| Message ID | 20210324170436.31843-2-brijesh.singh@amd.com |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support | expand |
> +static int __init mem_encrypt_snp_init(void) > +{ > + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) > + return 1; > + > + if (rmptable_init()) { > + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP); > + return 1; > + } > + > + static_branch_enable(&snp_enable_key); > + > + return 0; > +} Could you explain a bit why 'snp_enable_key' is needed in addition to X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP? For a lot of features, we just use cpu_feature_enabled(), which does both compile-time and static_cpu_has(). This whole series seems to lack compile-time disables for the code that it adds, like the code it adds to arch/x86/mm/fault.c or even mm/memory.c.
On 3/25/21 8:31 AM, Brijesh Singh wrote: > > On 3/25/21 9:58 AM, Dave Hansen wrote: >>> +static int __init mem_encrypt_snp_init(void) >>> +{ >>> + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) >>> + return 1; >>> + >>> + if (rmptable_init()) { >>> + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP); >>> + return 1; >>> + } >>> + >>> + static_branch_enable(&snp_enable_key); >>> + >>> + return 0; >>> +} >> Could you explain a bit why 'snp_enable_key' is needed in addition to >> X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP? > > > The X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP indicates that hardware supports the feature -- > this does not necessary means that SEV-SNP is enabled in the host. I think you're confusing the CPUID bit that initially populates X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP with the X86_FEATURE bit. We clear X86_FEATURE bits all the time for features that the kernel turns off, even while the hardware supports it. Look at what we do in init_ia32_feat_ctl() for SGX, for instance. We then go on to use X86_FEATURE_SGX at runtime to see if SGX was disabled, even though the hardware supports it. >> For a lot of features, we just use cpu_feature_enabled(), which does >> both compile-time and static_cpu_has(). This whole series seems to lack >> compile-time disables for the code that it adds, like the code it adds >> to arch/x86/mm/fault.c or even mm/memory.c. > > Noted, I will add the #ifdef to make sure that its compiled out when > the config does not have the AMD_MEM_ENCRYPTION enabled. IS_ENABLED() tends to be nicer for these things. Even better is if you coordinate these with your X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP checks. Then, put X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP in disabled-features.h, and you can use cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP) as both a (statically-patched) runtime *AND* compile-time check without an explicit #ifdefs.
On 3/25/21 10:51 AM, Dave Hansen wrote: > On 3/25/21 8:31 AM, Brijesh Singh wrote: >> On 3/25/21 9:58 AM, Dave Hansen wrote: >>>> +static int __init mem_encrypt_snp_init(void) >>>> +{ >>>> + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) >>>> + return 1; >>>> + >>>> + if (rmptable_init()) { >>>> + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP); >>>> + return 1; >>>> + } >>>> + >>>> + static_branch_enable(&snp_enable_key); >>>> + >>>> + return 0; >>>> +} >>> Could you explain a bit why 'snp_enable_key' is needed in addition to >>> X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP? >> >> The X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP indicates that hardware supports the feature -- >> this does not necessary means that SEV-SNP is enabled in the host. > I think you're confusing the CPUID bit that initially populates > X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP with the X86_FEATURE bit. We clear X86_FEATURE bits > all the time for features that the kernel turns off, even while the > hardware supports it. Ah, yes I was getting mixed up. I will see if we can remove the snp_key_enabled and use the feature check. > Look at what we do in init_ia32_feat_ctl() for SGX, for instance. We > then go on to use X86_FEATURE_SGX at runtime to see if SGX was disabled, > even though the hardware supports it. > >>> For a lot of features, we just use cpu_feature_enabled(), which does >>> both compile-time and static_cpu_has(). This whole series seems to lack >>> compile-time disables for the code that it adds, like the code it adds >>> to arch/x86/mm/fault.c or even mm/memory.c. >> Noted, I will add the #ifdef to make sure that its compiled out when >> the config does not have the AMD_MEM_ENCRYPTION enabled. > IS_ENABLED() tends to be nicer for these things. > > Even better is if you coordinate these with your X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP > checks. Then, put X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP in disabled-features.h, and you > can use cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP) as both a > (statically-patched) runtime *AND* compile-time check without an > explicit #ifdefs. I will try improve this in v2 and will try IS_ENABLED().
