| Message ID | 20171208115502.21775-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [RFC] crypto: chacha20 - add implementation using 96-bit nonce | expand |
On Fri, Dec 08, 2017 at 11:55:02AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > As pointed out by Eric [0], the way RFC7539 was interpreted when creating > our implementation of ChaCha20 creates a risk of IV reuse when using a > little endian counter as the IV generator. The reason is that the low end > bits of the counter get mapped onto the ChaCha20 block counter, which > advances every 64 bytes. This means that the counter value that gets > selected as IV for the next input block will collide with the ChaCha20 > block counter of the previous block, basically recreating the same > keystream but shifted by 64 bytes. > > RFC7539 describes the inputs of the algorithm as follows: > > The inputs to ChaCha20 are: > > o A 256-bit key > > o A 32-bit initial counter. This can be set to any number, but will > usually be zero or one. It makes sense to use one if we use the > zero block for something else, such as generating a one-time > authenticator key as part of an AEAD algorithm. > > o A 96-bit nonce. In some protocols, this is known as the > Initialization Vector. > > o An arbitrary-length plaintext > > The solution is to use a fixed value of 0 for the initial counter, and > only expose a 96-bit IV to the upper layers of the crypto API. > > So introduce a new ChaCha20 flavor called chacha20-iv96, which takes the > above into account, and should become the preferred ChaCha20 > implementation going forward for general use. Note that there are two conflicting conventions for what inputs ChaCha takes. The original paper by Daniel Bernstein (https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf) says that the block counter is 64-bit and the nonce is 64-bit, thereby expanding the key into 2^64 randomly accessible streams, each containing 2^64 randomly accessible 64-byte blocks. The RFC 7539 convention is equivalent to seeking to a large offset (determined by the first 32 bits of the 96-bit nonce) in the keystream defined by the djb convention, but only if the 32-bit portion of the block counter never overflows. Maybe it is only RFC 7539 that matters because that is what is being standardized by the IETF; I don't know. But it confused me. Anyway, I actually thought it was intentional that the ChaCha implementations in the Linux kernel allowed specifying the block counter, and therefore allowed seeking to any point in the keystream, exposing the full functionality of the cipher. It's true that it's easily misused though, so there may nevertheless be value in providing a nonce-only variant. Eric
On 8 December 2017 at 22:17, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> wrote: > On Fri, Dec 08, 2017 at 11:55:02AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: >> As pointed out by Eric [0], the way RFC7539 was interpreted when creating >> our implementation of ChaCha20 creates a risk of IV reuse when using a >> little endian counter as the IV generator. The reason is that the low end >> bits of the counter get mapped onto the ChaCha20 block counter, which >> advances every 64 bytes. This means that the counter value that gets >> selected as IV for the next input block will collide with the ChaCha20 >> block counter of the previous block, basically recreating the same >> keystream but shifted by 64 bytes. >> >> RFC7539 describes the inputs of the algorithm as follows: >> >> The inputs to ChaCha20 are: >> >> o A 256-bit key >> >> o A 32-bit initial counter. This can be set to any number, but will >> usually be zero or one. It makes sense to use one if we use the >> zero block for something else, such as generating a one-time >> authenticator key as part of an AEAD algorithm. >> >> o A 96-bit nonce. In some protocols, this is known as the >> Initialization Vector. >> >> o An arbitrary-length plaintext >> >> The solution is to use a fixed value of 0 for the initial counter, and >> only expose a 96-bit IV to the upper layers of the crypto API. >> >> So introduce a new ChaCha20 flavor called chacha20-iv96, which takes the >> above into account, and should become the preferred ChaCha20 >> implementation going forward for general use. > > Note that there are two conflicting conventions for what inputs ChaCha takes. > The original paper by Daniel Bernstein > (https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf) says that the block counter is > 64-bit and the nonce is 64-bit, thereby expanding the key into 2^64 randomly > accessible streams, each containing 2^64 randomly accessible 64-byte blocks. > > The RFC 7539 convention is equivalent to seeking to a large offset (determined > by the first 32 bits of the 96-bit nonce) in the keystream defined by the djb > convention, but only if the 32-bit portion of the block counter never overflows. > > Maybe it is only RFC 7539 that matters because that is what is being > standardized by the IETF; I don't know. But it confused me. > The distinction only matters if you start the counter at zero (or one), because you 'lose' 32 bits of IV that will never be != 0 in practice if you use a 64-bit counter. So that argues for not exposing the block counter as part of the API, given that it should start at zero anyway, and that you should take care not to put colliding values in it. > Anyway, I actually thought it was intentional that the ChaCha implementations in > the Linux kernel allowed specifying the block counter, and therefore allowed > seeking to any point in the keystream, exposing the full functionality of the > cipher. It's true that it's easily misused though, so there may nevertheless be > value in providing a nonce-only variant. > Currently, the skcipher API does not allow such random access, so while I can see how that could be a useful feature, we can't really make use of it today. But more importantly, it still does not mean the block counter should be exposed to the /users/ of the skcipher API which typically encrypt/decrypt blocks that are much larger than 64 bytes.
