); > + if (ret > 0) { > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d nvme status %x\n", > + __func__, qid, ret); > + ret = -EIO; Why EIO? > + } > + if (ret < 0) { > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d error %d\n", > + __func__, qid, ret); > + return ret; > + } Why did you choose to do these error conditionals differently for the send and receive functions? > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int nvme_auth_receive_validate(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid, > + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_failure_data *data, > + u16 transaction, u8 expected_msg) > +{ > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d auth_type %d auth_id %x\n", > + __func__, qid, data->auth_type, data->auth_id); > + > + if (data->auth_type == NVME_AUTH_COMMON_MESSAGES && > + data->auth_id == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_FAILURE1) { > + return data->rescode_exp; > + } > + if (data->auth_type != NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGES || > + data->auth_id != expected_msg) { > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid %d invalid message %02x/%02x\n", > + qid, data->auth_type, data->auth_id); > + return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_MESSAGE; > + } > + if (le16_to_cpu(data->t_id) != transaction) { > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid %d invalid transaction ID %d\n", > + qid, le16_to_cpu(data->t_id)); > + return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_MESSAGE; > + } > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int nvme_auth_set_dhchap_negotiate_data(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, > + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) > +{ > + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_negotiate_data *data = chap->buf; > + size_t size = sizeof(*data) + sizeof(union nvmf_auth_protocol); > + > + if (chap->buf_size < size) { > + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD; Is this an internal error? not sure I understand setting of this status > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + memset((u8 *)chap->buf, 0, size); > + data->auth_type = NVME_AUTH_COMMON_MESSAGES; > + data->auth_id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_NEGOTIATE; > + data->t_id = cpu_to_le16(chap->transaction); > + data->sc_c = 0; /* No secure channel concatenation */ > + data->napd = 1; > + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.authid = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_AUTH_ID; > + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.halen = 3; > + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.dhlen = 6; > + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[0] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA256; > + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[1] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA384; > + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[2] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA512; > + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[3] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_NULL; > + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[4] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_2048; > + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[5] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_3072; > + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[6] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_4096; > + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[7] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_6144; > + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[8] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_8192; > + > + return size; > +} > + > +static int nvme_auth_process_dhchap_challenge(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, > + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) > +{ > + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_challenge_data *data = chap->buf; > + size_t size = sizeof(*data) + data->hl + data->dhvlen; > + const char *hmac_name; > + > + if (chap->buf_size < size) { > + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD; > + return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD; > + } > + > + hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(data->hashid); > + if (!hmac_name) { > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid %d: invalid HASH ID %d\n", > + chap->qid, data->hashid); > + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_HASH_UNUSABLE; > + return -EPROTO; > + } > + if (chap->hash_id == data->hashid && chap->shash_tfm && > + !strcmp(crypto_shash_alg_name(chap->shash_tfm), hmac_name) && > + crypto_shash_digestsize(chap->shash_tfm) == data->hl) { > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, > + "qid %d: reuse existing hash %s\n", > + chap->qid, hmac_name); > + goto select_kpp; > + } newline > + if (chap->shash_tfm) { > + crypto_free_shash(chap->shash_tfm); > + chap->hash_id = 0; > + chap->hash_len = 0; > + } newline > + chap->shash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0, > + CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY); > + if (IS_ERR(chap->shash_tfm)) { > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid %d: failed to allocate hash %s, error %ld\n", > + chap->qid, hmac_name, PTR_ERR(chap->shash_tfm)); > + chap->shash_tfm = NULL; > + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_FAILED; > + return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED; > + } newline > + if (crypto_shash_digestsize(chap->shash_tfm) != data->hl) { > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid %d: invalid hash length %d\n", > + chap->qid, data->hl); > + crypto_free_shash(chap->shash_tfm); > + chap->shash_tfm = NULL; > + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_HASH_UNUSABLE; > + return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED; > + } newline > + if (chap->hash_id != data->hashid) { > + kfree(chap->host_response); kfree_sensitive? also why is is freed here? where was it allocated? > + chap->host_response = NULL; > + } > + chap->hash_id = data->hashid; > + chap->hash_len = data->hl; > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "qid %d: selected hash %s\n", > + chap->qid, hmac_name); > + > + gid_name = nvme_auth_dhgroup_kpp(data->dhgid); > + if (!gid_name) { > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid %d: invalid DH group id %d\n", > + chap->qid, data->dhgid); > + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_DHGROUP_UNUSABLE; > + return -EPROTO; No need for all the previous frees? Maybe we can rework these such that we first do all the checks and then go and allocate stuff? > + } > + > + if (data->dhgid != NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_NULL) { > + if (data->dhvlen == 0) { > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid %d: empty DH value\n", > + chap->qid); > + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_DHGROUP_UNUSABLE; > + return -EPROTO; > + } > + chap->dh_tfm = crypto_alloc_kpp(gid_name, 0, 0); > + if (IS_ERR(chap->dh_tfm)) { > + int ret = PTR_ERR(chap->dh_tfm); > + > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid %d: failed to initialize %s\n", > + chap->qid, gid_name); > + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_DHGROUP_UNUSABLE; > + chap->dh_tfm = NULL; > + return ret; > + } > + chap->dhgroup_id = data->dhgid; > + } else if (data->dhvlen != 0) { > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid %d: invalid DH value for NULL DH\n", > + chap->qid); > + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_DHGROUP_UNUSABLE; > + return -EPROTO; > + } > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "qid %d: selected DH group %s\n", > + chap->qid, gid_name); > + > +select_kpp: > + chap->s1 = le32_to_cpu(data->seqnum); > + memcpy(chap->c1, data->cval, chap->hash_len); > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int nvme_auth_set_dhchap_reply_data(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, > + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) > +{ > + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_reply_data *data = chap->buf; > + size_t size = sizeof(*data); > + > + size += 2 * chap->hash_len; > + if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_bidi) { > + get_random_bytes(chap->c2, chap->hash_len); > + chap->s2 = nvme_dhchap_seqnum++; Any serialization needed on nvme_dhchap_seqnum? > + } else > + memset(chap->c2, 0, chap->hash_len); > + > + > + if (chap->buf_size < size) { > + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD; > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + memset(chap->buf, 0, size); > + data->auth_type = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGES; > + data->auth_id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_REPLY; > + data->t_id = cpu_to_le16(chap->transaction); > + data->hl = chap->hash_len; > + data->dhvlen = 0; > + data->seqnum = cpu_to_le32(chap->s2); > + memcpy(data->rval, chap->response, chap->hash_len); > + if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_bidi) { Can we unite the "if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_bidi)" conditionals? > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d ctrl challenge %*ph\n", > + __func__, chap->qid, > + chap->hash_len, chap->c2); > + data->cvalid = 1; > + memcpy(data->rval + chap->hash_len, chap->c2, > + chap->hash_len); > + } > + return size; > +} > + > +static int nvme_auth_process_dhchap_success1(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, > + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) > +{ > + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_success1_data *data = chap->buf; > + size_t size = sizeof(*data); > + > + if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_bidi) > + size += chap->hash_len; > + > + > + if (chap->buf_size < size) { > + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD; > + return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD; > + } > + > + if (data->hl != chap->hash_len) { > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid %d: invalid hash length %d\n", > + chap->qid, data->hl); > + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_HASH_UNUSABLE; > + return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD; > + } > + > + if (!data->rvalid) > + return 0; > + > + /* Validate controller response */ > + if (memcmp(chap->response, data->rval, data->hl)) { > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d ctrl response %*ph\n", > + __func__, chap->qid, chap->hash_len, data->rval); > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d host response %*ph\n", > + __func__, chap->qid, chap->hash_len, chap->response); > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid %d: controller authentication failed\n", > + chap->qid); > + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_FAILED; > + return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED; > + } > + dev_info(ctrl->device, > + "qid %d: controller authenticated\n", > + chap->qid); > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int nvme_auth_set_dhchap_success2_data(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, > + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) > +{ > + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_success2_data *data = chap->buf; > + size_t size = sizeof(*data); > + > + memset(chap->buf, 0, size); > + data->auth_type = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGES; > + data->auth_id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_SUCCESS2; > + data->t_id = cpu_to_le16(chap->transaction); > + > + return size; > +} > + > +static int nvme_auth_set_dhchap_failure2_data(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, > + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) > +{ > + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_failure_data *data = chap->buf; > + size_t size = sizeof(*data); > + > + memset(chap->buf, 0, size); > + data->auth_type = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGES; > + data->auth_id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_FAILURE2; > + data->t_id = cpu_to_le16(chap->transaction); > + data->rescode = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_REASON_FAILED; > + data->rescode_exp = chap->status; > + > + return size; > +} > + > +static int nvme_auth_dhchap_host_response(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, > + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) > +{ > + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, chap->shash_tfm); > + u8 buf[4], *challenge = chap->c1; > + int ret; > + > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d host response seq %d transaction %d\n", > + __func__, chap->qid, chap->s1, chap->transaction); > + if (chap->dh_tfm) { > + challenge = kmalloc(chap->hash_len, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!challenge) { > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + goto out; > + } > + ret = nvme_auth_augmented_challenge(chap->hash_id, > + chap->sess_key, > + chap->sess_key_len, > + chap->c1, challenge, > + chap->hash_len); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + } > + shash->tfm = chap->shash_tfm; > + ret = crypto_shash_init(shash); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, challenge, chap->hash_len); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + put_unaligned_le32(chap->s1, buf); > + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 4); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + put_unaligned_le16(chap->transaction, buf); > + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 2); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); > + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 1); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, "HostHost", 8); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, ctrl->opts->host->nqn, > + strlen(ctrl->opts->host->nqn)); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 1); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, ctrl->opts->subsysnqn, > + strlen(ctrl->opts->subsysnqn)); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + ret = crypto_shash_final(shash, chap->response); > +out: > + if (challenge != chap->c1) > + kfree(challenge); > + return ret; > +} > + > +static int nvme_auth_dhchap_ctrl_response(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, > + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) > +{ > + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, chap->shash_tfm); > + u8 buf[4], *challenge = chap->c2; > + int ret; > + > + if (chap->dh_tfm) { > + challenge = kmalloc(chap->hash_len, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!challenge) { > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + goto out; > + } > + ret = nvme_auth_augmented_challenge(chap->hash_id, > + chap->sess_key, > + chap->sess_key_len, > + chap->c2, challenge, > + chap->hash_len); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + } > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d host response seq %d transaction %d\n", > + __func__, chap->qid, chap->s2, chap->transaction); > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d challenge %*ph\n", > + __func__, chap->qid, chap->hash_len, challenge); > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d subsysnqn %s\n", > + __func__, chap->qid, ctrl->opts->subsysnqn); > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d hostnqn %s\n", > + __func__, chap->qid, ctrl->opts->host->nqn); > + shash->tfm = chap->shash_tfm; > + ret = crypto_shash_init(shash); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, challenge, chap->hash_len); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + put_unaligned_le32(chap->s2, buf); > + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 4); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + put_unaligned_le16(chap->transaction, buf); > + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 2); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + memset(buf, 0, 4); > + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 1); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, "Controller", 10); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, ctrl->opts->subsysnqn, > + strlen(ctrl->opts->subsysnqn)); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 1); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, ctrl->opts->host->nqn, > + strlen(ctrl->opts->host->nqn)); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + ret = crypto_shash_final(shash, chap->response); > +out: > + if (challenge != chap->c2) > + kfree(challenge); > + return ret; > +} > + > +int nvme_auth_generate_key(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) > +{ > + int ret; > + u8 key_hash; > + > + if (!ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret) > + return 0; > + > + if (ctrl->dhchap_key && ctrl->dhchap_key_len) > + /* Key already set */ > + return 0; > + > + if (sscanf(ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret, "DHHC-1:%hhd:%*s:", > + &key_hash) != 1) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* Pass in the secret without the 'DHHC-1:XX:' prefix */ > + ctrl->dhchap_key = nvme_auth_extract_secret(ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret + 10, > + &ctrl->dhchap_key_len); > + if (IS_ERR(ctrl->dhchap_key)) { > + ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->dhchap_key); > + ctrl->dhchap_key = NULL; > + return ret; > + } > + return ret; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_generate_key); > + > +static void nvme_auth_reset(struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) > +{ > + chap->status = 0; > + chap->error = 0; > + chap->s1 = 0; > + chap->s2 = 0; > + chap->transaction = 0; > + memset(chap->c1, 0, sizeof(chap->c1)); > + memset(chap->c2, 0, sizeof(chap->c2)); > +} > + > +static void __nvme_auth_free(struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) > +{ > + if (chap->shash_tfm) > + crypto_free_shash(chap->shash_tfm); > + kfree_sensitive(chap->host_response); > + kfree(chap->buf); > + kfree(chap); > +} > + > +static void __nvme_auth_work(struct work_struct *work) > +{ > + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap = > + container_of(work, struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context, auth_work); > + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = chap->ctrl; > + size_t tl; > + int ret = 0; > + > + chap->transaction = ctrl->transaction++; > + > + /* DH-HMAC-CHAP Step 1: send negotiate */ > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d send negotiate\n", > + __func__, chap->qid); > + ret = nvme_auth_set_dhchap_negotiate_data(ctrl, chap); > + if (ret < 0) { > + chap->error = ret; > + return; > + } > + tl = ret; > + ret = nvme_auth_send(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, tl); > + if (ret) { > + chap->error = ret; > + return; > + } > + > + /* DH-HMAC-CHAP Step 2: receive challenge */ > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d receive challenge\n", > + __func__, chap->qid); > + > + memset(chap->buf, 0, chap->buf_size); > + ret = nvme_auth_receive(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, chap->buf_size); > + if (ret) { > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid %d failed to receive challenge, %s %d\n", > + chap->qid, ret < 0 ? "error" : "nvme status", ret); > + chap->error = ret; > + return; > + } > + ret = nvme_auth_receive_validate(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, chap->transaction, > + NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_CHALLENGE); > + if (ret) { > + chap->status = ret; > + chap->error = NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED; > + return; > + } > + > + ret = nvme_auth_process_dhchap_challenge(ctrl, chap); > + if (ret) { > + /* Invalid challenge parameters */ > + goto fail2; > + } > + > + if (chap->ctrl_key_len) { > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, > + "%s: qid %d DH exponential\n", > + __func__, chap->qid); > + ret = nvme_auth_dhchap_exponential(ctrl, chap); > + if (ret) > + goto fail2; > + } > + > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d host response\n", > + __func__, chap->qid); > + ret = nvme_auth_dhchap_host_response(ctrl, chap); > + if (ret) > + goto fail2; > + > + /* DH-HMAC-CHAP Step 3: send reply */ > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d send reply\n", > + __func__, chap->qid); > + ret = nvme_auth_set_dhchap_reply_data(ctrl, chap); > + if (ret < 0) > + goto fail2; > + > + tl = ret; > + ret = nvme_auth_send(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, tl); > + if (ret) > + goto fail2; > + > + /* DH-HMAC-CHAP Step 4: receive success1 */ > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d receive success1\n", > + __func__, chap->qid); > + > + memset(chap->buf, 0, chap->buf_size); > + ret = nvme_auth_receive(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, chap->buf_size); > + if (ret) { > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid %d failed to receive success1, %s %d\n", > + chap->qid, ret < 0 ? "error" : "nvme status", ret); > + chap->error = ret; > + return; > + } > + ret = nvme_auth_receive_validate(ctrl, chap->qid, > + chap->buf, chap->transaction, > + NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_SUCCESS1); > + if (ret) { > + chap->status = ret; > + chap->error = NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED; > + return; > + } > + > + if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_bidi) { > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, > + "%s: qid %d controller response\n", > + __func__, chap->qid); > + ret = nvme_auth_dhchap_ctrl_response(ctrl, chap); > + if (ret) > + goto fail2; > + } > + > + ret = nvme_auth_process_dhchap_success1(ctrl, chap); > + if (ret < 0) { > + /* Controller authentication failed */ > + goto fail2; > + } > + > + /* DH-HMAC-CHAP Step 5: send success2 */ > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d send success2\n", > + __func__, chap->qid); > + tl = nvme_auth_set_dhchap_success2_data(ctrl, chap); > + ret = nvme_auth_send(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, tl); > + if (!ret) { > + chap->error = 0; > + return; > + } > + > +fail2: > + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d send failure2, status %x\n", > + __func__, chap->qid, chap->status); > + tl = nvme_auth_set_dhchap_failure2_data(ctrl, chap); > + ret = nvme_auth_send(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, tl); > + if (!ret) > + ret = -EPROTO; > + chap->error = ret; > +} > + > +int nvme_auth_negotiate(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid) > +{ > + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap; > + > + if (!ctrl->dhchap_key || !ctrl->dhchap_key_len) { > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, "qid %d: no key\n", qid); > + return -ENOKEY; > + } > + > + mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); > + /* Check if the context is already queued */ > + list_for_each_entry(chap, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_list, entry) { > + if (chap->qid == qid) { > + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); > + queue_work(nvme_wq, &chap->auth_work); > + return 0; > + } > + } > + chap = kzalloc(sizeof(*chap), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!chap) { > + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); > + return -ENOMEM; > + } > + chap->qid = qid; > + chap->ctrl = ctrl; > + > + /* > + * Allocate a large enough buffer for the entire negotiation: > + * 4k should be enough to ffdhe8192. > + */ > + chap->buf_size = 4096; > + chap->buf = kzalloc(chap->buf_size, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!chap->buf) { > + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); > + kfree(chap); > + return -ENOMEM; > + } > + > + INIT_WORK(&chap->auth_work, __nvme_auth_work); > + list_add(&chap->entry, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_list); > + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); > + queue_work(nvme_wq, &chap->auth_work); Why is the auth in a work? e.g. it won't fail the connect? > + return 0; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_negotiate); > + > +int nvme_auth_wait(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid) > +{ > + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap; > + int ret; > + > + mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); > + list_for_each_entry(chap, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_list, entry) { > + if (chap->qid != qid) > + continue; > + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); > + flush_work(&chap->auth_work); > + ret = chap->error; > + nvme_auth_reset(chap); > + return ret; > + } > + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); > + return -ENXIO; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_wait); > + > +/* Assumes that the controller is in state RESETTING */ > +static void nvme_dhchap_auth_work(struct work_struct *work) > +{ > + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = > + container_of(work, struct nvme_ctrl, dhchap_auth_work); > + int ret, q; > + > + nvme_stop_queues(ctrl); > + /* Authenticate admin queue first */ > + ret = nvme_auth_negotiate(ctrl, NVME_QID_ANY); > + if (ret) { > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid 0: error %d setting up authentication\n", ret); > + goto out; > + } > + ret = nvme_auth_wait(ctrl, NVME_QID_ANY); > + if (ret) { > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid 0: authentication failed\n"); > + goto out; > + } > + dev_info(ctrl->device, "qid 0: authenticated\n"); > + > + for (q = 1; q < ctrl->queue_count; q++) { > + ret = nvme_auth_negotiate(ctrl, q); > + if (ret) { > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid %d: error %d setting up authentication\n", > + q, ret); > + goto out; > + } > + } > +out: > + /* > + * Failure is a soft-state; credentials remain valid until > + * the controller terminates the connection. > + */ > + if (nvme_change_ctrl_state(ctrl, NVME_CTRL_LIVE)) > + nvme_start_queues(ctrl); > +} > + > +void nvme_auth_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) > +{ > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_list); > + INIT_WORK(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_work, nvme_dhchap_auth_work); > + mutex_init(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); > + nvme_auth_generate_key(ctrl); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_init_ctrl); > + > +void nvme_auth_stop(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) > +{ > + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap = NULL, *tmp; > + > + cancel_work_sync(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_work); > + mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); > + list_for_each_entry_safe(chap, tmp, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_list, entry) > + cancel_work_sync(&chap->auth_work); > + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_stop); > + > +void nvme_auth_free(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) > +{ > + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap = NULL, *tmp; > + > + mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); > + list_for_each_entry_safe(chap, tmp, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_list, entry) { > + list_del_init(&chap->entry); > + flush_work(&chap->auth_work); > + __nvme_auth_free(chap); > + } > + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); > + kfree(ctrl->dhchap_key); > + ctrl->dhchap_key = NULL; > + ctrl->dhchap_key_len = 0; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_free); > diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.h b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.h > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..cf1255f9db6d > --- /dev/null > +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.h > @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ > +/* > + * Copyright (c) 2021 Hannes Reinecke, SUSE Software Solutions > + */ > + > +#ifndef _NVME_AUTH_H > +#define _NVME_AUTH_H > + > +#include <crypto/kpp.h> > + > +const char *nvme_auth_dhgroup_name(int dhgroup_id); > +int nvme_auth_dhgroup_pubkey_size(int dhgroup_id); > +int nvme_auth_dhgroup_privkey_size(int dhgroup_id); > +const char *nvme_auth_dhgroup_kpp(int dhgroup_id); > +int nvme_auth_dhgroup_id(const char *dhgroup_name); > + > +const char *nvme_auth_hmac_name(int hmac_id); > +const char *nvme_auth_digest_name(int hmac_id); > +int nvme_auth_hmac_id(const char *hmac_name); > + > +unsigned char *nvme_auth_extract_secret(unsigned char *dhchap_secret, > + size_t *dhchap_key_len); > +u8 *nvme_auth_transform_key(u8 *key, size_t key_len, u8 key_hash, char *nqn); > + > +#endif /* _NVME_AUTH_H */ > diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c > index 7efb31b87f37..f669b054790b 100644 > --- a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c > +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c > @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ > > #include "nvme.h" > #include "fabrics.h" > +#include "auth.h" > > #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS > #include "trace.h" > @@ -322,6 +323,7 @@ enum nvme_disposition { > COMPLETE, > RETRY, > FAILOVER, > + AUTHENTICATE, > }; > > static inline enum nvme_disposition nvme_decide_disposition(struct request *req) > @@ -329,6 +331,9 @@ static inline enum nvme_disposition nvme_decide_disposition(struct request *req) > if (likely(nvme_req(req)->status == 0)) > return COMPLETE; > > + if ((nvme_req(req)->status & 0x7ff) == NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED) > + return AUTHENTICATE; > + > if (blk_noretry_request(req) || > (nvme_req(req)->status & NVME_SC_DNR) || > nvme_req(req)->retries >= nvme_max_retries) > @@ -361,11 +366,13 @@ static inline void nvme_end_req(struct request *req) > > void nvme_complete_rq(struct request *req) > { > + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = nvme_req(req)->ctrl; > + > trace_nvme_complete_rq(req); > nvme_cleanup_cmd(req); > > - if (nvme_req(req)->ctrl->kas) > - nvme_req(req)->ctrl->comp_seen = true; > + if (ctrl->kas) > + ctrl->comp_seen = true; > > switch (nvme_decide_disposition(req)) { > case COMPLETE: > @@ -377,6 +384,15 @@ void nvme_complete_rq(struct request *req) > case FAILOVER: > nvme_failover_req(req); > return; > + case AUTHENTICATE: > +#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_AUTH > + if (nvme_change_ctrl_state(ctrl, NVME_CTRL_RESETTING)) > + queue_work(nvme_wq, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_work); Why is the state change here and not in nvme_dhchap_auth_work? > + nvme_retry_req(req); > +#else > + nvme_end_req(req); > +#endif > + return; > } > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_complete_rq); > @@ -707,7 +723,9 @@ bool __nvme_check_ready(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, struct request *rq, > switch (ctrl->state) { > case NVME_CTRL_CONNECTING: > if (blk_rq_is_passthrough(rq) && nvme_is_fabrics(req->cmd) && > - req->cmd->fabrics.fctype == nvme_fabrics_type_connect) > + (req->cmd->fabrics.fctype == nvme_fabrics_type_connect || > + req->cmd->fabrics.fctype == nvme_fabrics_type_auth_send || > + req->cmd->fabrics.fctype == nvme_fabrics_type_auth_receive)) What happens if the auth command comes before the connect (say in case of ctrl reset when auth was already queued but not yet executed? > return true; > break; > default: > @@ -3458,6 +3476,51 @@ static ssize_t nvme_ctrl_fast_io_fail_tmo_store(struct device *dev, > static DEVICE_ATTR(fast_io_fail_tmo, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, > nvme_ctrl_fast_io_fail_tmo_show, nvme_ctrl_fast_io_fail_tmo_store); > > +#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_AUTH > +static ssize_t nvme_ctrl_dhchap_secret_show(struct device *dev, > + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) > +{ > + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev); > + struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts = ctrl->opts; > + > + if (!opts->dhchap_secret) > + return sysfs_emit(buf, "none\n"); > + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", opts->dhchap_secret); Should we actually show this? don't know enough how much the secret should be kept a secret... > +} > + > +static ssize_t nvme_ctrl_dhchap_secret_store(struct device *dev, > + struct device_attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t count) > +{ > + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev); > + struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts = ctrl->opts; > + char *dhchap_secret; > + > + if (!ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret) > + return -EINVAL; > + if (count < 7) > + return -EINVAL; > + if (memcmp(buf, "DHHC-1:", 7)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + dhchap_secret = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!dhchap_secret) > + return -ENOMEM; > + memcpy(dhchap_secret, buf, count); > + if (strcmp(dhchap_secret, opts->dhchap_secret)) { > + kfree(opts->dhchap_secret); > + opts->dhchap_secret = dhchap_secret; > + /* Key has changed; reset authentication data */ > + nvme_auth_free(ctrl); > + nvme_auth_generate_key(ctrl); > + } Nice, worth a comment "/* Re-authentication with new secret */" > + if (nvme_change_ctrl_state(ctrl, NVME_CTRL_RESETTING)) > + queue_work(nvme_wq, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_work); > + return count; > +} > +DEVICE_ATTR(dhchap_secret, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, > + nvme_ctrl_dhchap_secret_show, nvme_ctrl_dhchap_secret_store); > +#endif > + > static struct attribute *nvme_dev_attrs[] = { > &dev_attr_reset_controller.attr, > &dev_attr_rescan_controller.attr, > @@ -3479,6 +3542,9 @@ static struct attribute *nvme_dev_attrs[] = { > &dev_attr_reconnect_delay.attr, > &dev_attr_fast_io_fail_tmo.attr, > &dev_attr_kato.attr, > +#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_AUTH > + &dev_attr_dhchap_secret.attr, > +#endif > NULL > }; > > @@ -3502,6 +3568,10 @@ static umode_t nvme_dev_attrs_are_visible(struct kobject *kobj, > return 0; > if (a == &dev_attr_fast_io_fail_tmo.attr && !ctrl->opts) > return 0; > +#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_AUTH > + if (a == &dev_attr_dhchap_secret.attr && !ctrl->opts) > + return 0; > +#endif > > return a->mode; > } > @@ -4312,6 +4382,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_complete_async_event); > void nvme_stop_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) > { > nvme_mpath_stop(ctrl); > + nvme_auth_stop(ctrl); > nvme_stop_keep_alive(ctrl); > nvme_stop_failfast_work(ctrl); > flush_work(&ctrl->async_event_work); > @@ -4366,6 +4437,7 @@ static void nvme_free_ctrl(struct device *dev) > > nvme_free_cels(ctrl); > nvme_mpath_uninit(ctrl); > + nvme_auth_free(ctrl); > __free_page(ctrl->discard_page); > > if (subsys) { > @@ -4456,6 +4528,7 @@ int nvme_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, struct device *dev, > > nvme_fault_inject_init(&ctrl->fault_inject, dev_name(ctrl->device)); > nvme_mpath_init_ctrl(ctrl); > + nvme_auth_init_ctrl(ctrl); > > return 0; > out_free_name: > diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c > index 9a8eade7cd23..ee6058c24743 100644 > --- a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c > +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c > @@ -370,6 +370,7 @@ int nvmf_connect_admin_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) > union nvme_result res; > struct nvmf_connect_data *data; > int ret; > + u32 result; > > cmd.connect.opcode = nvme_fabrics_command; > cmd.connect.fctype = nvme_fabrics_type_connect; > @@ -402,8 +403,25 @@ int nvmf_connect_admin_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) > goto out_free_data; > } > > - ctrl->cntlid = le16_to_cpu(res.u16); > - > + result = le32_to_cpu(res.u32); > + ctrl->cntlid = result & 0xFFFF; > + if ((result >> 16) & 2) { > + /* Authentication required */ > + ret = nvme_auth_negotiate(ctrl, NVME_QID_ANY); > + if (ret) { > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid 0: failed to setup authentication\n"); > + ret = NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED; > + goto out_free_data; > + } > + ret = nvme_auth_wait(ctrl, NVME_QID_ANY); > + if (ret) > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid 0: authentication failed\n"); > + else > + dev_info(ctrl->device, > + "qid 0: authenticated\n"); OK, so the auth work is serialized via nvme_auth_wait here... got it.. > + } > out_free_data: > kfree(data); > return ret; > @@ -436,6 +454,7 @@ int nvmf_connect_io_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, u16 qid) > struct nvmf_connect_data *data; > union nvme_result res; > int ret; > + u32 result; > > cmd.connect.opcode = nvme_fabrics_command; > cmd.connect.fctype = nvme_fabrics_type_connect; > @@ -461,6 +480,24 @@ int nvmf_connect_io_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, u16 qid) > nvmf_log_connect_error(ctrl, ret, le32_to_cpu(res.u32), > &cmd, data); > } > + result = le32_to_cpu(res.u32); > + if ((result >> 16) & 2) { > + /* Authentication required */ > + ret = nvme_auth_negotiate(ctrl, qid); > + if (ret) { > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid %d: failed to setup authentication\n", qid); > + ret = NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED; > + } else { > + ret = nvme_auth_wait(ctrl, qid); > + if (ret) > + dev_warn(ctrl->device, > + "qid %u: authentication failed\n", qid); > + else > + dev_info(ctrl->device, > + "qid %u: authenticated\n", qid); > + } > + } > kfree(data); > return ret; > } > @@ -552,6 +589,8 @@ static const match_table_t opt_tokens = { > { NVMF_OPT_NR_POLL_QUEUES, "nr_poll_queues=%d" }, > { NVMF_OPT_TOS, "tos=%d" }, > { NVMF_OPT_FAIL_FAST_TMO, "fast_io_fail_tmo=%d" }, > + { NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_SECRET, "dhchap_secret=%s" }, > + { NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_BIDI, "dhchap_bidi" }, > { NVMF_OPT_ERR, NULL } > }; > > @@ -827,6 +866,23 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts, > } > opts->tos = token; > break; > + case NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_SECRET: > + p = match_strdup(args); > + if (!p) { > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + goto out; > + } > + if (strlen(p) < 11 || strncmp(p, "DHHC-1:", 7)) { > + pr_err("Invalid DH-CHAP secret %s\n", p); > + ret = -EINVAL; > + goto out; > + } > + kfree(opts->dhchap_secret); > + opts->dhchap_secret = p; > + break; > + case NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_BIDI: > + opts->dhchap_bidi = true; > + break; > default: > pr_warn("unknown parameter or missing value '%s' in ctrl