On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 12:04:07PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote: > @@ -538,6 +540,10 @@ > #define MSR_K8_SYSCFG 0xc0010010 > #define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT 23 > #define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT BIT_ULL(MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT) > +#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_EN_BIT 24 > +#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_EN BIT_ULL(MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_EN_BIT) > +#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN_BIT 25 > +#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN BIT_ULL(MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN_BIT) > #define MSR_K8_INT_PENDING_MSG 0xc0010055 > /* C1E active bits in int pending message */ > #define K8_INTP_C1E_ACTIVE_MASK 0x18000000 Ok, I believe it is finally time to make this MSR architectural and drop this silliness with "K8" in the name. If you wanna send me a prepatch which converts all like this: MSR_K8_SYSCFG -> MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG I'll gladly take it. If you prefer me to do it, I'll gladly do it. > @@ -44,12 +45,16 @@ u64 sev_check_data __section(".data") = 0; > EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask); > DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_enable_key); > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enable_key); > +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(snp_enable_key); > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_enable_key); > > bool sev_enabled __section(".data"); > > /* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */ > static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); > > +static unsigned long rmptable_start, rmptable_end; __ro_after_init I guess. > + > /* > * When SNP is active, this routine changes the page state from private to shared before > * copying the data from the source to destination and restore after the copy. This is required > @@ -528,3 +533,82 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) > print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(); > } > > +static __init void snp_enable(void *arg) > +{ > + u64 val; > + > + rdmsrl_safe(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, &val); Why is this one _safe but the wrmsr isn't? Also, _safe returns a value - check it pls and return early. > + > + val |= MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_EN; > + val |= MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN; > + > + wrmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, val); > +} > + > +static __init int rmptable_init(void) > +{ > + u64 rmp_base, rmp_end; > + unsigned long sz; > + void *start; > + u64 val; > + > + rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE, &rmp_base); > + rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_RMP_END, &rmp_end); Ditto, why _safe if you're checking CPUID? > + > + if (!rmp_base || !rmp_end) { > + pr_info("SEV-SNP: Memory for the RMP table has not been reserved by BIOS\n"); > + return 1; > + } > + > + sz = rmp_end - rmp_base + 1; > + > + start = memremap(rmp_base, sz, MEMREMAP_WB); > + if (!start) { > + pr_err("SEV-SNP: Failed to map RMP table 0x%llx-0x%llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_end); ^^^^^^^ That prefix is done by doing #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "SEV-SNP: " fmt before the SNP-specific functions. > + return 1; > + } > + > + /* > + * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen if we are coming from kexec boot. > + * Do not initialize the RMP table when SEV-SNP is already. > + */ comment can be 80 cols wide. > + rdmsrl_safe(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, &val); As above. > + if (val & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_EN) > + goto skip_enable; > + > + /* Initialize the RMP table to zero */ > + memset(start, 0, sz); > + > + /* Flush the caches to ensure that data is written before we enable the SNP */ > + wbinvd_on_all_cpus(); > + > + /* Enable the SNP feature */ > + on_each_cpu(snp_enable, NULL, 1); What happens if you boot only a subset of the CPUs and then others get hotplugged later? IOW, you need a CPU hotplug notifier which enables the feature bit on newly arrived CPUs. Which makes me wonder whether it makes sense to have this in an initcall and not put it instead in init_amd(): the BSP will do the init work and the APs coming in will see that it has been enabled and only call snp_enable(). Which solves the hotplug thing automagically. > + > +skip_enable: > + rmptable_start = (unsigned long)start; > + rmptable_end = rmptable_start + sz; > + > + pr_info("SEV-SNP: RMP table physical address 0x%016llx - 0x%016llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_end); "RMP table at ..." also, why is this issued in skip_enable? You want to issue it