On 8 December 2017 at 22:42, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote: > On 8 December 2017 at 22:17, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> wrote: >> On Fri, Dec 08, 2017 at 11:55:02AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: >>> As pointed out by Eric [0], the way RFC7539 was interpreted when creating >>> our implementation of ChaCha20 creates a risk of IV reuse when using a >>> little endian counter as the IV generator. The reason is that the low end >>> bits of the counter get mapped onto the ChaCha20 block counter, which >>> advances every 64 bytes. This means that the counter value that gets >>> selected as IV for the next input block will collide with the ChaCha20 >>> block counter of the previous block, basically recreating the same >>> keystream but shifted by 64 bytes. >>> >>> RFC7539 describes the inputs of the algorithm as follows: >>> >>> The inputs to ChaCha20 are: >>> >>> o A 256-bit key >>> >>> o A 32-bit initial counter. This can be set to any number, but will >>> usually be zero or one. It makes sense to use one if we use the >>> zero block for something else, such as generating a one-time >>> authenticator key as part of an AEAD algorithm. >>> >>> o A 96-bit nonce. In some protocols, this is known as the >>> Initialization Vector. >>> >>> o An arbitrary-length plaintext >>> >>> The solution is to use a fixed value of 0 for the initial counter, and >>> only expose a 96-bit IV to the upper layers of the crypto API. >>> >>> So introduce a new ChaCha20 flavor called chacha20-iv96, which takes the >>> above into account, and should become the preferred ChaCha20 >>> implementation going forward for general use. >> >> Note that there are two conflicting conventions for what inputs ChaCha takes. >> The original paper by Daniel Bernstein >> (https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf) says that the block counter is >> 64-bit and the nonce is 64-bit, thereby expanding the key into 2^64 randomly >> accessible streams, each containing 2^64 randomly accessible 64-byte blocks. >> >> The RFC 7539 convention is equivalent to seeking to a large offset (determined >> by the first 32 bits of the 96-bit nonce) in the keystream defined by the djb >> convention, but only if the 32-bit portion of the block counter never overflows. >> >> Maybe it is only RFC 7539 that matters because that is what is being >> standardized by the IETF; I don't know. But it confused me. >> > > The distinction only matters if you start the counter at zero (or > one), because you 'lose' 32 bits of IV that will never be != 0 in > practice if you use a 64-bit counter. > > So that argues for not exposing the block counter as part of the API, > given that it should start at zero anyway, and that you should take > care not to put colliding values in it. > >> Anyway, I actually thought it was intentional that the ChaCha implementations in >> the Linux kernel allowed specifying the block counter, and therefore allowed >> seeking to any point in the keystream, exposing the full functionality of the >> cipher. It's true that it's easily misused though, so there may nevertheless be >> value in providing a nonce-only variant. >> > > Currently, the skcipher API does not allow such random access, so > while I can see how that could be a useful feature, we can't really > make use of it today. But more importantly, it still does not mean the > block counter should be exposed to the /users/ of the skcipher API > which typically encrypt/decrypt blocks that are much larger than 64 > bytes. ... but now that I think of it, how is this any different from, say, AES in CTR mode? The counter is big endian, but apart from that, using IVs derived from a counter will result in the exact same issue, only with a shift of 16 bytes. That means using file block numbers as IV is simply inappropriate, and you should encrypt them first like is done for AES-CBC
On Fri, Dec 08, 2017 at 10:54:24PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > >> Note that there are two conflicting conventions for what inputs ChaCha takes. > >> The original paper by Daniel Bernstein > >> (https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf) says that the block counter is > >> 64-bit and the nonce is 64-bit, thereby expanding the key into 2^64 randomly > >> accessible streams, each containing 2^64 randomly accessible 64-byte blocks. > >> > >> The RFC 7539 convention is equivalent to seeking to a large offset (determined > >> by the first 32 bits of the 96-bit nonce) in the keystream defined by the djb > >> convention, but only if the 32-bit portion of the block counter never overflows. > >> > >> Maybe it is only RFC 7539 that matters because that is what is being > >> standardized by the IETF; I