creation request\n", > p); > @@ -945,6 +1001,7 @@ void nvmf_free_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts) > kfree(opts->subsysnqn); > kfree(opts->host_traddr); > kfree(opts->host_iface); > + kfree(opts->dhchap_secret); > kfree(opts); > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvmf_free_options); > @@ -954,7 +1011,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvmf_free_options); > NVMF_OPT_KATO | NVMF_OPT_HOSTNQN | \ > NVMF_OPT_HOST_ID | NVMF_OPT_DUP_CONNECT |\ > NVMF_OPT_DISABLE_SQFLOW |\ > - NVMF_OPT_FAIL_FAST_TMO) > + NVMF_OPT_CTRL_LOSS_TMO |\ > + NVMF_OPT_FAIL_FAST_TMO |\ > + NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_SECRET |\ > + NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_BIDI) > > static struct nvme_ctrl * > nvmf_create_ctrl(struct device *dev, const char *buf) > @@ -1171,7 +1231,14 @@ static void __exit nvmf_exit(void) > BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_connect_command) != 64); > BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_property_get_command) != 64); > BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_property_set_command) != 64); > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_send_command) != 64); > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_receive_command) != 64); > BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_connect_data) != 1024); > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_negotiate_data) != 8); > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_challenge_data) != 16); > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_reply_data) != 16); > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_success1_data) != 16); > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_success2_data) != 16); > } > > MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); > diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h > index a146cb903869..27df1aac5736 100644 > --- a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h > +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h > @@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ enum { > NVMF_OPT_TOS = 1 << 19, > NVMF_OPT_FAIL_FAST_TMO = 1 << 20, > NVMF_OPT_HOST_IFACE = 1 << 21, > + NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_SECRET = 1 << 22, > + NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_BIDI = 1 << 23, > }; > > /** > @@ -96,6 +98,8 @@ enum { > * @max_reconnects: maximum number of allowed reconnect attempts before removing > * the controller, (-1) means reconnect forever, zero means remove > * immediately; > + * @dhchap_secret: DH-HMAC-CHAP secret > + * @dhchap_bidi: enable DH-HMAC-CHAP bi-directional authentication > * @disable_sqflow: disable controller sq flow control > * @hdr_digest: generate/verify header digest (TCP) > * @data_digest: generate/verify data digest (TCP) > @@ -120,6 +124,8 @@ struct nvmf_ctrl_options { > unsigned int kato; > struct nvmf_host *host; > int max_reconnects; > + char *dhchap_secret; > + bool dhchap_bidi; > bool disable_sqflow; > bool hdr_digest; > bool data_digest; > diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h b/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h > index 9871c0c9374c..b0dcb7d79b9e 100644 > --- a/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h > +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h > @@ -318,6 +318,15 @@ struct nvme_ctrl { > struct work_struct ana_work; > #endif > > +#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_AUTH > + struct work_struct dhchap_auth_work; > + struct list_head dhchap_auth_list; > + struct mutex dhchap_auth_mutex; > + unsigned char *dhchap_key; > + size_t dhchap_key_len; > + u16 transaction; > +#endif > + > /* Power saving configuration */ > u64 ps_max_latency_us; > bool apst_enabled; > @@ -885,6 +894,27 @@ static inline bool nvme_ctrl_sgl_supported(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) > return ctrl->sgls & ((1 << 0) | (1 << 1)); > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_AUTH > +void nvme_auth_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl); > +void nvme_auth_stop(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl); > +int nvme_auth_negotiate(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid); > +int nvme_auth_wait(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid); > +void nvme_auth_free(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl); > +int nvme_auth_generate_key(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl); > +#else > +static inline void nvme_auth_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) {}; > +static inline void nvme_auth_stop(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) {}; > +static inline int nvme_auth_negotiate(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid) > +{ > + return -EPROTONOSUPPORT; > +} > +static inline int nvme_auth_wait(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid) > +{ > + return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED; > +} > +static inline void nvme_auth_free(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) {}; > +#endif > + > u32 nvme_command_effects(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, struct nvme_ns *ns, > u8 opcode); > int nvme_execute_passthru_rq(struct request *rq); > diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/trace.c b/drivers/nvme/host/trace.c > index 2a89c5aa0790..1c36fcedea20 100644 > --- a/drivers/nvme/host/trace.c > +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/trace.c > @@ -287,6 +287,34 @@ static const char *nvme_trace_fabrics_property_get(struct trace_seq *p, u8 *spc) > return ret; > } > > +static const char *nvme_trace_fabrics_auth_send(struct trace_seq *p, u8 *spc) > +{ > + const char *ret = trace_seq_buffer_ptr(p); > + u8 spsp0 = spc[1]; > + u8 spsp1 = spc[2]; > + u8 secp = spc[3]; > + u32 tl = get_unaligned_le32(spc + 4); > + > + trace_seq_printf(p, "spsp0=%02x, spsp1=%02x, secp=%02x, tl=%u", > + spsp0, spsp1, secp, tl); > + trace_seq_putc(p, 0); > + return ret; > +} > + > +static const char *nvme_trace_fabrics_auth_receive(struct trace_seq *p, u8 *spc) > +{ > + const char *ret = trace_seq_buffer_ptr(p); > + u8 spsp0 = spc[1]; > + u8 spsp1 = spc[2]; > + u8 secp = spc[3]; > + u32 al = get_unaligned_le32(spc + 4); > + > + trace_seq_printf(p, "spsp0=%02x, spsp1=%02x, secp=%02x, al=%u", > + spsp0, spsp1, secp, al); > + trace_seq_putc(p, 0); > + return ret; > +} > + > static const char *nvme_trace_fabrics_common(struct trace_seq *p, u8 *spc) > { > const char *ret = trace_seq_buffer_ptr(p); > @@ -306,6 +334,10 @@ const char *nvme_trace_parse_fabrics_cmd(struct trace_seq *p, > return nvme_trace_fabrics_connect(p, spc); > case nvme_fabrics_type_property_get: > return nvme_trace_fabrics_property_get(p, spc); > + case nvme_fabrics_type_auth_send: > + return nvme_trace_fabrics_auth_send(p, spc); > + case nvme_fabrics_type_auth_receive: > + return nvme_trace_fabrics_auth_receive(p, spc); > default: > return nvme_trace_fabrics_common(p, spc); > } >

diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig b/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig index dc0450ca23a3..97e8412dc42d 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig @@ -83,3 +83,15 @@ config NVME_TCP from https://github.com/linux-nvme/nvme-cli. If unsure, say N. + +config NVME_AUTH + bool "NVM Express over Fabrics In-Band Authentication" + depends on NVME_CORE + select CRYPTO_HMAC + select CRYPTO_SHA256 + select CRYPTO_SHA512 + help + This provides support for NVMe over Fabrics In-Band Authentication + for the NVMe over TCP transport. + + If unsure, say N. diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/Makefile b/drivers/nvme/host/Makefile index dfaacd472e5d..4bae2a4a8d8c 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/Makefile +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/Makefile @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ nvme-core-$(CONFIG_NVME_MULTIPATH) += multipath.o nvme-core-$(CONFIG_BLK_DEV_ZONED) += zns.o nvme-core-$(CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FS) += fault_inject.o nvme-core-$(CONFIG_NVME_HWMON) += hwmon.o +nvme-core-$(CONFIG_NVME_AUTH) += auth.o nvme-y += pci.o diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5393ac16a002 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c @@ -0,0 +1,1285 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (c) 2020 Hannes Reinecke, SUSE Linux + */ + +#include <linux/crc32.h> +#include <linux/base64.h> +#include <asm/unaligned.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/dh.h> +#include <crypto/ffdhe.h> +#include "nvme.h" +#include "fabrics.h" +#include "auth.h" + +static u32 nvme_dhchap_seqnum; + +struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context { + struct list_head entry; + struct work_struct auth_work; + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl; + struct crypto_shash *shash_tfm; + struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm; + void *buf; + size_t buf_size; + int qid; + int error; + u32 s1; + u32 s2; + u16 transaction; + u8 status; + u8 hash_id; + u8 hash_len; + u8 dhgroup_id; + u8 c1[64]; + u8 c2[64]; + u8 response[64]; + u8 *host_response; +}; + +static struct nvme_auth_dhgroup_map { + int id; + const char name[16]; + const char kpp[16]; + int privkey_size; + int pubkey_size; +} dhgroup_map[] = { + { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_NULL, + .name = "NULL", .kpp = "NULL", + .privkey_size = 0, .pubkey_size = 0 }, + { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_2048, + .name = "ffdhe2048", .kpp = "dh", + .privkey_size = 256, .pubkey_size = 256 }, + { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_3072, + .name = "ffdhe3072", .kpp = "dh", + .privkey_size = 384, .pubkey_size = 384 }, + { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_4096, + .name = "ffdhe4096", .kpp = "dh", + .privkey_size = 512, .pubkey_size = 512 }, + { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_6144, + .name = "ffdhe6144", .kpp = "dh", + .privkey_size = 768, .pubkey_size = 768 }, + { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_8192, + .name = "ffdhe8192", .kpp = "dh", + .privkey_size = 1024, .pubkey_size = 1024 }, +}; + +const char *nvme_auth_dhgroup_name(int dhgroup_id) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) { + if (dhgroup_map[i].id == dhgroup_id) + return dhgroup_map[i].name; + } + return NULL; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_name); + +int nvme_auth_dhgroup_pubkey_size(int dhgroup_id) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) { + if (dhgroup_map[i].id == dhgroup_id) + return dhgroup_map[i].pubkey_size; + } + return -1; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_pubkey_size); + +int nvme_auth_dhgroup_privkey_size(int dhgroup_id) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) { + if (dhgroup_map[i].id == dhgroup_id) + return dhgroup_map[i].privkey_size; + } + return -1; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_privkey_size); + +const char *nvme_auth_dhgroup_kpp(int dhgroup_id) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) { + if (dhgroup_map[i].id == dhgroup_id) + return dhgroup_map[i].kpp; + } + return NULL; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_kpp); + +int nvme_auth_dhgroup_id(const char *dhgroup_name) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) { + if (!strncmp(dhgroup_map[i].name, dhgroup_name, + strlen(dhgroup_map[i].name))) + return dhgroup_map[i].id; + } + return -1; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_id); + +static struct nvme_dhchap_hash_map { + int id; + const char hmac[15]; + const char digest[15]; +} hash_map[] = { + {.id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA256, + .hmac = "hmac(sha256)", .digest = "sha256" }, + {.id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA384, + .hmac = "hmac(sha384)", .digest = "sha384" }, + {.id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA512, + .hmac = "hmac(sha512)", .digest = "sha512" }, +}; + +const char *nvme_auth_hmac_name(int hmac_id) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hash_map); i++) { + if (hash_map[i].id == hmac_id) + return hash_map[i].hmac; + } + return NULL; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_name); + +const char *nvme_auth_digest_name(int hmac_id) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hash_map); i++) { + if (hash_map[i].id == hmac_id) + return hash_map[i].digest; + } + return NULL; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_digest_name); + +int nvme_auth_hmac_id(const char *hmac_name) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hash_map); i++) { + if (!strncmp(hash_map[i].hmac, hmac_name, + strlen(hash_map[i].hmac))) + return hash_map[i].id; + } + return -1; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_id); + +unsigned char *nvme_auth_extract_secret(unsigned char *secret, size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *key; + u32 