only once, on enable. also, rmp_base and rmp_end look redundant - you can simply use rmptable_start and rmptable_end. Which reminds me - that function needs to check as the very first thing on entry whether SNP is enabled and exit if so - there's no need to read MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE and MSR_AMD64_RMP_END unnecessarily. > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int __init mem_encrypt_snp_init(void) > +{ > + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) > + return 1; > + > + if (rmptable_init()) { > + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP); > + return 1; > + } > + > + static_branch_enable(&snp_enable_key); > + > + return 0; > +} > +/* > + * SEV-SNP must be enabled across all CPUs, so make the initialization as a late initcall. Is there any particular reason for this to be a late initcall? -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
On 4/14/21 2:27 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 12:04:07PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote: >> @@ -538,6 +540,10 @@ >> #define MSR_K8_SYSCFG 0xc0010010 >> #define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT 23 >> #define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT BIT_ULL(MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT) >> +#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_EN_BIT 24 >> +#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_EN BIT_ULL(MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_EN_BIT) >> +#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN_BIT 25 >> +#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN BIT_ULL(MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN_BIT) >> #define MSR_K8_INT_PENDING_MSG 0xc0010055 >> /* C1E active bits in int pending message */ >> #define K8_INTP_C1E_ACTIVE_MASK 0x18000000 > Ok, I believe it is finally time to make this MSR architectural and drop > this silliness with "K8" in the name. If you wanna send me a prepatch which > converts all like this: > > MSR_K8_SYSCFG -> MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG > > I'll gladly take it. If you prefer me to do it, I'll gladly do it. I will send patch to address it. > >> @@ -44,12 +45,16 @@ u64 sev_check_data __section(".data") = 0; >> EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask); >> DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_enable_key); >> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enable_key); >> +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(snp_enable_key); >> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_enable_key); >> >> bool sev_enabled __section(".data"); >> >> /* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */ >> static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); >> >> +static unsigned long rmptable_start, rmptable_end; > __ro_after_init I guess. Yes. > >> + >> /* >> * When SNP is active, this routine changes the page state from private to shared before >> * copying the data from the source to destination and restore after the copy. This is required >> @@ -528,3 +533,82 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) >> print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(); >> } >> >> +static __init void snp_enable(void *arg) >> +{ >> + u64 val; >> + >> + rdmsrl_safe(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, &val); > Why is this one _safe but the wrmsr isn't? Also, _safe returns a value - > check it pls and return early. No strong reason to use _safe. We reached here after all the CPUID checks. I will drop the _safe. > >> + >> + val |= MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_EN; >> + val |= MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN; >> + >> + wrmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, val); >> +} >> + >> +static __init int rmptable_init(void) >> +{ >> + u64 rmp_base, rmp_end; >> + unsigned long sz; >> + void *start; >> + u64 val; >> + >> + rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE, &rmp_base); >> + rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_RMP_END, &rmp_end); > Ditto, why _safe if you're checking CPUID? > >> + >> + if (!rmp_base || !rmp_end) { >> + pr_info("SEV-SNP: Memory for the RMP table has not been reserved by BIOS\n"); >> + return 1; >> + } >> + >> + sz = rmp_end - rmp_base + 1; >> + >> + start = memremap(rmp_base, sz, MEMREMAP_WB); >> + if (!start) { >> + pr_err("SEV-SNP: Failed to map RMP table 0x%llx-0x%llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_end); > ^^^^^^^ > > That prefix is done by doing > > #undef pr_fmt > #define pr_fmt(fmt) "SEV-SNP: " fmt > > before the SNP-specific functions. Sure, I will use it. > >> + return 1; >> + } >> + >> + /* >> + * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen if we are coming from kexec boot. >> + * Do not initialize the RMP table when SEV-SNP is already. >> + */ > comment can be 80 cols