don't know. But it confused me. > >> > > > > The distinction only matters if you start the counter at zero (or > > one), because you 'lose' 32 bits of IV that will never be != 0 in > > practice if you use a 64-bit counter. > > > > So that argues for not exposing the block counter as part of the API, > > given that it should start at zero anyway, and that you should take > > care not to put colliding values in it. > > > >> Anyway, I actually thought it was intentional that the ChaCha implementations in > >> the Linux kernel allowed specifying the block counter, and therefore allowed > >> seeking to any point in the keystream, exposing the full functionality of the > >> cipher. It's true that it's easily misused though, so there may nevertheless be > >> value in providing a nonce-only variant. > >> > > > > Currently, the skcipher API does not allow such random access, so > > while I can see how that could be a useful feature, we can't really > > make use of it today. But more importantly, it still does not mean the > > block counter should be exposed to the /users/ of the skcipher API > > which typically encrypt/decrypt blocks that are much larger than 64 > > bytes. > > ... but now that I think of it, how is this any different from, say, > AES in CTR mode? The counter is big endian, but apart from that, using > IVs derived from a counter will result in the exact same issue, only > with a shift of 16 bytes. > > That means using file block numbers as IV is simply inappropriate, and > you should encrypt them first like is done for AES-CBC The problem with using a stream cipher --- whether that is ChaCha20, AES-CTR, or something else --- for disk/file encryption is that by necessity of file/disk encryption, each time the "same" block is written to, the IV is the same, which is really bad for stream ciphers (but not as bad for AES-XTS, AES-CBC, etc.). It's irrelevant whether you do ESSIV or otherwise encrypt the IVs. ESSIV does make the IV for each offset unpredictable by an attacker, which is desirable for AES-CBC, but it doesn't stop the IV from being repeated for each overwrite. And just to clarify, you definitely *can* seek to any position in the ChaCha20 stream using the existing ChaCha20 implementations and the existing skcipher API, simply by providing the appropriate IV. Maybe it was unintentional, but it does work. chacha20poly1305.c even uses it to start at block 1 instead of block 0. I don't know whether there are other users, though. Eric
On 8 December 2017 at 23:11, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> wrote: > On Fri, Dec 08, 2017 at 10:54:24PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: >> >> Note that there are two conflicting conventions for what inputs ChaCha takes. >> >> The original paper by Daniel Bernstein >> >> (https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf) says that the block counter is >> >> 64-bit and the nonce is 64-bit, thereby expanding the key into 2^64 randomly >> >> accessible streams, each containing 2^64 randomly accessible 64-byte blocks. >> >> >> >> The RFC 7539 convention is equivalent to seeking to a large offset (determined >> >> by the first 32 bits of the 96-bit nonce) in the keystream defined by the djb >> >> convention, but only if the 32-bit portion of the block counter never overflows. >> >> >> >> Maybe it is only RFC 7539 that matters because that is what is being >> >> standardized by the IETF; I don't know. But it confused me. >> >> >> > >> > The distinction only matters if you start the counter at zero (or >> > one), because you 'lose' 32 bits of IV that will never be != 0 in >> > practice if you use a 64-bit counter. >> > >> > So that argues for not exposing the block counter as part of the API, >> > given that it should start at zero anyway, and that you should take >> > care not to put colliding values in it. >> > >> >> Anyway, I actually thought it was intentional that the ChaCha implementations in >> >> the Linux kernel allowed specifying the block counter, and therefore allowed >> >> seeking to any point in the keystream, exposing the full functionality of the >> >> cipher. It's true that it's easily misused though, so there may nevertheless be >> >> value in providing a nonce-only variant. >> >> >> > >> > Currently, the skcipher API does not allow such random access, so >> > while I can see how that could be a useful feature, we can't really >> > make use of it today. But more importantly, it still does not mean the >> > block counter should be exposed to the /users/ of the skcipher API >> > which typically encrypt/decrypt blocks that are much larger than 64 >> > bytes. >> >> ... but now that I think of it, how is this any different from, say, >> AES in CTR mode? The counter is big endian, but apart