| Message ID | 20201015211124.1187822-1-hegtvedt@cisco.com |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [v5.8/bluetooth] Bluetooth: Disconnect if E0 is used for Level 4 | expand |
On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 11:11:24PM +0200, Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt wrote: > From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> > > E0 is not allowed with Level 4: > > BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C page 1319: > > '128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys > required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed, > SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key > not shortened' > > SC enabled: > > > HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13 > Status: Success (0x00) > Handle: 256 > Page: 1/2 > Features: 0x0b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 > Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support) > LE Supported (Host) > Secure Connections (Host Support) > > HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4 > Status: Success (0x00) > Handle: 256 > Encryption: Enabled with AES-CCM (0x02) > > SC disabled: > > > HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13 > Status: Success (0x00) > Handle: 256 > Page: 1/2 > Features: 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 > Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support) > LE Supported (Host) > > HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4 > Status: Success (0x00) > Handle: 256 > Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01) > [May 8 20:23] Bluetooth: hci0: Invalid security: expect AES but E0 was used > < HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3 > Handle: 256 > Reason: Authentication Failure (0x05) > > Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> > (cherry picked from commit 8746f135bb01872ff412d408ea1aa9ebd328c1f5) > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.8 Any reason you didn't sign off on these backports? You should take the credit for them :) thanks, greg k-h
On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 11:11:24PM +0200, Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt wrote: > From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> > > E0 is not allowed with Level 4: <snip> Ok, I think I have queued up all of the backports you sent for bluetooth now, thanks! greg k-h
On 16/10/2020 09:25, Greg KH wrote: > On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 11:11:24PM +0200, Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt wrote: >> From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> >> >> E0 is not allowed with Level 4: >> >> BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C page 1319: >> >> '128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys >> required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed, >> SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key >> not shortened' >> >> SC enabled: >> >>> HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13 >> Status: Success (0x00) >> Handle: 256 >> Page: 1/2 >> Features: 0x0b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 >> Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support) >> LE Supported (Host) >> Secure Connections (Host Support) >>> HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4 >> Status: Success (0x00) >> Handle: 256 >> Encryption: Enabled with AES-CCM (0x02) >> >> SC disabled: >> >>> HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13 >> Status: Success (0x00) >> Handle: 256 >> Page: 1/2 >> Features: 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 >> Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support) >> LE Supported (Host) >>> HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4 >> Status: Success (0x00) >> Handle: 256 >> Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01) >> [May 8 20:23] Bluetooth: hci0: Invalid security: expect AES but E0 was used >> < HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3 >> Handle: 256 >> Reason: Authentication Failure (0x05) >> >> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> >> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> >> (cherry picked from commit 8746f135bb01872ff412d408ea1aa9ebd328c1f5) >> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.8 > > Any reason you didn't sign off on these backports? You should take the > credit for them :) I just cherry-pick (-: I have always reserved the sign off part for code change. Will make a note of that for the future. -- Best regards, Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt
diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h index da3728871e85..78970afa96f9 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h @@ -1402,11 +1402,13 @@ static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status) else encrypt = 0x01; - if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP) - conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW; + if (!status) { + if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP) + conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW; - if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level) - conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level; + if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level) + conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level; + } mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock); list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) { diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c index 307800fd18e6..b99b5c6de55a 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c @@ -1323,6 +1323,23 @@ int hci_conn_check_link_mode(struct hci_conn *conn) return 0; } + /* AES encryption is required for Level 4: + * + * BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C + * page 1319: + * + * 128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys + * required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed, + * SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key + * not shortened) + */ + if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS && + !test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags)) { + bt_dev_err(conn->hdev, + "Invalid security: Missing AES-CCM usage"); + return 0; + } + if (hci_conn_ssp_enabled(conn) && !test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags)) return 0; diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c index 6c6c9a81bee2..ff38f98988db 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -3068,27 +3068,23 @@ static void hci_encrypt_change_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags); + /* Check link security requirements are met */ + if (!hci_conn_check_link_mode(conn)) + ev->status = HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE; + if (ev->status && conn->state == BT_CONNECTED) { if (ev->status == HCI_ERROR_PIN_OR_KEY_MISSING) set_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_FAILURE, &conn->flags); + /* Notify upper layers so they can cleanup before + * disconnecting. + */ + hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, ev->status); hci_disconnect(conn, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE); hci_conn_drop(conn); goto unlock; } - /* In Secure Connections Only mode, do not allow any connections - * that are not encrypted with AES-CCM using a P-256 authenticated - * combination key. - */ - if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && - (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags) || - conn->key_type != HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256)) { - hci_connect_cfm(conn, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE); - hci_conn_drop(conn); - goto unlock; - } - /* Try reading the encryption key size for encrypted ACL links */ if (!ev->status && ev->encrypt && conn->type == ACL_LINK) { struct hci_cp_read_enc_key_size cp;