crc; + int key_len; + size_t allocated_len; + + allocated_len = strlen(secret); + key = kzalloc(allocated_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!key) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + key_len = base64_decode(secret, allocated_len, key); + if (key_len != 36 && key_len != 52 && + key_len != 68) { + pr_debug("Invalid DH-HMAC-CHAP key len %d\n", + key_len); + kfree_sensitive(key); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + } + + /* The last four bytes is the CRC in little-endian format */ + key_len -= 4; + /* + * The linux implementation doesn't do pre- and post-increments, + * so we have to do it manually. + */ + crc = ~crc32(~0, key, key_len); + + if (get_unaligned_le32(key + key_len) != crc) { + pr_debug("DH-HMAC-CHAP key crc mismatch (key %08x, crc %08x)\n", + get_unaligned_le32(key + key_len), crc); + kfree_sensitive(key); + return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED); + } + *out_len = key_len; + return key; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_extract_secret); + +u8 *nvme_auth_transform_key(u8 *key, size_t key_len, u8 key_hash, char *nqn) +{ + const char *hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(key_hash); + struct crypto_shash *key_tfm; + struct shash_desc *shash; + u8 *transformed_key; + int ret; + + /* No key transformation required */ + if (key_hash == 0) + return 0; + + hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(key_hash); + if (!hmac_name) { + pr_warn("Invalid key hash id %d\n", key_hash); + return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED); + } + key_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(key_tfm)) + return (u8 *)key_tfm; + + shash = kmalloc(sizeof(struct shash_desc) + + crypto_shash_descsize(key_tfm), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!shash) { + crypto_free_shash(key_tfm); + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + } + transformed_key = kzalloc(crypto_shash_digestsize(key_tfm), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!transformed_key) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out_free_shash; + } + + shash->tfm = key_tfm; + ret = crypto_shash_setkey(key_tfm, key, key_len); + if (ret < 0) + goto out_free_shash; + ret = crypto_shash_init(shash); + if (ret < 0) + goto out_free_shash; + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, nqn, strlen(nqn)); + if (ret < 0) + goto out_free_shash; + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, "NVMe-over-Fabrics", 17); + if (ret < 0) + goto out_free_shash; + ret = crypto_shash_final(shash, transformed_key); +out_free_shash: + kfree(shash); + crypto_free_shash(key_tfm); + if (ret < 0) { + kfree_sensitive(transformed_key); + return ERR_PTR(ret); + } + return transformed_key; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_transform_key); + +static int nvme_auth_hash_skey(int hmac_id, u8 *skey, size_t skey_len, u8 *hkey) +{ + const char *digest_name; + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + int ret; + + digest_name = nvme_auth_digest_name(hmac_id); + if (!digest_name) { + pr_debug("%s: failed to get digest for %d\n", __func__, + hmac_id); + return -EINVAL; + } + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(digest_name, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, skey, skey_len, hkey); + if (ret < 0) + pr_debug("%s: Failed to hash digest len %zu\n", __func__, + skey_len); + + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + return ret; +} + +int nvme_auth_augmented_challenge(u8 hmac_id, u8 *skey, size_t skey_len, + u8 *challenge, u8 *aug, size_t hlen) +{ + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + struct shash_desc *desc; + u8 *hashed_key; + const char *hmac_name; + int ret; + + hashed_key = kmalloc(hlen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!hashed_key) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = nvme_auth_hash_skey(hmac_id, skey, + skey_len, hashed_key); + if (ret < 0) + goto out_free_key; + + hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(hmac_id); + if (!hmac_name) { + pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algoritm %d\n", + __func__, hmac_id); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_free_key; + } + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(tfm); + goto out_free_key; + } + desc = kmalloc(sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!desc) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out_free_hash; + } + desc->tfm = tfm; + + ret = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, hashed_key, hlen); + if (ret) + goto out_free_desc; + + ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); + if (ret) + goto out_free_desc; + + ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, challenge, hlen); + if (ret) + goto out_free_desc; + + ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, aug); +out_free_desc: + kfree_sensitive(desc); +out_free_hash: + crypto_free_shash(tfm); +out_free_key: + kfree_sensitive(hashed_key); + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_augmented_challenge); + +int nvme_auth_gen_privkey(struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm, int dh_gid) +{ + char *pkey; + int ret, pkey_len; + + if (dh_gid == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_2048 || + dh_gid == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_3072 || + dh_gid == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_4096 || + dh_gid == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_6144 || + dh_gid == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_8192) { + struct dh p = {0}; + int bits = nvme_auth_dhgroup_pubkey_size(dh_gid) << 3; + int dh_secret_len = 64; + u8 *dh_secret = kzalloc(dh_secret_len, GFP_KERNEL); + + if (!dh_secret) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* + * NVMe base spec v2.0: The DH value shall be set to the value + * of g^x mod p, where 'x' is a random number selected by the + * host that shall be at least 256 bits long. + * + * We will be using a 512 bit random number as private key. + * This is large enough to provide adequate security, but + * small enough such that we can trivially conform to + * NIST SB800-56A section 5.6.1.1.4 if + * we guarantee that the random number is not either + * all 0xff or all 0x00. But that should be guaranteed + * by the in-kernel RNG anyway. + */ + get_random_bytes(dh_secret, dh_secret_len); + + ret = crypto_ffdhe_params(&p, bits); + if (ret) { + kfree_sensitive(dh_secret); + return ret; + } + + p.key = dh_secret; + p.key_size = dh_secret_len; + + pkey_len = crypto_dh_key_len(&p); + pkey = kmalloc(pkey_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pkey) { + kfree_sensitive(dh_secret); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + get_random_bytes(pkey, pkey_len); + ret = crypto_dh_encode_key(pkey, pkey_len, &p); + if (ret) { + pr_debug("failed to encode private key, error %d\n", + ret); + kfree_sensitive(dh_secret); + goto out; + } + } else { + pr_warn("invalid dh group %d\n", dh_gid); + return -EINVAL; + } + ret = crypto_kpp_set_secret(dh_tfm, pkey, pkey_len); + if (ret) + pr_debug("failed to set private key, error %d\n", ret); +out: + kfree_sensitive(pkey); + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_gen_privkey); + +int nvme_auth_gen_pubkey(struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm, + u8 *host_key, size_t host_key_len) +{ + struct kpp_request *req; + struct crypto_wait wait; + struct scatterlist dst; + int ret; + + req = kpp_request_alloc(dh_tfm, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) + return -ENOMEM; + + crypto_init_wait(&wait); + kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0); + sg_init_one(&dst, host_key, host_key_len); + kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, host_key_len); + kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, + crypto_req_done, &wait); + + ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req), &wait); + + kpp_request_free(req); + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_gen_pubkey); + +int nvme_auth_gen_shared_secret(struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm, + u8 *ctrl_key, size_t ctrl_key_len, + u8 *sess_key, size_t sess_key_len) +{ + struct kpp_request *req; + struct crypto_wait wait; + struct scatterlist src, dst; + int ret; + + req = kpp_request_alloc(dh_tfm, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) + return -ENOMEM; + + crypto_init_wait(&wait); + sg_init_one(&src, ctrl_key, ctrl_key_len); + kpp_request_set_input(req, &src, ctrl_key_len); + sg_init_one(&dst, sess_key, sess_key_len); + kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, sess_key_len); + kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, + crypto_req_done, &wait); + + ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req), &wait); + + kpp_request_free(req); + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_gen_shared_secret); + +static int nvme_auth_send(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid, + void *data, size_t tl) +{ + struct nvme_command cmd = {}; + blk_mq_req_flags_t flags = qid == NVME_QID_ANY ? + 0 : BLK_MQ_REQ_NOWAIT | BLK_MQ_REQ_RESERVED; + struct request_queue *q = qid == NVME_QID_ANY ? + ctrl->fabrics_q : ctrl->connect_q; + int ret; + + cmd.auth_send.opcode = nvme_fabrics_command; + cmd.auth_send.fctype = nvme_fabrics_type_auth_send; + cmd.auth_send.secp = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_PROTOCOL_IDENTIFIER; + cmd.auth_send.spsp0 = 0x01; + cmd.auth_send.spsp1 = 0x01; + cmd.auth_send.tl = tl; + + ret = __nvme_submit_sync_cmd(q, &cmd, NULL, data, tl, 0, qid, + 0, flags); + if (ret > 0) + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, + "%s: qid %d nvme status %d\n", __func__, qid, ret); + else if (ret < 0) + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, + "%s: qid %d error %d\n", __func__, qid, ret); + return ret; +} + +static int nvme_auth_receive(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid, + void *buf, size_t al) +{ + struct nvme_command cmd = {}; + blk_mq_req_flags_t flags = qid == NVME_QID_ANY ? + 0 : BLK_MQ_REQ_NOWAIT | BLK_MQ_REQ_RESERVED; + struct request_queue *q = qid == NVME_QID_ANY ? + ctrl->fabrics_q : ctrl->connect_q; + int ret; + + cmd.auth_receive.opcode = nvme_fabrics_command; + cmd.auth_receive.fctype = nvme_fabrics_type_auth_receive; + cmd.auth_receive.secp = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_PROTOCOL_IDENTIFIER; + cmd.auth_receive.spsp0 = 0x01; + cmd.auth_receive.spsp1 = 0x01; + cmd.auth_receive.al = al; + + ret = __nvme_submit_sync_cmd(q, &cmd, NULL, buf, al, 0, qid, + 0, flags); + if (ret > 0) { + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d nvme status %x\n", + __func__, qid, ret); + ret = -EIO; + } + if (ret < 0) { + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d error %d\n", + __func__, qid, ret); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int nvme_auth_receive_validate(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid, + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_failure_data *data, + u16 transaction, u8 expected_msg) +{ + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d auth_type %d auth_id %x\n", + __func__, qid, data->auth_type, data->auth_id); + + if (data->auth_type == NVME_AUTH_COMMON_MESSAGES && + data->auth_id == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_FAILURE1) { + return data->rescode_exp; + } + if (data->auth_type != NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGES || + data->auth_id != expected_msg) { + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid %d invalid message %02x/%02x\n", + qid, data->auth_type, data->auth_id); + return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_MESSAGE; + } + if (le16_to_cpu(data->t_id) != transaction) { + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid %d invalid transaction ID %d\n", + qid, le16_to_cpu(data->t_id)); + return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_MESSAGE; + } + return 0; +} + +static int nvme_auth_set_dhchap_negotiate_data(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) +{ + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_negotiate_data *data = chap->buf; + size_t size = sizeof(*data) + sizeof(union nvmf_auth_protocol); + + if (chap->buf_size < size) { + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD; + return -EINVAL; + } + memset((u8 *)chap->buf, 0, size); + data->auth_type = NVME_AUTH_COMMON_MESSAGES; + data->auth_id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_NEGOTIATE; + data->t_id = cpu_to_le16(chap->transaction); + data->sc_c = 0; /* No secure channel concatenation */ + data->napd = 1; + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.authid = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_AUTH_ID; + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.halen = 3; + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.dhlen = 6; + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[0] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA256; + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[1] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA384; + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[2] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA512; + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[3] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_NULL; + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[4] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_2048; + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[5] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_3072; + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[6] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_4096; + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[7] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_6144; + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[8] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_8192; + + return size; +} + +static int nvme_auth_process_dhchap_challenge(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) +{ + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_challenge_data *data = chap->buf; + size_t size = sizeof(*data) + data->hl + data->dhvlen; + const char *hmac_name; + + if (chap->buf_size < size) { + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD; + return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD; + } + + hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(data->hashid); + if (!hmac_name) { + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid %d: invalid HASH ID %d\n", + chap->qid, data->hashid); + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_HASH_UNUSABLE; + return -EPROTO; + } + if (chap->hash_id == data->hashid && chap->shash_tfm && + !strcmp(crypto_shash_alg_name(chap->shash_tfm), hmac_name) && + crypto_shash_digestsize(chap->shash_tfm) == data->hl) { + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, + "qid %d: reuse existing hash %s\n", + chap->qid, hmac_name); + goto select_kpp; + } + if (chap->shash_tfm) { + crypto_free_shash(chap->shash_tfm); + chap->hash_id = 0; + chap->hash_len = 0; + } + chap->shash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY); + if (IS_ERR(chap->shash_tfm)) { + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid %d: failed to allocate hash %s, error %ld\n", + chap->qid, hmac_name, PTR_ERR(chap->shash_tfm)); + chap->shash_tfm = NULL; + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_FAILED; + return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED; + } + if (crypto_shash_digestsize(chap->shash_tfm) != data->hl) { + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid %d: invalid hash length %d\n", + chap->qid, data->hl); + crypto_free_shash(chap->shash_tfm); + chap->shash_tfm = NULL; + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_HASH_UNUSABLE; + return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED; + } + if (chap->hash_id != data->hashid) { + kfree(chap->host_response); + chap->host_response = NULL; + } + chap->hash_id = data->hashid; + chap->hash_len = data->hl; + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "qid %d: selected hash %s\n", + chap->qid, hmac_name); + + gid_name = nvme_auth_dhgroup_kpp(data->dhgid); + if (!gid_name) { + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid %d: invalid DH group id %d\n", + chap->qid, data->dhgid); + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_DHGROUP_UNUSABLE; + return -EPROTO; + } + + if (data->dhgid != NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_NULL) { + if (data->dhvlen == 0) { + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid %d: empty DH value\n", + chap->qid); + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_DHGROUP_UNUSABLE; + return -EPROTO; + } + chap->dh_tfm = crypto_alloc_kpp(gid_name, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(chap->dh_tfm)) { + int ret = PTR_ERR(chap->dh_tfm); + + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid %d: failed to initialize %s\n", + chap->qid, gid_name); + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_DHGROUP_UNUSABLE; + chap->dh_tfm = NULL; + return ret; + } + chap->dhgroup_id = data->dhgid; + } else if (data->dhvlen != 0) { + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid %d: invalid DH value for NULL DH\n", + chap->qid); + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_DHGROUP_UNUSABLE; + return -EPROTO; + } + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "qid %d: selected DH group %s\n", + chap->qid, gid_name); + +select_kpp: + chap->s1 = le32_to_cpu(data->seqnum); + memcpy(chap->c1, data->cval, chap->hash_len); + + return 0; +} + +static int nvme_auth_set_dhchap_reply_data(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) +{ + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_reply_data *data = chap->buf; + size_t size = sizeof(*data); + + size += 2 * chap->hash_len; + if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_bidi) { + get_random_bytes(chap->c2, chap->hash_len); + chap->s2 = nvme_dhchap_seqnum++; + } else + memset(chap->c2, 0, chap->hash_len); + + + if (chap->buf_size < size) { + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD; + return -EINVAL; + } + memset(chap->buf, 0, size); + data->auth_type = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGES; + data->auth_id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_REPLY; + data->t_id = cpu_to_le16(chap->transaction); + data->hl = chap->hash_len; + data->dhvlen = 0; + data->seqnum = cpu_to_le32(chap->s2); + memcpy(data->rval, chap->response, chap->hash_len); + if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_bidi) { + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d ctrl challenge %*ph\n", + __func__, chap->qid, + chap->hash_len, chap->c2); + data->cvalid = 1; + memcpy(data->rval + chap->hash_len, chap->c2, + chap->hash_len); + } + return size; +} + +static int nvme_auth_process_dhchap_success1(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) +{ + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_success1_data *data = chap->buf; + size_t size = sizeof(*data); + + if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_bidi) + size += chap->hash_len; + + + if (chap->buf_size < size) { + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD; + return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD; + } + + if (data->hl != chap->hash_len) { + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid %d: invalid hash length %d\n", + chap->qid, data->hl); + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_HASH_UNUSABLE; + return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD; + } + + if (!data->rvalid) + return 0; + + /* Validate controller response */ + if (memcmp(chap->response, data->rval, data->hl)) { + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d ctrl response %*ph\n", + __func__, chap->qid, chap->hash_len, data->rval); + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d host response %*ph\n", + __func__, chap->qid, chap->hash_len, chap->response); + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid %d: controller authentication failed\n", + chap->qid); + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_FAILED; + return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED; + } + dev_info(ctrl->device, + "qid %d: controller authenticated\n", + chap->qid); + return 0; +} + +static int nvme_auth_set_dhchap_success2_data(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) +{ + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_success2_data *data = chap->buf; + size_t size = sizeof(*data); + + memset(chap->buf, 0, size); + data->auth_type = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGES; + data->auth_id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_SUCCESS2; + data->t_id = cpu_to_le16(chap->transaction); + + return size; +} + +static int nvme_auth_set_dhchap_failure2_data(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) +{ + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_failure_data *data = chap->buf; + size_t size = sizeof(*data); + + memset(chap->buf, 0, size); + data->auth_type = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGES; + data->auth_id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_FAILURE2; + data->t_id = cpu_to_le16(chap->transaction); + data->rescode = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_REASON_FAILED; + data->rescode_exp = chap->status; + + return size; +} + +static int nvme_auth_dhchap_host_response(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) +{ + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, chap->shash_tfm); + u8 buf[4], *challenge = chap->c1; + int ret; + + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d host response seq %d transaction %d\n", + __func__, chap->qid, chap->s1, chap->transaction); + if (chap->dh_tfm) { + challenge = kmalloc(chap->hash_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!challenge) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + ret = nvme_auth_augmented_challenge(chap->hash_id, + chap->sess_key, + chap->sess_key_len, + chap->c1, challenge, + chap->hash_len); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + shash->tfm = chap->shash_tfm; + ret = crypto_shash_init(shash); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, challenge, chap->hash_len); + if (ret) + goto out; + put_unaligned_le32(chap->s1, buf); + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 4); + if (ret) + goto out; + put_unaligned_le16(chap->transaction, buf); + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 2); + if (ret) + goto out; + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 1); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, "HostHost", 8); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, ctrl->opts->host->nqn, + strlen(ctrl->opts->host->nqn)); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 1); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, ctrl->opts->subsysnqn, + strlen(ctrl->opts->subsysnqn)); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_final(shash, chap->response); +out: + if (challenge != chap->c1) + kfree(challenge); + return ret; +} + +static int nvme_auth_dhchap_ctrl_response(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) +{ + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, chap->shash_tfm); + u8 buf[4], *challenge = chap->c2; + int ret; + + if (chap->dh_tfm) { + challenge = kmalloc(chap->hash_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!challenge) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + ret = nvme_auth_augmented_challenge(chap->hash_id, + chap->sess_key, + chap->sess_key_len, + chap->c2, challenge, + chap->hash_len); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d host response seq %d transaction %d\n", + __func__, chap->qid, chap->s2, chap->transaction); + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d challenge %*ph\n", + __func__, chap->qid, chap->hash_len, challenge); + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d subsysnqn %s\n", + __func__, chap->qid, ctrl->opts->subsysnqn); + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d hostnqn %s\n", + __func__, chap->qid, ctrl->opts->host->nqn); + shash->tfm = chap->shash_tfm; + ret = crypto_shash_init(shash); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, challenge, chap->hash_len); + if (ret) + goto out; + put_unaligned_le32(chap->s2, buf); + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 4); + if (ret) + goto out; + put_unaligned_le16(chap->transaction, buf); + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 2); + if (ret) + goto out; + memset(buf, 0, 4); + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 1); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, "Controller", 10); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, ctrl->opts->subsysnqn, + strlen(ctrl->opts->subsysnqn)); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 1); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, ctrl->opts->host->nqn, + strlen(ctrl->opts->host->nqn)); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = crypto_shash_final(shash, chap->response); +out: + if (challenge != chap->c2) + kfree(challenge); + return ret; +} + +int nvme_auth_generate_key(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) +{ + int ret; + u8 key_hash; + + if (!ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret) + return 0; + + if (ctrl->dhchap_key && ctrl->dhchap_key_len) + /* Key already set */ + return 0; + + if (sscanf(ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret, "DHHC-1:%hhd:%*s:", + &key_hash) != 1) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Pass in the secret without the 'DHHC-1:XX:' prefix */ + ctrl->dhchap_key = nvme_auth_extract_secret(ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret + 10, + &ctrl->dhchap_key_len); + if (IS_ERR(ctrl->dhchap_key)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->dhchap_key); + ctrl->dhchap_key = NULL; + return ret; + } + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_generate_key); + +static void nvme_auth_reset(struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) +{ + chap->status = 0; + chap->error = 0; + chap->s1 = 0; + chap->s2 = 0; + chap->transaction = 0; + memset(chap->c1, 0, sizeof(chap->c1)); + memset(chap->c2, 0, sizeof(chap->c2)); +} + +static void __nvme_auth_free(struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap) +{ + if (chap->shash_tfm) + crypto_free_shash(chap->shash_tfm); + kfree_sensitive(chap->host_response); + kfree(chap->buf); + kfree(chap); +} + +static void __nvme_auth_work(struct work_struct *work) +{ + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap = + container_of(work, struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context, auth_work); + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = chap->ctrl; + size_t tl; + int ret = 0; + + chap->transaction = ctrl->transaction++; + + /* DH-HMAC-CHAP Step 1: send negotiate */ + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d send negotiate\n", + __func__, chap->qid); + ret = nvme_auth_set_dhchap_negotiate_data(ctrl, chap); + if (ret < 0) { + chap->error = ret; + return; + } + tl = ret; + ret = nvme_auth_send(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, tl); + if (ret) { + chap->error = ret; + return; + } + + /* DH-HMAC-CHAP Step 2: receive challenge */ + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d receive challenge\n", + __func__, chap->qid); + + memset(chap->buf, 0, chap->buf_size); + ret = nvme_auth_receive(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, chap->buf_size); + if (ret) { + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid %d failed to receive challenge, %s %d\n", + chap->qid, ret < 0 ? "error" : "nvme status", ret); + chap->error = ret; + return; + } + ret = nvme_auth_receive_validate(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, chap->transaction, + NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_CHALLENGE); + if (ret) { + chap->status = ret; + chap->error = NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED; + return; + } + + ret = nvme_auth_process_dhchap_challenge(ctrl, chap); + if (ret) { + /* Invalid challenge parameters */ + goto fail2; + } + + if (chap->ctrl_key_len) { + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, + "%s: qid %d DH exponential\n", + __func__, chap->qid); + ret = nvme_auth_dhchap_exponential(ctrl, chap); + if (ret) + goto fail2; + } + + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d host response\n", + __func__, chap->qid); + ret = nvme_auth_dhchap_host_response(ctrl, chap); + if (ret) + goto fail2; + + /* DH-HMAC-CHAP Step 3: send reply */ + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d send reply\n", + __func__, chap->qid); + ret = nvme_auth_set_dhchap_reply_data(ctrl, chap); + if (ret < 0) + goto fail2; + + tl = ret; + ret = nvme_auth_send(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, tl); + if (ret) + goto fail2; + + /* DH-HMAC-CHAP Step 4: receive success1 */ + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d receive success1\n", + __func__, chap->qid); + + memset(chap->buf, 0, chap->buf_size); + ret = nvme_auth_receive(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, chap->buf_size); + if (ret) { + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid %d failed to receive success1, %s %d\n", + chap->qid, ret < 0 ? "error" : "nvme status", ret); + chap->error = ret; + return; + } + ret = nvme_auth_receive_validate(ctrl, chap->qid, + chap->buf, chap->transaction, + NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_SUCCESS1); + if (ret) { + chap->status = ret; + chap->error = NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED; + return; + } + + if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_bidi) { + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, + "%s: qid %d controller response\n", + __func__, chap->qid); + ret = nvme_auth_dhchap_ctrl_response(ctrl, chap); + if (ret) + goto fail2; + } + + ret = nvme_auth_process_dhchap_success1(ctrl, chap); + if (ret < 0) { + /* Controller authentication failed */ + goto fail2; + } + + /* DH-HMAC-CHAP Step 5: send success2 */ + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d send success2\n", + __func__, chap->qid); + tl = nvme_auth_set_dhchap_success2_data(ctrl, chap); + ret = nvme_auth_send(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, tl); + if (!ret) { + chap->error = 0; + return; + } + +fail2: + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d send failure2, status %x\n", + __func__, chap->qid, chap->status); + tl = nvme_auth_set_dhchap_failure2_data(ctrl, chap); + ret = nvme_auth_send(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, tl); + if (!ret) + ret = -EPROTO; + chap->error = ret; +} + +int nvme_auth_negotiate(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid) +{ + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap; + + if (!ctrl->dhchap_key || !ctrl->dhchap_key_len) { + dev_warn(ctrl->device, "qid %d: no key\n", qid); + return -ENOKEY; + } + + mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); + /* Check if the context is already queued */ + list_for_each_entry(chap, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_list, entry) { + if (chap->qid == qid) { + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); + queue_work(nvme_wq, &chap->auth_work); + return 0; + } + } + chap = kzalloc(sizeof(*chap), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!chap) { + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); + return -ENOMEM; + } + chap->qid = qid; + chap->ctrl = ctrl; + + /* + * Allocate a large enough buffer for the entire negotiation: + * 4k should be enough to ffdhe8192. + */ + chap->buf_size = 4096; + chap->buf = kzalloc(chap->buf_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!chap->buf) { + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); + kfree(chap); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + INIT_WORK(&chap->auth_work, __nvme_auth_work); + list_add(&chap->entry, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_list); + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); + queue_work(nvme_wq, &chap->auth_work); + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_negotiate); + +int nvme_auth_wait(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid) +{ + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap; + int ret; + + mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); + list_for_each_entry(chap, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_list, entry) { + if (chap->qid != qid) + continue; + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); + flush_work(&chap->auth_work); + ret = chap->error; + nvme_auth_reset(chap); + return ret; + } + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); + return -ENXIO; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_wait); + +/* Assumes that the controller is in state RESETTING */ +static void nvme_dhchap_auth_work(struct work_struct *work) +{ + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = + container_of(work, struct nvme_ctrl, dhchap_auth_work); + int ret, q; + + nvme_stop_queues(ctrl); + /* Authenticate admin queue first */ + ret = nvme_auth_negotiate(ctrl, NVME_QID_ANY); + if (ret) { + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid 0: error %d setting up authentication\n", ret); + goto out; + } + ret = nvme_auth_wait(ctrl, NVME_QID_ANY); + if (ret) { + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid 0: authentication failed\n"); + goto out; + } + dev_info(ctrl->device, "qid 0: authenticated\n"); + + for (q = 1; q < ctrl->queue_count; q++) { + ret = nvme_auth_negotiate(ctrl, q); + if (ret) { + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid %d: error %d setting up authentication\n", + q, ret); + goto out; + } + } +out: + /* + * Failure is a soft-state; credentials remain valid until + * the controller terminates the connection. + */ + if (nvme_change_ctrl_state(ctrl, NVME_CTRL_LIVE)) + nvme_start_queues(ctrl); +} + +void nvme_auth_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) +{ + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_list); + INIT_WORK(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_work, nvme_dhchap_auth_work); + mutex_init(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); + nvme_auth_generate_key(ctrl); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_init_ctrl); + +void nvme_auth_stop(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) +{ + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap = NULL, *tmp; + + cancel_work_sync(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_work); + mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); + list_for_each_entry_safe(chap, tmp, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_list, entry) + cancel_work_sync(&chap->auth_work); + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_stop); + +void nvme_auth_free(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) +{ + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap = NULL, *tmp; + + mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); + list_for_each_entry_safe(chap, tmp, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_list, entry) { + list_del_init(&chap->entry); + flush_work(&chap->auth_work); + __nvme_auth_free(chap); + } + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex); + kfree(ctrl->dhchap_key); + ctrl->dhchap_key = NULL; + ctrl->dhchap_key_len = 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_free); diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.h b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cf1255f9db6d --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.h @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2021 Hannes Reinecke, SUSE Software Solutions + */ + +#ifndef _NVME_AUTH_H +#define _NVME_AUTH_H + +#include <crypto/kpp.h> + +const char *nvme_auth_dhgroup_name(int dhgroup_id); +int nvme_auth_dhgroup_pubkey_size(int dhgroup_id); +int nvme_auth_dhgroup_privkey_size(int dhgroup_id); +const char *nvme_auth_dhgroup_kpp(int dhgroup_id); +int nvme_auth_dhgroup_id(const char *dhgroup_name); + +const char *nvme_auth_hmac_name(int hmac_id); +const char *nvme_auth_digest_name(int hmac_id); +int nvme_auth_hmac_id(const char *hmac_name); + +unsigned char *nvme_auth_extract_secret(unsigned char *dhchap_secret, + size_t *dhchap_key_len); +u8 *nvme_auth_transform_key(u8 *key, size_t key_len, u8 key_hash, char *nqn); + +#endif /* _NVME_AUTH_H */ diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c index 7efb31b87f37..f669b054790b 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include "nvme.h" #include "fabrics.h" +#include "auth.h" #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include "trace.h" @@ -322,6 +323,7 @@ enum nvme_disposition { COMPLETE, RETRY, FAILOVER, + AUTHENTICATE, }; static inline enum nvme_disposition nvme_decide_disposition(struct request *req) @@ -329,6 +331,9 @@ static inline enum nvme_disposition nvme_decide_disposition(struct request *req) if (likely(nvme_req(req)->status == 0)) return COMPLETE; + if ((nvme_req(req)->status & 0x7ff) == NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED) + return AUTHENTICATE; + if (blk_noretry_request(req) || (nvme_req(req)->status & NVME_SC_DNR) || nvme_req(req)->retries >= nvme_max_retries) @@ -361,11 +366,13 @@ static inline void nvme_end_req(struct request *req) void nvme_complete_rq(struct request *req) { + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = nvme_req(req)->ctrl; + trace_nvme_complete_rq(req); nvme_cleanup_cmd(req); - if (nvme_req(req)->ctrl->kas) - nvme_req(req)->ctrl->comp_seen = true; + if (ctrl->kas) + ctrl->comp_seen = true; switch (nvme_decide_disposition(req)) { case COMPLETE: @@ -377,6 +384,15 @@ void nvme_complete_rq(struct request *req) case FAILOVER: nvme_failover_req(req); return; + case AUTHENTICATE: +#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_AUTH + if (nvme_change_ctrl_state(ctrl, NVME_CTRL_RESETTING)) + queue_work(nvme_wq, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_work); + nvme_retry_req(req); +#else + nvme_end_req(req); +#endif + return; } } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_complete_rq); @@ -707,7 +723,9 @@ bool __nvme_check_ready(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, struct request *rq, switch (ctrl->state) { case NVME_CTRL_CONNECTING: if (blk_rq_is_passthrough(rq) && nvme_is_fabrics(req->cmd) && - req->cmd->fabrics.fctype == nvme_fabrics_type_connect) + (req->cmd->fabrics.fctype == nvme_fabrics_type_connect || + req->cmd->fabrics.fctype == nvme_fabrics_type_auth_send || + req->cmd->fabrics.fctype == nvme_fabrics_type_auth_receive)) return true; break; default: @@ -3458,6 +3476,51 @@ static ssize_t nvme_ctrl_fast_io_fail_tmo_store(struct device *dev, static DEVICE_ATTR(fast_io_fail_tmo, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, nvme_ctrl_fast_io_fail_tmo_show, nvme_ctrl_fast_io_fail_tmo_store); +#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_AUTH +static ssize_t nvme_ctrl_dhchap_secret_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts = ctrl->opts; + + if (!opts->dhchap_secret) + return sysfs_emit(buf, "none\n"); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", opts->dhchap_secret); +} + +static ssize_t nvme_ctrl_dhchap_secret_store(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t count) +{ + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts = ctrl->opts; + char *dhchap_secret; + + if (!ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret) + return -EINVAL; + if (count < 7) + return -EINVAL; + if (memcmp(buf, "DHHC-1:", 7)) + return -EINVAL; + + dhchap_secret = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!dhchap_secret) + return -ENOMEM; + memcpy(dhchap_secret, buf, count); + if (strcmp(dhchap_secret, opts->dhchap_secret)) { + kfree(opts->dhchap_secret); + opts->dhchap_secret = dhchap_secret; + /* Key has changed; reset authentication data */ + nvme_auth_free(ctrl); + nvme_auth_generate_key(ctrl); + } + if (nvme_change_ctrl_state(ctrl, NVME_CTRL_RESETTING)) + queue_work(nvme_wq, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_work); + return count; +} +DEVICE_ATTR(dhchap_secret, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, + nvme_ctrl_dhchap_secret_show, nvme_ctrl_dhchap_secret_store); +#endif + static struct attribute *nvme_dev_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_reset_controller.attr, &dev_attr_rescan_controller.attr, @@ -3479,6 +3542,9 @@ static struct attribute *nvme_dev_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_reconnect_delay.attr, &dev_attr_fast_io_fail_tmo.attr, &dev_attr_kato.attr, +#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_AUTH + &dev_attr_dhchap_secret.attr, +#endif NULL }; @@ -3502,6 +3568,10 @@ static umode_t nvme_dev_attrs_are_visible(struct kobject *kobj, return 0; if (a == &dev_attr_fast_io_fail_tmo.attr && !ctrl->opts) return 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_AUTH + if (a == &dev_attr_dhchap_secret.attr && !ctrl->opts) + return 0; +#endif return a->mode; } @@ -4312,6 +4382,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_complete_async_event); void nvme_stop_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) { nvme_mpath_stop(ctrl); + nvme_auth_stop(ctrl); nvme_stop_keep_alive(ctrl); nvme_stop_failfast_work(ctrl); flush_work(&ctrl->async_event_work); @@ -4366,6 +4437,7 @@ static void nvme_free_ctrl(struct device *dev) nvme_free_cels(ctrl); nvme_mpath_uninit(ctrl); + nvme_auth_free(ctrl); __free_page(ctrl->discard_page); if (subsys) { @@ -4456,6 +4528,7 @@ int nvme_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, struct device *dev, nvme_fault_inject_init(&ctrl->fault_inject, dev_name(ctrl->device)); nvme_mpath_init_ctrl(ctrl); + nvme_auth_init_ctrl(ctrl); return 0; out_free_name: diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c index 9a8eade7cd23..ee6058c24743 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c @@ -370,6 +370,7 @@ int nvmf_connect_admin_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) union nvme_result res; struct nvmf_connect_data *data; int ret; + u32 result; cmd.connect.opcode = nvme_fabrics_command; cmd.connect.fctype = nvme_fabrics_type_connect; @@ -402,8 +403,25 @@ int nvmf_connect_admin_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) goto out_free_data; } - ctrl->cntlid = le16_to_cpu(res.u16); - + result = le32_to_cpu(res.u32); + ctrl->cntlid = result & 0xFFFF; + if ((result >> 16) & 2) { + /* Authentication required */ + ret = nvme_auth_negotiate(ctrl, NVME_QID_ANY); + if (ret) { + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid 0: failed to setup authentication\n"); + ret = NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED; + goto out_free_data; + } + ret = nvme_auth_wait(ctrl, NVME_QID_ANY); + if (ret) + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid 0: authentication failed\n"); + else + dev_info(ctrl->device, + "qid 0: authenticated\n"); + } out_free_data: kfree(data); return ret; @@ -436,6 +454,7 @@ int nvmf_connect_io_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, u16 qid) struct nvmf_connect_data *data; union nvme_result res; int ret; + u32 result; cmd.connect.opcode = nvme_fabrics_command; cmd.connect.fctype = nvme_fabrics_type_connect; @@ -461,6 +480,24 @@ int nvmf_connect_io_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, u16 qid) nvmf_log_connect_error(ctrl, ret, le32_to_cpu(res.u32), &cmd, data); } + result = le32_to_cpu(res.u32); + if ((result >> 16) & 2) { + /* Authentication required */ + ret = nvme_auth_negotiate(ctrl, qid); + if (ret) { + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid %d: failed to setup authentication\n", qid); + ret = NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED; + } else { + ret = nvme_auth_wait(ctrl, qid); + if (ret) + dev_warn(ctrl->device, + "qid %u: authentication failed\n", qid); + else + dev_info(ctrl->device, + "qid %u: authenticated\n", qid); + } + } kfree(data); return ret; } @@ -552,6 +589,8 @@ static const match_table_t opt_tokens = { { NVMF_OPT_NR_POLL_QUEUES, "nr_poll_queues=%d" }, { NVMF_OPT_TOS, "tos=%d" }, { NVMF_OPT_FAIL_FAST_TMO, "fast_io_fail_tmo=%d" }, + { NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_SECRET, "dhchap_secret=%s" }, + { NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_BIDI, "dhchap_bidi" }, { NVMF_OPT_ERR, NULL } }; @@ -827,6 +866,23 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts, } opts->tos = token; break; + case NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_SECRET: + p = match_strdup(args); + if (!p) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + if (strlen(p) < 11 || strncmp(p, "DHHC-1:", 7)) { + pr_err("Invalid DH-CHAP secret %s\n", p); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + kfree(opts->dhchap_secret); + opts->dhchap_secret = p; + break; + case NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_BIDI: + opts->dhchap_bidi = true; + break; default: pr_warn("unknown parameter or missing value '%s' in ctrl creation request\n", p); @@ -945,6 +1001,7 @@ void nvmf_free_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts) kfree(opts->subsysnqn); kfree(opts->host_traddr); kfree(opts->host_iface); + kfree(opts->dhchap_secret); kfree(opts); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvmf_free_options); @@ -954,7 +1011,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvmf_free_options); NVMF_OPT_KATO | NVMF_OPT_HOSTNQN | \ NVMF_OPT_HOST_ID | NVMF_OPT_DUP_CONNECT |\ NVMF_OPT_DISABLE_SQFLOW |\ - NVMF_OPT_FAIL_FAST_TMO) + NVMF_OPT_CTRL_LOSS_TMO |\ + NVMF_OPT_FAIL_FAST_TMO |\ + NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_SECRET |\ + NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_BIDI) static struct nvme_ctrl * nvmf_create_ctrl(struct device *dev, const char *buf) @@ -1171,7 +1231,14 @@ static void __exit nvmf_exit(void) BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_connect_command) != 64); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_property_get_command) != 64); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_property_set_command) != 64); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_send_command) != 64); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_receive_command) != 64); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_connect_data) != 1024); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_negotiate_data) != 8); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_challenge_data) != 16); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_reply_data) != 16); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_success1_data) != 16); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_success2_data) != 16); } MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h index a146cb903869..27df1aac5736 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h @@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ enum { NVMF_OPT_TOS = 1 << 19, NVMF_OPT_FAIL_FAST_TMO = 1 << 20, NVMF_OPT_HOST_IFACE = 1 << 21, + NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_SECRET = 1 << 22, + NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_BIDI = 1 << 23, }; /** @@ -96,6 +98,8 @@ enum { * @max_reconnects: maximum number of allowed reconnect attempts before removing * the controller, (-1) means reconnect forever, zero means remove * immediately; + * @dhchap_secret: DH-HMAC-CHAP secret + * @dhchap_bidi: enable DH-HMAC-CHAP bi-directional authentication * @disable_sqflow: disable controller sq flow control * @hdr_digest: generate/verify header digest (TCP) * @data_digest: generate/verify data digest (TCP) @@ -120,6 +124,8 @@ struct nvmf_ctrl_options { unsigned int kato; struct nvmf_host *host; int max_reconnects; + char *dhchap_secret; + bool dhchap_bidi; bool disable_sqflow; bool hdr_digest; bool data_digest; diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h b/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h index 9871c0c9374c..b0dcb7d79b9e 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h @@ -318,6 +318,15 @@ struct nvme_ctrl { struct work_struct ana_work; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_AUTH + struct work_struct dhchap_auth_work; + struct list_head dhchap_auth_list; + struct mutex dhchap_auth_mutex; + unsigned char *dhchap_key; + size_t dhchap_key_len; + u16 transaction; +#endif + /* Power saving configuration */ u64 ps_max_latency_us; bool apst_enabled; @@ -885,6 +894,27 @@ static inline bool nvme_ctrl_sgl_supported(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) return ctrl->sgls & ((1 << 0) | (1 << 1)); } +#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_AUTH +void nvme_auth_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl); +void nvme_auth_stop(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl); +int nvme_auth_negotiate(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid); +int nvme_auth_wait(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid); +void nvme_auth_free(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl); +int nvme_auth_generate_key(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl); +#else +static inline void nvme_auth_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) {}; +static inline void nvme_auth_stop(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) {}; +static inline int nvme_auth_negotiate(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid) +{ + return -EPROTONOSUPPORT; +} +static inline int nvme_auth_wait(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid) +{ + return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED; +} +static inline void nvme_auth_free(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) {}; +#endif + u32 nvme_command_effects(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, struct nvme_ns *ns, u8 opcode); int nvme_execute_passthru_rq(struct request *rq); diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/trace.c b/drivers/nvme/host/trace.c index 2a89c5aa0790..1c36fcedea20 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/trace.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/trace.c @@ -287,6 +287,34 @@ static const char *nvme_trace_fabrics_property_get(struct trace_seq *p, u8 *spc) return ret; } +static const char *nvme_trace_fabrics_auth_send(struct trace_seq *p, u8 *spc) +{ + const char *ret = trace_seq_buffer_ptr(p); + u8 spsp0 = spc[1]; + u8 spsp1 = spc[2]; + u8 secp = spc[3]; + u32 tl = get_unaligned_le32(spc + 4); + + trace_seq_printf(p, "spsp0=%02x, spsp1=%02x, secp=%02x, tl=%u", + spsp0, spsp1, secp, tl); + trace_seq_putc(p, 0); + return ret; +} + +static const char *nvme_trace_fabrics_auth_receive(struct trace_seq *p, u8 *spc) +{ + const char *ret = trace_seq_buffer_ptr(p); + u8 spsp0 = spc[1]; + u8 spsp1 = spc[2]; + u8 secp = spc[3]; + u32 al = get_unaligned_le32(spc + 4); + + trace_seq_printf(p, "spsp0=%02x, spsp1=%02x, secp=%02x, al=%u", + spsp0, spsp1, secp, al); + trace_seq_putc(p, 0); + return ret; +} + static const char *nvme_trace_fabrics_common(struct trace_seq *p, u8 *spc) { const char *ret = trace_seq_buffer_ptr(p); @@ -306,6 +334,10 @@ const char *nvme_trace_parse_fabrics_cmd(struct trace_seq *p, return nvme_trace_fabrics_connect(p, spc); case nvme_fabrics_type_property_get: return nvme_trace_fabrics_property_get(p, spc); + case nvme_fabrics_type_auth_send: + return nvme_trace_fabrics_auth_send(p, spc); + case nvme_fabrics_type_auth_receive: + return nvme_trace_fabrics_auth_receive(p, spc); default: return nvme_trace_fabrics_common(p, spc); }

[07/12] nvme: Implement In-Band authentication

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