from that, using >> IVs derived from a counter will result in the exact same issue, only >> with a shift of 16 bytes. >> >> That means using file block numbers as IV is simply inappropriate, and >> you should encrypt them first like is done for AES-CBC > > The problem with using a stream cipher --- whether that is ChaCha20, AES-CTR, or > something else --- for disk/file encryption is that by necessity of file/disk > encryption, each time the "same" block is written to, the IV is the same, which > is really bad for stream ciphers (but not as bad for AES-XTS, AES-CBC, etc.). > It's irrelevant whether you do ESSIV or otherwise encrypt the IVs. ESSIV does > make the IV for each offset unpredictable by an attacker, which is desirable for > AES-CBC, but it doesn't stop the IV from being repeated for each overwrite. > I'm not suggesting using an encrypted IV to fix the stream cipher issue, I'm well aware that that is impossible. What I am saying is that the counter collision can be mitigated by encrypting the IV. > And just to clarify, you definitely *can* seek to any position in the ChaCha20 > stream using the existing ChaCha20 implementations and the existing skcipher > API, simply by providing the appropriate IV. Maybe it was unintentional, but it > does work. chacha20poly1305.c even uses it to start at block 1 instead of block > 0. I don't know whether there are other users, though. > Well, I understand that that's how ChaCha20 works, and that you can manipulate the IV directly to start at another point in the keystream. AES-CTR can do exactly the same, for the same reason. What I am saying is that the skcipher API does not allow you to decrypt an arbitrary part of a block, which could benefit from the ability of not having to generate the entire key stream. So the more we discuss this, the more I think there is actually no difference with AES-CTR (apart from the block size), and there a similar enhancement in RFC3686 where the IV does not cover the AES block level counter, making it safe to use another counter to generate the IVs. Of course, this is essentially what you did for the fscrypt code, I just don't like seeing that kind of reasoning being implement in the crypto API client.
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote: > As pointed out by Eric [0], the way RFC7539 was interpreted when creating > our implementation of ChaCha20 creates a risk of IV reuse when using a > little endian counter as the IV generator. The reason is that the low end > bits of the counter get mapped onto the ChaCha20 block counter, which > advances every 64 bytes. This means that the counter value that gets > selected as IV for the next input block will collide with the ChaCha20 > block counter of the previous block, basically recreating the same > keystream but shifted by 64 bytes. As Eric pointed out for steram ciphers such as chacha20 our policy is to expose the raw IV in the base algorithm, and then layer more restrictive implementations on top that can then be used in different scenarios such as IPsec or disk encryption. For example, with CTR, ctr(aes) is the base algorithm and places no restrictions on the IV, while rfc3686(ctr(aes)) is the more restrictive version that's used by IPsec. Within the kernel I don't really see an issue with abuse because all users are hopefully reviewed by the community. If you're worried about incorrect use in user-space we could think about restricting access to these base implementations. For chacha20 we did not add a restrictive template because the primary user IPsec uses it only through AEAD where the IV restriction is in place. Cheers, -- Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c index cbdb75d15cd0..76a570058cc8 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static int chacha20_neon(struct skcipher_request *req) err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true); - crypto_chacha20_init(state, ctx, walk.iv); + crypto_chacha20_init(state, ctx, walk.iv, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm)); kernel_neon_begin(); while (walk.nbytes > 0) { @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int chacha20_neon(struct skcipher_request *req) return err; } -static struct skcipher_alg alg = { +static struct skcipher_alg alg[] = {{ .base.cra_name = "chacha20", .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-neon", .base.cra_priority = 300, @@ -104,19 +104,35 @@ static struct skcipher_alg alg = { .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, .encrypt = chacha20_neon, .decrypt = chacha20_neon, -}; +}, { + .base.cra_name = "chacha20-iv96", + .