wide. Noted. > >> + rdmsrl_safe(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, &val); > As above. > >> + if (val & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_EN) >> + goto skip_enable; >> + >> + /* Initialize the RMP table to zero */ >> + memset(start, 0, sz); >> + >> + /* Flush the caches to ensure that data is written before we enable the SNP */ >> + wbinvd_on_all_cpus(); >> + >> + /* Enable the SNP feature */ >> + on_each_cpu(snp_enable, NULL, 1); > What happens if you boot only a subset of the CPUs and then others get > hotplugged later? IOW, you need a CPU hotplug notifier which enables the > feature bit on newly arrived CPUs. > > Which makes me wonder whether it makes sense to have this in an initcall > and not put it instead in init_amd(): the BSP will do the init work > and the APs coming in will see that it has been enabled and only call > snp_enable(). > > Which solves the hotplug thing automagically. This function need to be called after all the APs are up. But you have raised a very good point regarding the hotplug CPU. Let me look into CPU hotplug notifier and move the MSR initialization for AP inside the AP bringup callbacks. > >> + >> +skip_enable: >> + rmptable_start = (unsigned long)start; >> + rmptable_end = rmptable_start + sz; >> + >> + pr_info("SEV-SNP: RMP table physical address 0x%016llx - 0x%016llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_end); > "RMP table at ..." > > also, why is this issued in skip_enable? You want to issue it only once, > on enable. > > also, rmp_base and rmp_end look redundant - you can simply use > rmptable_start and rmptable_end. > > Which reminds me - that function needs to check as the very first thing > on entry whether SNP is enabled and exit if so - there's no need to read > MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE and MSR_AMD64_RMP_END unnecessarily. We need to store the virtual address of the RMP table range so that RMP table can be accessed later. In next patch we add some helpers to read the RMP table. >> + >> + return 0; >> +} >> + >> +static int __init mem_encrypt_snp_init(void) >> +{ >> + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) >> + return 1; >> + >> + if (rmptable_init()) { >> + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP); >> + return 1; >> + } >> + >> + static_branch_enable(&snp_enable_key); >> + >> + return 0; >> +} >> +/* >> + * SEV-SNP must be enabled across all CPUs, so make the initialization as a late initcall. > Is there any particular reason for this to be a late initcall? I wanted this function to be called after APs are up but your hotplug question is making me rethink this logic. I will work to improve it. >
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index b03694e116fe..1142d31eb06c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -481,6 +481,8 @@ #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT) #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT) #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED_BIT) +#define MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE 0xc0010132 +#define MSR_AMD64_RMP_END 0xc0010133 #define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL 0xc001011f @@ -538,6 +540,10 @@ #define MSR_K8_SYSCFG 0xc0010010 #define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT 23 #define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT BIT_ULL(MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT) +#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_EN_BIT 24 +#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_EN BIT_ULL(MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_EN_BIT) +#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN_BIT 25 +#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN BIT_ULL(MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN_BIT) #define MSR_K8_INT_PENDING_MSG 0xc0010055 /* C1E active bits in int pending message */ #define K8_INTP_C1E_ACTIVE_MASK 0x18000000 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-snp.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-snp.h index 59b57a5f6524..f7280d5c6158 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-snp.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-snp.h @@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ struct __packed snp_page_state_change { #define RMP_X86_PG_LEVEL(level) (((level) == RMP_PG_SIZE_4K) ? PG_LEVEL_4K : PG_LEVEL_2M) #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT +#include <linux/jump_label.h> + static inline int __pvalidate(unsigned long vaddr, int rmp_psize, int validate, unsigned long *rflags) { @@ -93,6 +95,13 @@ void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr int snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages); int snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages); +extern struct static_key_false snp_enable_key; +static inline bool snp_key_active(void) +{ + return