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-neon", + .base.cra_priority = 300, + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha20_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = CHACHA20_NONCE_SIZE, + .chunksize = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE, + .walksize = 4 * CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, + .encrypt = chacha20_neon, + .decrypt = chacha20_neon, +}}; static int __init chacha20_simd_mod_init(void) { if (!(elf_hwcap & HWCAP_ASIMD)) return -ENODEV; - return crypto_register_skcipher(&alg); + return crypto_register_skciphers(alg, ARRAY_SIZE(alg)); } static void __exit chacha20_simd_mod_fini(void) { - crypto_unregister_skcipher(&alg); + crypto_unregister_skciphers(alg, ARRAY_SIZE(alg)); } module_init(chacha20_simd_mod_init); @@ -125,3 +141,4 @@ module_exit(chacha20_simd_mod_fini); MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20-iv96"); diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20_glue.c index dce7c5d39c2f..44c7fe376a1d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20_glue.c @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int chacha20_simd(struct skcipher_request *req) err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true); - crypto_chacha20_init(state, ctx, walk.iv); + crypto_chacha20_init(state, ctx, walk.iv, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm)); kernel_fpu_begin(); @@ -116,6 +116,22 @@ static struct skcipher_alg alg = { .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, .encrypt = chacha20_simd, .decrypt = chacha20_simd, +}, { + .base.cra_name = "chacha20-iv96", + .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-simd", + .base.cra_priority = 300, + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha20_ctx), + .base.cra_alignmask = sizeof(u32) - 1, + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = CHACHA20_NONCE_SIZE, + .chunksize = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, + .encrypt = chacha20_simd, + .decrypt = chacha20_simd, }; static int __init chacha20_simd_mod_init(void) @@ -143,4 +159,5 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_AUTHOR("Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("chacha20 cipher algorithm, SIMD accelerated"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20-iv96"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20-simd"); diff --git a/crypto/chacha20_generic.c b/crypto/chacha20_generic.c index e451c3cb6a56..943acb92857e 100644 --- a/crypto/chacha20_generic.c +++ b/crypto/chacha20_generic.c @@ -35,7 +35,8 @@ static void chacha20_docrypt(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, } } -void crypto_chacha20_init(u32 *state, struct chacha20_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv) +void crypto_chacha20_init(u32 *state, struct chacha20_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv, + int ivsize) { state[0] = 0x61707865; /* "expa" */ state[1] = 0x3320646e; /* "nd 3" */ @@ -49,10 +50,10 @@ void crypto_chacha20_init(u32 *state, struct chacha20_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv) state[9] = ctx->key[5]; state[10] = ctx->key[6]; state[11] = ctx->key[7]; - state[12] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 0); - state[13] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 4); - state[14] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 8); - state[15] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 12); + state[12] = (ivsize > CHACHA20_NONCE_SIZE) ? get_unaligned_le32(iv) : 0; + state[13] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + ivsize - 12); + state[14] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + ivsize - 8); + state[15] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + ivsize - 4); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_chacha20_init); @@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ int crypto_chacha20_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req) err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true); - crypto_chacha20_init(state, ctx, walk.iv); + crypto_chacha20_init(state, ctx, walk.iv, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm)); while (walk.nbytes > 0) { unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes; @@ -99,7 +100,7 @@ int crypto_chacha20_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_chacha20_crypt); -static struct skcipher_alg alg = { +static struct skcipher_alg alg[] = {{ .base.cra_name = "chacha20", .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-generic", .base.cra_priority = 100, @@ -114,16 +115,32 @@ static struct skcipher_alg alg = { .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, .encrypt = crypto_chacha20_crypt, .decrypt = crypto_chacha20_crypt, -}; +}, { + .base.cra_name = "chacha20-iv96", + .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-generic", + .base.cra_priority = 100, + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha20_ctx), + .base.cra_alignmask = sizeof(u32) - 1, + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = CHACHA20_NONCE_SIZE, + .chunksize = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, + .encrypt = crypto_chacha20_crypt, + .decrypt = crypto_chacha20_crypt, +}}; static int __init chacha20_generic_mod_init(void) { - return crypto_register_skcipher(&alg); + return crypto_register_skciphers(alg, ARRAY_SIZE(alg)); } static void __exit chacha20_generic_mod_fini(void) { - crypto_unregister_skcipher(&alg); + crypto_unregister_skciphers(alg, ARRAY_SIZE(alg)); } module_init(chacha20_generic_mod_init); @@ -133,4 +150,5 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_AUTHOR("Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("chacha20 cipher algorithm"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20-iv96"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20-generic"); diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c index 29d7020b8826..ce87cc4f81b1 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.c +++ b/crypto/testmgr.c @@ -2563,6 +2563,15 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = { } } }, { + .alg = "chacha20-iv96", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = { + .enc = { .vecs = chacha20_enc_tv_template, .count = 1 }, + .dec = { .vecs = chacha20_enc_tv_template, .count = 1 }, + } + } + }, { .alg = "cmac(aes)", .fips_allowed = 1, .test = alg_test_hash, diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h index a714b6293959..4a5e5411e12c 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.h +++ b/crypto/testmgr.h @@ -32612,7 +32612,7 @@ static const struct cipher_testvec salsa20_stream_enc_tv_template[] = { }; static const struct cipher_testvec chacha20_enc_tv_template[] = { - { /* RFC7539 A.2. Test Vector #1 */ + { /* RFC7539 A.2. Test Vector #1 (shared with chacha20-iv96) */ .key = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha20.h b/include/crypto/chacha20.h index b83d66073db0..5db09213fe67 100644 --- a/include/crypto/chacha20.h +++ b/include/crypto/chacha20.h @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/crypto.h> +#define CHACHA20_NONCE_SIZE 12 #define CHACHA20_IV_SIZE 16 #define CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE 32 #define CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE 64 @@ -20,7 +21,8 @@ struct chacha20_ctx { }; void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u32 *stream); -void crypto_chacha20_init(u32 *state, struct chacha20_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv); +void crypto_chacha20_init(u32 *state, struct chacha20_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv, + int ivsize); int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keysize); int crypto_chacha20_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req);
As pointed out by Eric [0], the way RFC7539 was interpreted when creating our implementation of ChaCha20 creates a risk of IV reuse when using a little endian counter as the IV generator. The reason is that the low end bits of the counter get mapped onto the ChaCha20 block counter, which advances every 64 bytes. This means that the counter value that gets selected as IV for the next input block will collide with the ChaCha20 block counter of the previous block, basically recreating the same keystream but shifted by 64 bytes. RFC7539 describes the inputs of the algorithm as follows: The inputs to ChaCha20 are: o A 256-bit key o A 32-bit initial counter. This can be set to any number, but will usually be zero or one. It makes sense to use one if we use the zero block for something else, such as generating a one-time authenticator key as part of an AEAD algorithm. o A 96-bit nonce. In some protocols, this is known as the Initialization Vector. o An arbitrary-length plaintext The solution is to use a fixed value of 0 for the initial counter, and only expose a 96-bit IV to the upper layers of the crypto API. So introduce a new ChaCha20 flavor called chacha20-iv96, which takes the above into account, and should become the preferred ChaCha20 implementation going forward for general use. [0] https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=151269722430848&w=2 Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com> Cc: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Cc: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org> Cc: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> --- arch/arm64/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c | 27 +++++++++++--- arch/x86/crypto/chacha20_glue.c | 19 +++++++++- crypto/chacha20_generic.c | 38 ++++++++++++++------ crypto/testmgr.c | 9 +++++ crypto/testmgr.h | 2 +- include/crypto/chacha20.h | 4 ++- 6 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) -- 2.11.0