static_branch_unlikely(&snp_enable_key); +} + + #else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ static inline int __pvalidate(unsigned long vaddr, int psize, int validate, unsigned long *eflags) @@ -114,6 +123,7 @@ early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned i } static inline int snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages) { return 0; } static inline int snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages) { return 0; } +static inline bool snp_key_active(void) { return false; } #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index 35af2f21b8f1..39461b9cb34e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include <asm/msr.h> #include <asm/cmdline.h> #include <asm/sev-snp.h> +#include <linux/io.h> #include "mm_internal.h" @@ -44,12 +45,16 @@ u64 sev_check_data __section(".data") = 0; EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask); DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_enable_key); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enable_key); +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(snp_enable_key); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_enable_key); bool sev_enabled __section(".data"); /* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */ static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); +static unsigned long rmptable_start, rmptable_end; + /* * When SNP is active, this routine changes the page state from private to shared before * copying the data from the source to destination and restore after the copy. This is required @@ -528,3 +533,82 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(); } +static __init void snp_enable(void *arg) +{ + u64 val; + + rdmsrl_safe(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, &val); + + val |= MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_EN; + val |= MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN; + + wrmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, val); +} + +static __init int rmptable_init(void) +{ + u64 rmp_base, rmp_end; + unsigned long sz; + void *start; + u64 val; + + rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE, &rmp_base); + rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_RMP_END, &rmp_end); + + if (!rmp_base || !rmp_end) { + pr_info("SEV-SNP: Memory for the RMP table has not been reserved by BIOS\n"); + return 1; + } + + sz = rmp_end - rmp_base + 1; + + start = memremap(rmp_base, sz, MEMREMAP_WB); + if (!start) { + pr_err("SEV-SNP: Failed to map RMP table 0x%llx-0x%llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_end); + return 1; + } + + /* + * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen if we are coming from kexec boot. + * Do not initialize the RMP table when SEV-SNP is already. + */ + rdmsrl_safe(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, &val); + if (val & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_SNP_EN) + goto skip_enable; + + /* Initialize the RMP table to zero */ + memset(start, 0, sz); + + /* Flush the caches to ensure that data is written before we enable the SNP */ + wbinvd_on_all_cpus(); + + /* Enable the SNP feature */ + on_each_cpu(snp_enable, NULL, 1); + +skip_enable: + rmptable_start = (unsigned long)start; + rmptable_end = rmptable_start + sz; + + pr_info("SEV-SNP: RMP table physical address 0x%016llx - 0x%016llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_end); + + return 0; +} + +static int __init mem_encrypt_snp_init(void) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) + return 1; + + if (rmptable_init()) { + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP); + return 1; + } + + static_branch_enable(&snp_enable_key); + + return 0; +} +/* + * SEV-SNP must be enabled across all CPUs, so make the initialization as a late initcall. + */ +late_initcall(mem_encrypt_snp_init);
The memory integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). The RMP is a single data structure shared across the system that contains one entry for every 4K page of DRAM that may be used by SEV-SNP VMs. The goal of RMP is to track the owner of each page of memory. Pages of memory can be owned by the hypervisor, owned by a specific VM or owned by the AMD-SP. See APM2 section 15.36.3 for more detail on RMP. The RMP table is used to enforce access control to memory. The table itself is not directly writable by the software. New CPU instructions (RMPUPDATE, PVALIDATE, RMPADJUST) are used to manipulate the RMP entries. Based on the platform configuration, the BIOS reserves the memory used for the RMP table. The start and end address of the RMP table can be queried by reading the RMP_BASE and RMP_END MSRs. If the RMP_BASE and RMP_END are not set then we disable the SEV-SNP feature. The SEV-SNP feature is enabled only after the RMP table is successfully initialized. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/sev-snp.h | 10 ++++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 100 insertions(+)